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I. INTRODUCTION 
The killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers in May 
2020 put the issue of police reform back into the national discussion and 
made Minnesota,1 at least during a brief window of time, confront its past 
on issues of racism and police abuse.2 The video showing Mr. Floyd 
                                                           
ǂ Professor of Law at Mitchell Hamline School of Law and Ad Hoc Counsel to the 
Minnesota-Dakota State Conference of the NAACP. The contents of this article represent 
my own personal views and not the views of either institution. This article builds from the 
testimony I presented in June 2020 at the Minnesota Legislature during a special legislative 
session to consider police reform legislation. I would like to thank Yusef Mgeni and 
Professors Mike Steenson and Angelique EagleWoman for their helpful comments and 
encouragement. I would also like to thank Emily Gullickson and Elizabeth Plaine for their 
excellent research assistance. 
1 National discussions on racism and police reform go back at least a century. As Dr. Kenneth 
Clark observed more than fifty years ago while testifying to the Kerner Commission: 
I read that report . . . of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were 
reading the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of 
1935, the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of 
1943, the report of the McCone Commission on the Watts riot. I must 
again in candor say to you members of this Commission—it is a kind of 
Alice in Wonderland with the same moving picture reshown over and 
over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same 
inaction. 
U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 265 (1968), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015000225410&view=1up&seq=287 
[https://perma.cc/JKY3-8ELM]. 
2 As the national press recognized, “The Twin Cities area has been an outsized part of the 
dialogue about the police use of force.” Jelani Cobb, The Death of George Floyd, in Context, 
NEW YORKER (May 28, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-death-
of-george-floyd-in-context [https://perma.cc/KZW7-RBLJ] (recounting past police killings in 
2
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pleading for his life while a Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck 
became an unprecedented catalyst for outrage.3 Even in the midst of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, massive protests and civil unrest spread from 
Minneapolis to all over the world.4 
Nationwide demonstrations and media attention put pressure on 
policymakers and police departments to make substantial changes. Police 
reform efforts appeared at every level of government. For instance, the New 
York Police Department announced that it would disband its notorious 
plainclothes anti-crime unit.5 Likewise, a majority of the Minneapolis City 
Council vowed to “begin the process of ending the Minneapolis Police 
Department.”6 By summer’s end, Iowa, Delaware, Utah, and Nevada passed 
                                                           
Minnesota); see also infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text (discussing two of the most 
significant events in Minnesota history). 
3 Within six weeks of the killing, nearly ten percent of Americans reported participating in 
demonstrations over the death of Mr. Floyd and others. Jugal K. Patel, Quoctrung Bui, & 
Larry Buchanan, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-
protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/EG7B-3E7J]. By early July 2020, more than 40% 
of all counties in the United States had at least one protest related to the killing. Id. 
4 See generally Borzou Daragahi, Why the George Floyd Protests Went Global, ATL. 
COUNCIL (June 10, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/george-floyd-
protests-world-racism/ [https://perma.cc/C74Y-FZRF] (“Solidarity marches and gatherings 
took place from Sydney to Beirut to Istanbul to London to Berlin. . . . [R]arely if ever has 
one incident inspired such a broad global movement. Attention has focused not just on the 
United States and its abuses but also on entire systems of power, racism, and oppression, 
which have come under scrutiny and criticism in what amounts to a global teach-in.”). 
5 Ali Watkins, N.Y.P.D. Disbands Plainclothes Units Involved in Many Shootings, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/nyregion/nypd-plainclothes-
cops.html [https://perma.cc/A6BH-M4LW]. As Commissioner of Police Dermot Shea 
acknowledged, “the anti-crime units were a vestige of the city’s era of ‘stop-and-frisk,’ when 
officers routinely searched people in high-crime areas, a practice that a judge declared 
unconstitutional after finding it disproportionately affected [P]eople of [C]olor.” Id.; see also 
George Joseph & Lilam Quigley, Plainclothes NYPD Cops Are Involved in a Staggering 
Number of Killings, THE INTERCEPT (May 9, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/05/09/saheed-vassell-nypd-plain-clothes/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KT6-D398] (“[P]lainclothes officers, estimated to be around 6 percent 
of the force, account for 31 percent of all fatal shooting incidents.”). 
6 Liz Navratil, Most of Minneapolis City Council Pledges to ‘Begin the Process of Ending’ 
Police Department, STAR TRIB. (June 8, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.startribune.com/mpls-
council-majority-backs-dismantling-police-department/571088302/ [https://perma.cc/4LAF-
B8X8]. The Council also voted unanimously to submit a proposal to voters to abolish the 
police department and create a new “Department of Community Safety and Violence 
Prevention.” Liz Navratil, Minneapolis City Council Votes Unanimously for Proposal that 
Could Replace Police Department, STAR TRIB. (June 27, 2020, 3:49 PM), 
https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-city-council-votes-unanimously-for-proposal-that-
could-replace-police-department/571504662/ [https://perma.cc/P5CB-B8X3]; see also 
Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance Amending Article VII of the City Charter Relating to 
Administration and Article VIII of the City Charter Relating to Officers and Other 
Employees, Pertaining to the Creation of a New Charter Department to Provide for 
3
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legislation banning choke holds,7 and Colorado enacted broad changes that 
could serve as a model for Minnesota and other states.8 Meanwhile, the 
United States House of Representatives passed a bipartisan bill that 
“mark[ed] one of the most comprehensive efforts in modern times to re-
imagine law enforcement departments across the country.”9 
In Minnesota, Governor Tim Walz called a special session of the 
Minnesota Legislature less than two weeks after Mr. Floyd’s killing to 
                                                           
Community Safety and Violence Prevention, and the Removal of the Police Department as 
a Charter Department 1–2 (June 27, 2020), 
https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/File/3882/MPD%20Charter%20Amendment%
20Articles%20VII%20and%20Article%20VIII.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JMY-FLT7] 
(proposing the removal of the police department). 
7 Legislative Responses for Policing–State Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/legislative-responses-for-policing.aspx [https://perma.cc/TRN4-CYUS]; Sam Metz, 
Nevada Passes Policing Bills, Including a Ban on Chokeholds, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 1, 
2020), https://apnews.com/article/legislature-nevada-police-police-reform-minneapolis-
4338a49fb5281132520df77392f0872f [https://perma.cc/ZP8K-DSYJ]. More than 375 bills 
on police reform were introduced in thirty-two states in the two months following Floyd’s 
death. Holly Bailey & Timothy Bella, Police Reform Bill Passed by Minnesota Legislature 
Doesn’t Go Far Enough, Critics Say, WASH. POST (July 22, 2020, 10:05 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-reform-bill-passed-by-minnesota-
legislature-doesnt-go-far-enough-critics-say/2020/07/21/3d23b602-cba7-11ea-91f1-
28aca4d833a0_story.html [https://perma.cc/7VU7-UJNC]. “‘This kind of rapid response from 
legislators, on this type of issue particularly, is not something I’ve ever seen previously,’ [said] Amber 
Widgery, a program principal on criminal justice issues at the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.” Alan Suderman, States Race to Pass Policing Reforms After George Floyd’s 
Death, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 8, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.startribune.com/states-race-to-
pass-policing-reforms-after-floyd-s-death/572051772/ [https://perma.cc/6MBR-G5QA]. 
8 See Jesse Paul & Jennifer Brown, Colorado Governor Signs Sweeping Accountability Bill 
into Law. Here’s How It Will Change Law Enforcement, COLO. SUN (June 19, 2020, 9:53 
AM), https://coloradosun.com/2020/06/19/colorado-police-accountability-bill-becomes-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/KKB5-D9SP]; see also infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text 
(describing the Colorado legislation and its potential application in Minnesota). 
9 Claudia Grisales, House Approves Police Reform Bill, but Issue Stalled Amid Partisan 
Standoff, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 25, 2020, 8:44 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/25/883263263/house-approves-police-reform-bill-but-issue-
stalled-amid-partisan-standoff [https://perma.cc/95PJ-TVLB]. The media considered the 
House bill “the most sweeping federal intervention into law enforcement in years.” Cate 
Edmondson, House Passes Sweeping Policing Bill Targeting Racial Bias and Use of Force, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/politics/house-police-
overhaul-bill.html [https://perma.cc/PMA6-CY8Z]. Unfortunately, and not surprisingly, the 
Senate did not accept the House bill, and instead proposed its own bill that Democrats found 
“so threadbare and lacking in substance that it does not even provide a proper baseline for 
negotiations.” Letter from Cory A. Booker, U.S. Sen., Kamala D. Harris, U.S. Sen., and 
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address “the need for systemic police accountability and reform in 
Minnesota.”10 However, despite promises for “sweeping changes,” the 
legislature failed to reach an agreement during the first special session.11 
During the second special session, however, approximately one month later, 
legislators found more success. After weeks of negotiations, the legislature 
overwhelmingly passed perhaps the most expansive police reforms in the 
state’s history and substantially more than any other state had accomplished 
up to that point, other than Colorado.12 The new legislation included: a 
statewide ban on choke holds; including the kind of neck restraint used on Mr. 
Floyd; a prohibition on warrior-style training for officers; enhanced data 
collection around deadly force encounters; a requirement that officers intervene 
when witnessing excessive force by other officers; and the creation of a new state 
unit to investigate police killings, among other changes.13 
The final reform bill, however, left considerable work to be done, 
particularly given the depth of policing problems in Minnesota. Governor Walz 
acknowledged that the law was “only the beginning” and that “[t]he work 
                                                           
10 TIM WALZ, GOV. OF MINN., PROCLAMATION FOR SPECIAL SESSION 2020 (June 10, 2020), 
https://mn.gov/governor/assets/06.10.2020%20Special%20Session%20Proclamation%20fin
al_tcm1055-435510.pdf [https://perma.cc/D534-KMLD]. 
11 Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Jack Healy, Minnesota Lawmakers Vowed Police Reform. 
They Couldn’t Agree on Any, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/us/minnesota-police-george-floyd.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9F7-LD9P]. Not only was Minnesota the “focal point for nationwide fury 
and grief over police killings and racism,” it was also the only one in the country where 
Democrats control one chamber and Republicans the other. Id. “State lawmakers’ initial 
efforts to pass police reform collapsed weeks earlier amid partisan bickering between 
Democrats who called on lawmakers to embrace the urgency of the moment vs. Republicans 
who accused them of trying to defund the police.” Bailey & Bella, supra note 7. 
12 Briana Bierschbach, Minnesota Lawmakers Pass Sweeping Package of Police 
Accountability Measures, STAR TRIB. (July 21, 2020, 4:18 PM), 
https://www.startribune.com/state-lawmakers-strike-deal-on-police-reform-
proposals/571833891/ [https://perma.cc/Z4AZ-RFFT] (reporting the House approved the 
measure 102 to 29, and the Senate passed it 60 to 7); see also Bailey & Bella, supra note 7 
(“Supporters described the legislation that was passed as the most expansive criminal justice 
reforms in the state’s history.”). As Minnesota Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington 
said, “When I look at the laws that have been passed in other states for police reform, most of it 
comes down to banning chokeholds and some duty to intervene . . . I think this is far broader and 
goes far deeper than that. I think we did really good work.” Jennifer Bjorhus & Torey Van Oot, 
Responses to Minnesota’s Police Reforms Range from Lukewarm to ‘Slap in the Face’, STAR 
TRIB. (July 22, 2020, 12:34 AM), https://www.startribune.com/reactions-to-police-reforms-
go-from-lukewarm-to-slap-in-face/571853831/ [https://perma.cc/K324-5FFP]. 
13 See Bierschbach, supra note 12 (detailing the bill’s provisions). The new legislation also 
“boosts funding for crisis intervention training, creates a panel of expert arbitrators to handle police 
misconduct cases, and establishes incentives for officers to live in the communities they police.” Id. 
5
Hilbert: Improving Police Officer Accountability in Minnesota: Three Propo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2020] IMPROVING POLICE OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 227 
does not end today.”14 Many legislators considered the bill only a first step.15 
Indeed, the final bill represented significant compromises from the initial 
proposals considered by the House of Representatives.16 Several lawmakers 
publicly declared that the bill was “insufficient” but voted for it anyway.17 
Others raised concern about the lack of public input and the nature of the 
final negotiations.18 Many community leaders criticized the legislation and 
spoke out for further action.19 
The legislation passed last summer reflects both the speed with 
which legislators acted and the substantial amount of work still left to be 
done. In the past, Minnesota has shown its capacity to respond to shocking 
acts of violence with strong legislation. Almost exactly one hundred years 
before Mr. Floyd’s killing, three African American men, Elias Clayton, 
Elmer Jackson, and Isaac McGhie, were lynched by a mob of thousands of 
White people in Duluth while police stood by and failed to do anything to 
stop them, having ignored clear warnings of the planned lynchings from 
earlier in the day.20 Within one year, the Minnesota Legislature responded 
with arguably the strongest anti-lynching legislation in the United States at 
the time, becoming one of the first states to ban lynching altogether.21 Now, 
                                                           
14 Bailey & Bella, supra note 7. 
15 State Rep. Rena Moran, the DFL co-chairwoman of the People of Color and Indigenous 
(POCI) Caucus at the Legislature promised, “It is only the beginning.” Bjorhus & Van Oot, 
supra note 12. 
16 Bailey & Bella, supra note 7 (“Democrats dropped several items they had pursued, 
including the restoration of voting rights to felons and a measure that would have put the 
state attorney general in charge of prosecuting police killings.”). 
17 Id. According to State Sen. Jeff Hayden, “‘While this bill sets the groundwork for the work 
that we know needs to continue after this, the conversation cannot and will not end there 
with the passage of this bill . . . There’s a lot of work to protect [B]lack bodies.’” Id. 
18 Sen. Hayden also raised concerns about how the final bill was negotiated, stating that there 
could have been more conversation on policing legislation: “‘Instead we got a closed-door 
deal in the middle of the night with no public input,’ he said.” Walker Orenstein & Peter 
Callaghan, The Legislature Just Passed a Police Reform Bill. What It Does—and Doesn’t 




19 Steven Belton, President and CEO of the Urban League Twin Cities, felt that “this 
legislation represents the low-hanging fruit, . . . [but we have] richer, higher fruit that needs 
to be harvested.” Bjorhus & Van Oot, supra note 12. Local civil rights leader and President 
of Communities United Against Police Brutality Michelle Gross called the bill “mediocre” 
with “a lot of extra garbage that we don’t need.” Id. 
20 The Executive Committee, NAACP Stands for Justice, NAACP DULUTH, MN BRANCH 
(June 4, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://duluthnaacp.org/news/9016060 [https://perma.cc/7NE6-
VH6M]; see also Ann Juergens, Lena Olive Smith: A Minnesota Civil Rights Pioneer, 28 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 397, 417 (2001). 
21 See Juergens, supra note 20, at 417; see also Meagan Flynn, Century after Minnesota 
Lynchings, Black Man Convicted of Rape ‘Because of His Race’ up for Pardon, WASH. 
6
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the State of Minnesota must answer the call again to confront what has 
happened in the hundred years since then. 
The century between the anti-lynching bill and last summer’s 
legislation was largely marked by decades of inaction, while police violence 
and abuse of power went largely unabated.22 In fact, over the past several 
years, being killed by the police has become a leading cause of death 
amongst young men of color.23 Nearly 200 people in Minnesota were killed 
by the police between 2000 and 2020.24 And yet, “the cycle of police brutality 
and racism has been met with cosmetic tinkering instead of substantive 
structural change.”25 The public protests in Minnesota and nationwide were 
a response not only to unjust policing of marginalized communities in 
particular, they “are a cry for action to public officials for real change, writ 
large.”26 
                                                           
POST. (June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/12/duluth-
lynchings-mason-pardon/ [https://perma.cc/N6SS-8F9V] (exploring the history of the Duluth 
lynchings and their aftermath, including the NAACP Duluth office and anti-lynching 
legislation); Michael J. Nolan, Defendant, Lynch Thyself: A California Appellate Court Goes 
from the Sublime to the Ridiculous in People v. Anthony J., 4 HOW. SCROLL: SOC. JUST. L. 
REV. 53, 69–70 (2001) (providing a historical review of state anti-lynching legislation). 
22 See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text (describing the past several decades of 
multiple studies and little actual reform). 
23 Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee, & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of 
Force in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. 
OF SCI. 16793, 16796 (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6708348/ [https://perma.cc/99P7-78DV] 
(“Police violence is a leading cause of death for young men, and young Men of Color face 
exceptionally high risk of being killed by police.”); see also Amina Khan, Getting Killed by 
Police Is a Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men in America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 
2019), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2019-08-15/police-shootings-are-a-leading-
cause-of-death-for-black-men [https://perma.cc/8P4Y-87NA] (reporting that Black men and 
boys are 2.5 times more likely than White men and boys to die during an encounter with 
police officers). 
24 Jeff Hargarten, Jennifer Bjorhus, MaryJo Webster, & Kelly Smith, Every Police-Involved 
Death in Minnesota Since 2000, STAR TRIB. (updated Oct. 2, 2020), 
https://www.startribune.com/fatal-police-encounters-since-2000/502088871/ 
[https://perma.cc/AMQ3-7FY9] (database of all who have “died after a physical confrontation 
with law enforcement in Minnesota since January 2000” through October 2, 2020). 
25 Letter from Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. to U.S. House of Rep. and U.S. Sen. 




26 Id. (including nearly 500 national organizations’ signatures, along with the NAACP). 
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While there are many tools available for police reform,27 this article 
focuses on options available to the Minnesota State Legislature.28 The legal 
system, in general, has fallen short of its obligations to curb police violence 
in three ways. First, federal civil rights laws designed to incentivize better 
police behavior and provide remedies to victims of police abuse have been 
deeply undermined by the United States Supreme Court.29 In particular, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “§ 1983”),30 “the primary weapon used by civil 
                                                           
27 Other options could include political structures, such as civilian review boards; 
technological advances, like body cameras; and structural reforms, such as recalibrating 
police budgets to provide more social workers. See generally PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST 
CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DM6R-FEZZ] [hereafter PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST 
CENTURY POLICING] (explaining how President Obama charged the task force with 
“identifying best practices and offering recommendations on how policing practices can 
promote effective crime reduction while building public trust”); POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 5 (2016), 
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WJ5V-VJMU] [hereafter PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES] (compiling the 
“latest thinking on police use-of-force issues from the perspective of many of the nation’s 
leading police executives”); LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., NEW ERA OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY: A GUIDE TO FAIR, SAFE, AND EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY POLICING, at xvii (2019), 
https://civilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Policing_Full_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T27Y-VX4X] (explaining that the report “draws from the policies and 
practices of departments across the country that have adopted innovative reforms, informed 
by experience, community feedback, and expert advice, to address long-standing 
challenges”). 
28 Reform at the police department level can be important, but state-wide change is necessary. 
The issues are not just about the Minneapolis Police or the metropolitan area. Over the past 
five years, sixty percent of more than 100 cases regarding excessive use of force that resulted in 
death or injury took place outside the metro area. See Briana Bierschbach, George Floyd Killing 
Triggers Examination of Minnesota Law on Police Deadly Force, STAR TRIB. (June 17, 
2020, 10:24 PM), https://www.startribune.com/floyd-killing-triggers-examination-of-
minnesota-law-on-police-deadly-force/571329622/ [https://perma.cc/7K83-JW8R] (citing 
Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington). From 2007 to 2017, Minnesota 
jurisdictions across the State made over 900 payouts to citizens for alleged misconduct 
totaling over $60 million, and the number is increasing from an average of fifty payouts per 
year to nearly 100 payouts per year. Randy Furst & MaryJo Webster, Minnesota Cities, 
Counties Paid $60.8 Million in Police Misconduct Claims in Past Decade, STAR TRIB. (April 
15, 2018, 7:43 AM), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-cities-counties-paid-60-8m-in-
police-misconduct-claims-in-past-decade/479781413/ [https://perma.cc/728V-BBEB]. 
29 See infra notes 158–85 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s efforts 
undermining § 1983); see also Hon. Lynn Adelman, The Erosion of Civil Rights and What 
to Do About it, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) (“The Supreme Court, however, under Chief 
Justices Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts, has been dominated by 
conservatives for almost half a century and, since Monroe, the Court has been hostile to the 
statute, continuously narrowing it and imposing restrictions on civil rights plaintiffs.”). 
30 Section 1983 provides in relevant part,  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
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rights lawyers to remedy police abuse,”31 has been the subject of incremental 
attacks from the Court for sixty years. Specifically, the judicially-constructed 
doctrine of “qualified immunity”—a concept not specifically mentioned in 
the text of § 198332—has expanded to the point of nearly swallowing whole 
any chances plaintiffs once had of vindicating rights under § 1983.33  
Second, in those cases that actually impose civil liability on officers 
who abuse their power, the deterrent effects of § 1983 have been undercut 
by a second development: the near-universal indemnification of police 
officers by taxpayers.34 Even if officers are found guilty of § 1983 violations 
in civil court and ordered to pay damages, the officers often pay nothing at 
all.35 Regardless of how egregious their violations of constitutional law, 
officers face little or no financial consequence whatsoever.36 
 Third, hardly any officers are ever charged, much less convicted, 
in cases of police-involved killings.37 State criminal laws still lag behind what 
                                                           
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1996). 
31 Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in 
Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1504 (1993). 
32 The Court itself acknowledged that the text of § 1983 has no explicit mention of any 
immunities. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163 (1992) (“§ 1983 creates a species of tort 
liability that on its face admits of no immunities.”); see also infra notes 164–85 and 
accompanying text (explaining the origin and development of qualified immunity in § 1983 
jurisprudence). 
33 Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-
court-protects-bad-cops.html [https://perma.cc/9PDY-5VSE] (“[T]he [C]ourt has made it 
very difficult, and often impossible, to hold police officers and the governments that employ 
them accountable for civil rights violations. This undermines the ability to deter illegal police 
behavior and leaves victims without compensation. When the police kill or injure innocent 
people, the victims rarely have recourse.”). 
34 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 961 (2014) (reporting 
the results of her nationwide study of police departments and concluding that “officers are 
virtually always indemnified” for judgments and settlements). 
35 Id. at 890 (finding that “governments satisfied settlements and judgments in full even when 
officers were disciplined or terminated by the department or criminally prosecuted for their 
conduct”). 
36 Id. at 923. One example is particularly telling. The City of Denver paid $885,000 to settle 
a lawsuit where one of its officers stomped on the back of a teenage boy while using a fence 
for leverage, breaking his ribs and causing him to suffer kidney damage and a lacerated liver. 
Id. Although the officer was criminally charged (and acquitted), the city covered the entire 
settlement. Id. 
37 Shalia Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause Death Are Charged or Convicted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/police-killings-prosecution-
charges.html [https://perma.cc/6LH7-W7PM] (“Union protections that shield police officers 
9
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many police departments already require.38 Statutes defining deadly use of 
force focus exclusively on the officer’s state of mind and neglect the officer’s 
conduct during the situation that led to the use of deadly force.39 While 
Minnesota actually included some improvements to its deadly use-of-force 
statute last summer, the law in Minnesota still focuses entirely on the 
moment that deadly force was used rather than what officers could have 
done to prevent the situation from arising at all.40 
This article responds to each of these problems with three specific 
legislative proposals based on similar ideas from community activists, 
academics, legislators, and other states. For example, in response to the 
limited effectiveness of § 1983, Colorado recently enacted a state-based 
equivalent.41 Its new law explicitly denies accused officers the protection of 
qualified immunity while providing the benefits afforded plaintiffs under the 
federal act, including attorney’s fees.42 In response to the near-universal 
indemnification of officers, community activists have been pushing the idea 
                                                           
from timely investigation, legal standards that give them the benefit of the doubt, and a 
tendency to take officers at their word have added up to few convictions and little prison time 
for officers who kill.”). 
38 For example, Minnesota’s state statutory standards for deadly use of force are less restrictive 
than those of local law enforcement. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICY 
MANUAL § 5-301, at III.B.3 (2020) (“Officers shall not use deadly force except in accordance 
with MN Statute § 609.066, and [adding] even in those circumstances officers shall first 
consider all reasonable alternatives including less lethal measures, before using deadly 
force.”). St. Paul requires its officers to first try to de-escalate the conflict and limits authorized 
use of force to situations involving an “imminent” threat. ST. PAUL POLICE DEP’T, POLICY 
MANUAL § 246.01, at IV (de-escalation), § 246.00, at VII.B (2020). 
39 See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, 
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 637 (2018) 
(“Existing statutes on police use of deadly force tend to focus on the reasonableness of the 
officer’s belief in the need to use force.”). 
40 See MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 2(b) (effective March 1, 2021) (authorizing deadly use 
of force only “if an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the benefit of hindsight, that such 
force is necessary . . . to protect the peace officer or another from death or great bodily 
harm”).  
41 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 (2020) (stating that a police officer who “under color 
of law” deprives any person of rights protected under Article II of the Colorado State 
Constitution “is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable or any other appropriate 
relief”); see also Russell Berman, The State Where Protests Have Already Forced Major 
Police Reform, THE ATLANTIC (July 17, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/07/police-reform-law-colorado/614269/ 
[https://perma.cc/9P8T-GGD2] (reporting how, after gunshots had been fired into the crowd 
during a protest just outside the state capitol, State Rep. Leslie Herod told her fellow 
Democrats, “I don’t want a card. I don’t want any niceties. I want a bill, and I need your 
support to get a bill introduced that addresses these concerns.”). 
42 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 (2)(b) & (4) (2020). The Act also limits liability caps 
and other immunities. See id. at (2)(a) (“Statutory immunities and statutory limitations on 
liability, damages, or attorney feeds do not apply to claims brought pursuant to this section.”). 
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of professional liability insurance for officers for years. Last summer, several 
state representatives drafted actual legislation.43 While that bill did not pass, 
it is at least a template for future legislation.44 Lastly, Professor Cynthia Lee 
drafted a model use of force statute with provisions that address many gaps 
that persist within Minnesota’s deadly use of force statute after the police 
reform bill passed last summer, namely covering pre-seizure conduct and 
whether officers attempted to de-escalate the situation before using deadly 
force.45 
Minnesota can build on each of these three ideas to create 
legislative reforms targeting current weaknesses in the law around police 
accountability. Minnesota’s past provides important context for the urgency 
of additional reform in this area.46 Part II of this article provides background 
on the racist and problematic history of policing in Minnesota and the many 
reports and studies that have both condemned the State’s lack of action and 
proposed specific steps that could have helped, but were never taken.47 
Part III of this article details the three specific legislative proposals 
recommended to address the problems discussed above. First, Minnesota 
should enact a state-based civil rights statute modeled on federal § 1983, but 
with explicit restrictions on qualified immunity.48 Second, Minnesota should 
enact a complete change to the current model of officer indemnification and 
require that officers carry their own professional liability insurance, just like 
lawyers and doctors do, to leverage market-based accountability forces.49 
Third, Minnesota should amend its current statute on police use of deadly 
force to include consideration of what an officer does or does not do that 
contributes to the circumstances leading to the deadly use of force.50 
                                                           
43 H.R. 87, 2020 Leg., 2d Spec. Sess., at 1–3 (Minn. 2020), 
http://wdoc.house.leg.state.mn.us/leg/LS91/2_2020/HF0087.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X3MR-46RB]. 
44 See generally Judy Greenwald, Group Presses for Police Insurance Reform; Minneapolis 
Self-Insured, BUS. INS.: RISK MGMT. (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200610/NEWS06/912335052/Group-
presses-for-police-insurance-reform-Minneapolis-self-insured# [https://perma.cc/CC68-
XTU8] (providing background on the discussions about policies that would require police 
officers to carry liability insurance). 
45 See Lee, supra note 39, at 664–65 (detailing model statute provisions on police officers’ 
use of deadly force). Professor Lee hopes that such changes may encourage police “to act 
with more care before using deadly force.” See id. at 638 (“Reforming the law in a way that 
encourages the use of deadly force only when it is proportionate and necessary can provide 
a useful counter to [officers’ natural] self-preservation instinct.”). 
46 JOHN D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND EXECUTIONS IN MINNESOTA 
229 (2003) (“[T]he violent legacy left behind by state-sanctioned and extrajudicial killings in 
Minnesota must never be forgotten.”). 
47 See infra Part II. 
48 See infra Section III.A. 
49 See infra Section III.B. 
50 See infra Section III.C. 
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II. MINNESOTA’S PAST AND PRESENT: RACISM AND POLICE 
ABUSE FOLLOWED BY STUDIES AND INACTION 
A. Minnesota History 
Despite its progressive image,51 Minnesota has a long history of 
racial oppression and police violence.52 Two examples illustrate this point: 
the largest mass execution in American history and the northernmost 
lynching on record both occurred in Minnesota.53 
1. The Largest Mass Execution in the Country 
As far back as its inception, Minnesota used its military power and 
the criminal justice system to remove, exclude, and in many cases, murder 
the populations of Indigenous communities that were already living in 
Minnesota when Europeans first arrived.54 Governor Alexander Ramsey 
                                                           
51 Minnesota was recently rated as the second most liberal state in the country. The Hill Staff, 
How Red or Blue is Your State?, THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/house-races/221721-how-red-or-blue-is-your-state 
[https://perma.cc/EMD8-55EA]. The Democratic candidate has won Minnesota in eleven 
straight presidential elections making it the longest active Democratic streak in the country 
for any state, whereas no Republican has won any statewide election in Minnesota since 2006 
(including senator, governor, and even state auditor). Nathaniel Rakich, Why Minnesota 
Could Be the Next Midwestern State to Go Red, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 31, 2020, 7:00 
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-minnesota-could-be-the-next-midwestern-
state-to-go-red/ [https://perma.cc/VHZ2-JZ9V]; see also Briana Bierschbach, Why Is 
Minnesota More Liberal Than Its Neighboring States?, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:00 
AM), https://www.startribune.com/why-is-minnesota-more-liberal-than-its-neighboring-
states/569326221/ [https://perma.cc/GTQ5-HE24] (noting that “the merger between the 
Democratic Party and the more left-wing Farmer-Labor Party created the Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Party (DFL) in 1944, giving a home to liberal voters and helping to solidify a progressive 
streak in the state”). 
52 See infra notes 67–87 and accompanying text (reporting on studies conducted over the past 
five decades).  
53 Another stain on Minnesota’s history is its role in slavery and slavery’s role in the early 
financial enterprises of the new state. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. LEHMAN, SLAVERY’S 
REACH: SOUTHERN SLAVEHOLDERS IN THE NORTH STAR STATE 6 (explaining how 
“Minnesotans allowed illegal slaveholding in their communities and benefited from it. . . . 
Southern dollars from slave plantations helped Minnesota’s businesses, communities, and 
institutions to develop, and Minnesotans disregarded federal law in order to keep the money 
flowing.”); see also John D. Bessler, What I Think About When I Think About the Death 
Penalty, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 784 (2018) (writing about Minnesota, “Examples of 
miscarriages of justice are, in reality, incredibly easy to find—and they can often be found 
close to home.”). 
54 Waziyatawin, Ph.D., Colonial Calibrations: The Expendability of Minnesota’s Original 
People, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 450, 455 (2013) (“The United States unilaterally 
abrogated our treaties, stole our Minnesota homeland, imprisoned our people in 
concentration camps, force-marched our women and children, mass-lynched our warriors, 
mass-incarcerated our able-bodied men, ethnically-cleansed us from Minnesota, and then 
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made clear his intentions in an appearance before the Minnesota State 
Legislature in the fall of 1862, stating that the Dakota peoples “must be 
exterminated or driven forever beyond the borders of the State.”55 Later that 
year, on December 26, at the conclusion of the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862, 
and at the direction of state leaders, thirty-eight Dakota men were hanged 
simultaneously from a massive scaffold that had been constructed expressly 
for the mass execution. 56 Minnesota had initially wanted to hang more than 
300 men, but President Lincoln decided to reduce the number.57 Despite 
the “highly suspect” circumstances under which most of those sentenced to 
death had been convicted, President Lincoln decided to carry out the mass 
execution of the thirty-eight men.58 
                                                           
instituted further policies of genocide, including a bounty system on Dakota scalps.”); see 
also Colette Routel, Minnesota Bounties on Dakota Men During the U.S.-Dakota War of 
1862, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (chronicling the state-ordered bounty system 
“as part of a much broader extermination program that was at the heart of federal Indian 
policy during this time period”). 
55 Waziyatawin, supra note 54, at 459. 
56 Angelique EagleWoman (Wambdi A. Was’teWinyan), Wintertime for the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations by the 
United States and the Need for a Reconciliation Involving International Indigenous Human 
Rights Norms, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 486, 517 (2013). For a detailed recounting of the 
events leading up to the war and the atrocities committed against the Dakota peoples during 
and after the war, see id. at 506–19. 
57 Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 13, 32 (1990). Lincoln faced strong resistance from many Minnesotans who 
were outraged that he was reducing the number to be hanged. See, e.g., id. at 29–30 
(describing newspaper headlines and an open letter to the President from “the citizens of St. 
Paul” predicting vengeance by the settlers). 
58 Lenor A. Scheffler, Reflections of a Contemporary Minnesota Dakota Lawyer: Dakota 
Identity and Its Impacts in 1862 and 2012, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 582, 602 (2013); see 
also Chomsky, supra note 57, at 14 (detailing the unusual features of the executions, 
including the review of the sentences “not by an appellate court, but by the President of 
the United States”). In all the wars that took place between European settlers and members 
of the Indigenous nations, “in no others did the United States apply criminal sanctions to 
punish those defeated in war.” Id. Professor EagleWoman has criticized President Lincoln 
for not following the “general military practice at the time.” Vincent Schilling, The Traumatic 
True History and Name List of the Dakota 38, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (December 27, 
2017), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/the-traumatic-true-history-and-name-list-of-
the-dakota-38-3awsx1BAdU2v_KWM81RomQ [https://perma.cc/U895-JKGE]. “They 
should have been released. He made a political decision . . . based on the racial hatred . . . 
Lincoln was a lawyer [and] knew that this was improper.” Id.; see also Paul Finkelman, U.S.-
Dakota War of 1862: “I Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes.” Lincoln the Lawyer, 
Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 405, 412 
(2013) (detailing Lincoln’s many “strong political reasons for supporting the executions” and 
explaining how “Lincoln could hardly afford to risk alienating voters in Minnesota”). 
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2. The Northernmost Lynching on Record  
Minnesota was also the site of the northernmost lynching recorded 
in the country.59 On June 15, 1920, nearly one hundred years to the day 
before George Floyd was killed, three African American men, Elias 
Clayton, Elmer Jackson, and Isaac McGhie, were lynched by a mob of 
thousands of White people in Duluth.60 The police ignored clear warnings 
that afternoon of a planned lynching.61 After being wrenched out of their jail 
cells by force, beaten, and subjected to a mock trial, the three men were 
hung from lampposts one block away while an estimated 10,000 White 
people watched.62 Many of the White people participated in the lynching 
                                                           
59 Oswald G. Villard et al., Editorial Paragraphs, 110 THE NATION 839, 841 (June 26, 1920), 
https://www.unz.com/print/Nation-1920jun26-00839/ [https://perma.cc/N6QR-JEBJ] 
(describing the lynching as presenting “no unusual circumstances” except for “establishing a 
new farthest north of the tide of race hatred”) (on file with author). Racial violence and 
murder was at a high point in the North during this time. See, e.g., Emma Coleman Jordan, A 
History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557, 611 (2003) (“In 
the summer of 1919, there were twenty-three race riots, primarily in northern cities.”). 
60 Tina Burnside, On June 15, 1920, A Duluth Mob Lynched Three Black Men, MINNPOST 
(June 29, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2019/07/on-june-15-1920-a-duluth-
mob-lynched-three-black-men/ [https://perma.cc/NE7H-MT54]. The details of how the 
three men died are particularly chilling. See id. (“When McGhie’s rope broke, they hung 
him a second time. A man sitting on a lamppost [being used for the lynching] repeatedly 
kicked Clayton in the face as he suffocated [from the hanging].”). 
61 See NAACP, DULUTH, MN BRANCH, supra note 20; see also Juergens, supra note 20, at 
413 (citing Plan to Hang Negroes Bared to Police Tuesday Afternoon, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. 
June 18, 1920, at 1). Despite being specifically warned that a mob “was planning to dynamite 
the jail and kill the suspects,” the police “did little to head off the evening’s attack.” Id.; see 
also Burnside, supra note 60 (“Duluth Commissioner of Public Safety William F. Murnian 
failed to instruct his officers to stop the rioters forcefully, allowing them to enter the jail.”). 
“In his 1933 book, ‘The Tragedy of Lynching,’ the sociologist Arthur F. Raper estimated 
that, based on his study of 100 lynchings, white police officers participated in at least half of 
all lynchings and that in 90 percent of others law-enforcement officers ‘either condone or 
wink at the mob action.’” Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Is Owned, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/24/magazine/reparations-
slavery.html [https://perma.cc/RA34-J4C6]. 
62 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW 
& INEQ. 263, 266 (2003). As in so many lynchings, the Black victims had been falsely accused 
by a White woman of sexual assault. Tom Nelson, Our Duluth Lynchings, 77 BENCH & BAR 
MINN. 4, 4 (2020). Ida B. Wells long ago pointed out that lynching linked the violent murder 
of Black men with the reinforcement of the sexual taboo against relations between Black 
men and White women. See Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Lynch Law in America, 23 THE ARENA 
15, 18 (Jan. 1900), https://archive.org/details/ArenaMagazine-
Volume23a/page/n29/mode/2up?q=lynch+law [https://perma.cc/FLZ3-NEFF]. 
[M]any men have been put to death whose innocence was afterward 
established; and to-day, under this reign of the “unwritten law,” no 
colored man, no matter what his reputation, is safe from lynching if a 
white woman, no matter what her standing or motive, cares to charge 
him with insult or assault. 
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and posed with the dead bodies, joking about sending the picture to the 
South as a message.63 Historian Bill Green described the scene as “White 
men mugging for the camera like fishermen displaying their prize catches.”64 
B. Decades of Studies and Reports with the Same Conclusions (and the 
Same Inaction) 
Racism and police abuse are not merely relics of Minnesota’s past. 
In what he termed the Minnesota Paradox, Dr. Sam Myers documented 
how, although Minnesota is considered “a great place to live,”65 the state has 
the largest disparities between White residents and Black residents in nearly 
every major facet of life: 
Measured by racial gaps in unemployment rates, wage and 
salary incomes, incarceration rates, arrest rates, home 
ownership rates, mortgage lending rates, test scores, 
reported child maltreatment rates, school disciplinary and 
suspension rates, and even drowning rates, African 
Americans are worse off in Minnesota than they are in 
virtually every other state in the nation.66 
                                                           
Id. 
63 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 196–97; see also Nelson, supra note 62, at 4 (explaining how 
postcards from the lynching “flew off the shelves of Duluth merchants at fifty cents each”).  
64 William D. Green, Thoughts About Commemorating the Duluth Lynchings, 77 BENCH & 
BAR MINN. 12, 13 (May/June 2020). 
65 Heather Brown, The ‘Minnesota Paradox’: Why the State Has One of the Largest Racial 
Disparities, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2020), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/06/23/the-
minnesota-paradox-why-the-land-of-10000-lakes-has-one-of-the-largest-racial-disparities/ 
[https://perma.cc/T2KJ-4HBQ] (“Survey after survey have stated that Minnesota is a great 
place to live.”); see also David Leonhardt, ‘The Minnesota Paradox’, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/briefing/minneapolis-coronavirus-tara-reader-
your-monday-briefing.html [https://perma.cc/73X4-V64K] (“Minnesota’s Twin Cities metro 
area has one of the country’s highest standards of living by many measures: high incomes, 
long life expectancy, a large number of corporate headquarters and a rich cultural scene.”). 
66 Dr. Samuel Myers, The Minnesota Paradox, U. MINN.: HUBERT H. HUMPHREY SCH. OF 
PUB. AFFS. (June 5, 2020), https://www.hhh.umn.edu/roy-wilkins-center-human-relations-
and-social-justice/minnesota-paradox, [https://perma.cc/KL4P-56S4]; see also Taylor Gee, 
Something Is Rotten in the State of Minnesota, POLITICO MAG. (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/minnesota-race-inequality-philando-
castile-214053 [https://perma.cc/T6EJ-A8XE] (confirming Dr. Myers’ assessment: “In 
metrics across the board—household income, unemployment rates, poverty rates and 
education attainment—the gap between white people and people of color is significantly larger 
in Minnesota than it is most everywhere else.”); Jeff Wagner, Minnesota Ranked 2nd-Worst 
in U.S. For Racial Equality, CBS MINN. (August 22, 2017, 10:15 PM), 
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2017/08/22/minnesota-racial-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/3EJB-UKEM] (“[B]lack people in Minnesota are ten times more likely to 
end up in jail or prison than [W]hite people.”); Randy Furst & MaryJo Webster, How Did 
Minnesota Become One of the Most Racially Inequitable States?, STAR TRIB. (September 
6, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://www.startribune.com/how-did-minnesota-become-one-of-the-
15
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The killing of George Floyd was not an anomaly. Decades of 
studies and reports have documented the same thing: police abuse and 
racism toward racially marginalized communities. In 1993, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System found that 
in Hennepin County, People of Color and Whites were arrested and 
charged at vastly disproportionate rates.67 As the task force observed, “One 
glaring signpost of the specter of racism in the disposition of criminal cases 
is the fact that although people of color comprise 6% of the state’s 
population, they comprise 45% of the prison population.”68 The task force 
also found that, “although the justice system is no longer made to enforce 
the ultimate social control of slavery or the complex codes of legal 
segregation that took its place, the justice system still finds itself being used 
as a powerful tool of the pervasive prejudice and the subtle, often elaborately 
camouflaged discrimination that still deeply scars our national life.”69 Not 
surprisingly, the task force concluded that “Nowhere in the system is this 
‘control’ dynamic more in evidence than in the interaction of communities 
of color with the police.”70 
In 2003, the Council on Crime and Justice and Institute on Race 
and Poverty conducted a study on traffic stop arrest rates. They jointly 
reported to the legislature that police stopped and searched Black, Latinx, 
and Native American drivers at greater rates than White drivers.71 
Importantly, the researchers also determined that officers had “found 
contraband as a result of searches of [Black, Latinx, and Native American 
drivers] at lower rates than in searches of White drivers.”72 Racial profiling 
in arrests was found statewide.73 The disparities “existed in nearly every 
                                                           
most-racially-inequitable-states/547537761/ [https://perma.cc/DD6L-JG97] (“By almost any 
measurement, Minnesota is plagued by racial disparities. In unemployment statistics. In the 
percentage of people in poverty. In homeownership. And in other areas as well.”). 




68 Id. at S-3. 
69 Id. at 5. 
70 Id. The task force detailed “a pattern of racial bias . . . throughout the justice system.” Id. 
at 7. Reporting data from the early 1990s, the task force found that “[a]lmost 15 years after 
the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act, Native American children are still being 
removed from their homes at approximately 10 times the rate that [W]hite children are 
removed.” Id. 
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participating jurisdiction” across the state.74 The researchers concluded that 
“[t]hese patterns suggest a strong likelihood that racial/ethnic bias plays a 
role in traffic stop policies and practices in Minnesota.”75  
In 2009, there were two major investigations of the Metro Gang 
Strike Force, a multi-jurisdictional police task force commissioned to fight 
drug trade and violent crime throughout Minnesota.76 An investigation 
revealed that since its inception in 1997, officers were improperly seizing 
money and property and often brutalizing innocent victims, many of whom 
were People of Color.77 As one investigation found, “It is difficult to classify, 
in terms of severity, the areas of misconduct revealed by this investigation.”78 
Some allegations were found “to be shocking.”79 Racial profiling by the 
Strike Force included “shakedowns” that targeted undocumented 
immigrants.80 
Between 2006 and 2012, the City of Minneapolis paid out $14 
million for alleged police misconduct, though very few of these cases 
resulted in disciplinary action for officers.81 In addition to instances of police 
misconduct and use of force, arrest data from the Minneapolis Police 
Department suggests a disparate impact in the enforcement of low-level 
offenses against People of Color. Of the nearly 100,000 arrests for low-level 
offenses made by Minneapolis police officers between 2012 and 2014, 
                                                           
74 Id. at 3. 
75 Id. 
76 The initial investigation was conducted by the Office of the Legislative Auditor. METRO 
GANG STRIKE FORCE REV. PANEL, REPORT 1–2 (Aug. 20, 2009), 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/co/about/Documents/final_report_mgsf_review_panel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9ZVP-G67T] [hereinafter METRO GANG STRIKE FORCE REPORT]. On the 
night after the Legislative Auditor’s report was issued, “a number of Strike Force officers 
were observed shredding documents at the Strike Force offices.” Id. at 2.  
77 See id. at 22–23. The report noted that “these encounters almost always involved a [P]erson 
of [C]olor.” Id. at 22; see also Randy Furst, Payouts Reveal Brutal, Rogue Metro Gang Strike 
Force, STAR TRIB. (Aug 5, 2012, 5:15 PM), https://www.startribune.com/payouts-reveal-
brutal-rogue-metro-gang-strike-force/165028086/ [https://perma.cc/7U33-WHNS] (“The 
stories and payouts to 96 victims of the now-defunct Strike Force . . . provide the most 
detailed picture yet of an out-of-control police squad.”). 
78 METRO GANG STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 76, at 14. 
79 Id. 
80 Virgil Wiebe, Immigration Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in 
Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 581, 626 (2017) (describing how the Strike Force “ran off 
the rails in the mid-2000s”); see also METRO GANG STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 76, 
at 11 (“The Strike Force’s mission does not support the creation of roving ‘saturation’ details 
that stop people for traffic violations or seize the funds of an undocumented alien who has 
committed no other offense. Yet this is what we found, many times over.”). 
81 Alejandra Matos & Randy Furst, Minneapolis Cops Rarely Disciplined in Big-Payout Cases, 
STAR TRIB. (June 3, 2013, 2:06 PM), https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-cops-rarely-
disciplined-in-big-payout-cases/209811991/ [https://perma.cc/D2Z6-BQ4C]. 
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African Americans accounted for 59%, despite representing only 19% of the 
city’s population.82 
A recent report by the Minnesota Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights found selective enforcement of nonviolent 
offenses contributes to higher rates of incarceration for People of Color.83 
Statewide, African Americans represent 6% of the population, yet as of 
January 2016, they made up 35% of the state’s prison population.84 For 
Native Americans, “the disparity is even starker.”85 Despite only 
representing 1% of the population, Native Americans account for 10% of 
the state’s prison population.86 
Most recently, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison and 
Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington convened a 
working group on police-involved killings in the spring of 2020 and 
produced a wide range of recommendations. The Working Group 
summarized the results of decades of inaction: 
There have been many firm opinions over the years about 
why police-involved deadly force encounters persist, and 
those opinions have grown more intense and more 
polarized as people’s and communities’ frustration, grief, 
and anger has grown. This has also made practical 
solutions for reducing them that can be effectively 
implemented and widely adopted harder and harder to 
agree on. In the meantime, people continue losing their 
lives, survivors’ lives continue being changed forever, 
communities continue being torn apart, and trust between 
community and law enforcement continues to fray.87  
                                                           
82 Picking up the Pieces: A Minneapolis Case Study, ACLU (2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/racial-justice/race-and-criminal-justice/picking-pieces 
[https://perma.cc/QDU2-CS7J]. According to the research, African Americans were 8.7 
times more likely and Native Americans were 8.6 times more likely to be arrested for a low-
level offense than White people. Id. Racial profiling seems even more obvious when looking 
at disparities between nighttime and daytime stops. As the ACLU study found, at 3:00 AM, 
Black drivers in Minneapolis are two times more likely than White drivers to be pulled over 
and arrested for an active driving violation, but at 2:00 PM, when officers presumably can 
better identify the driver’s race, Black drivers are nine times more likely to be stopped. Id. 
83 MINN. ADVISORY COMM. TO U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., CIVIL RIGHTS AND POLICING 
PRACTICES IN MINNESOTA 9 (2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/03-22-MN-Civil-
Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6XK-GLRN].  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 STATE OF MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY WORKING GROUP, POLICE-INVOLVED DEADLY 
FORCE ENCOUNTERS 1 (Feb. 2020), https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/co/working-
group/Documents/police-involved-deadly-force-encounters-recommendations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49CM-5FPF] [hereinafter STATE OF MINN. WORKING GROUP]. 
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C. Past Signs of Progress  
While Minnesota has a history of racial violence, it has a track 
record of responding as well. In the wake of the lynchings in Duluth, 
Governor J.A.A. Burnquist, who was also president of the St. Paul NAACP 
at the time, immediately called in the National Guard later that night to 
disperse the mob.88 Troops were stationed in Black neighborhoods to 
protect Black citizens.89 The St. Paul NAACP initiated and funded an 
outside investigation.90 And in time, Duluth became the first city in America 
to create a public memorial to lynching victims.91 
The Minnesota Legislature also responded to the lynchings. 
Pushed hard by lobbying from the NAACP and, in particular, activist Nellie 
Francis,92 the Minnesota Legislature passed arguably the strongest anti-
lynching legislation at the time,93 and it became one of the first states to ban 
lynching altogether.94 Drafted by Francis, the legislation sailed through both 
the House and the Senate with a nearly unanimous vote and was signed into 
law in April 1921, less than one year after the lynchings.95 With a sharp eye 
towards the complicity of the police in the Duluth lynchings, the new law 
                                                           
88 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 197. 
89 Id. at 201. 
90 Id. at 197. 
91 See Nelson, supra note 62, at 4 (“Duluth was the very first community in our nation to 
build a monument to honor its lynching victims.”). 
92 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 216. W.E.B. DuBois even paid visits to both Duluth and St. 
Paul to support the effort. Id. at 217. The National NAACP sent Francis and local NAACP 
leaders various supporting materials, including a copy of the anti-lynching legislation from 
Kentucky. Id. at 217. The NAACP was founded in 1909 largely to confront the issue of 
lynching and racist mob violence against Black communities. See LANGSTON HUGHES, 
FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE NAACP 20–23 (1962) (describing founding of 
NAACP in response to a 1908 Springfield, Illinois riot in which African Americans were 
lynched, injured, and driven from the city, and their homes and businesses destroyed); see 
also James W. Fox Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal 
Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113, 163 (2006) (noting how, along with 
Ida B. Wells, the NAACP “devoted significant efforts to persuade both state and federal 
White legislators to pass anti-lynching bills”). 
93 See Nolan, supra note 21, at 69–70 (providing a historical review of state anti-lynching 
legislation). 
94 Juergens, supra note 20, at 417; see also Act approved Apr. 20, 1921, ch. 401, 1921 Minn. 
Laws 612 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 373.28 (1974)) (“An act to prevent lynching; to fix 
indemnity for the dependents of any person lynched, and to provide for the removal from 
office of the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs having charge of any person lynched.”). The anti-
lynching statute, unfortunately, was quietly repealed in 1984. See MINN. STAT. § 373.28 
(1974), repealed by Act approved May 2, 1984, ch. 629, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 1713, 1763. 
95 BESSLER, supra note 46, at 217; see also Mrs. W.T. Francis Author of Anti-Lynching Bill, 
NW. BULL., at 1, 4, (May 12, 1923), 
https://www.mnhs.org/duluthlynchings/documents/Mrs_WT_Francis_Author_of_AntiLyn
ching_Bill-831.001.php [https://perma.cc/N4WM-WD3N] (identifying Francis with the 
“high distinct honor” of being the “Mother” of the anti-lynching legislation). 
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imposed liability on counties for lynching victims murdered in their county 
and made failure to use all reasonable means to prevent a lynching a fireable 
offense for law enforcement officers.96 The state also put pressure on the 
federal government. Over the next sixteen years, the Minnesota Legislature 
would twice approve joint resolutions calling on the U.S. Congress to enact 
a federal anti-lynching bill.97  
III. THREE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MINNESOTA POLICE 
A Proposal No. 1: Enact a State-based Equivalent to § 1983 
Section 1983 is considered “the most important legal vehicle for 
holding police and other government officials accountable for 
misconduct.”98 The law was written specifically “to interpose the federal 
courts between the States and the people . . . to protect the people from 
unconstitutional action under color of state law.”99 The Supreme Court once 
believed that the purpose of § 1983 was to establish “the role of the Federal 
Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power.”100 As 
the Court explained, § 1983 “was intended not only to provide 
                                                           
96 Act approved Apr. 20, 1921 §§1–4. For example, the civil cap on damages against a county 
was $7,500, the same amount sought by one of the lynching victim’s fathers. BESSLER, supra 
note 46, at 220. 
97 See S. Con. Res. 14, 1935 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1935) (“BE IT RESOLVED, by the 
Senate of the State of Minnesota, the House of Representatives concurring therein, that the 
Congress of the United States be and is hereby memorialized to enact a Federal Anti-
Lynching law at the present session.”); H.R. Con. Res. 16, 1937 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 
1937) (same). 
98 See Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 2; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 
(1972) (“Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely 
federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights 
secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.”). The Supreme Court also recognized 
the important role of § 1983 in Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1980) (“This 
statute, enacted to aid in the preservation of human liberty and human rights reflects a 
congressional judgment that a damages remedy against the offending party is a vital 
component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
99 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242. 
100 Id. at 239. The federal legislation was necessary because “state courts were being used to 
harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop 
deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally 
protected rights.” Id. at 240. Section 1983 was crafted to “alter[] the relationship between the 
States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was 
concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state 
officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that 
these failings extended to the state courts.” Id. at 242. 
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compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent 
against future constitutional deprivations, as well.”101 
However, the Court has incrementally disabled § 1983.102 As a 
result, § 1983 has “failed to live up to its promise of eradicating widespread 
and pernicious practices of rank and file officers.”103 Instead of preserving § 
1983’s original purpose as a “guarantor of basic federal rights against state 
power,” the Court has reversed course and worries instead about the 
“potential costs that § 1983 imposes on government.”104 While protecting 
government officials, the Court “has consistently narrowed the statute and 
made it more difficult for plaintiffs to vindicate violations of their rights.”105 
1. The Unfulfilled Promise of § 1983 
a. The Complicated History of § 1983 
Section 1983 was originally enacted as Section 1 of the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871,106 in response to some of the most violent racial hostility 
                                                           
101 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). 
102 See Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State Constitutions 
Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence, 115 
PENN ST. L. REV. 877, 889–90 (2011) (explaining how the Court’s more recent interpretation 
of § 1983 “has erected three often insurmountable obstacles to recovering damages caused 
by the violation of federal constitutional rights (qualified immunity, no vicarious liability, and 
absolute immunity for state government entities)”); Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 4 (2018) 
(“[T]he Court has been hostile to the statute, continuously narrowing it and imposing 
restrictions on civil rights plaintiffs.”); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move 
from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1751 (1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
increasingly undermined and demeaned § 1983 with a tort rhetoric strategy designed to 
control the statute’s text and interpretation.”); see also infra notes 164–85 and accompanying 
text (detailing the impact of qualified immunity on § 1983 interpretation). 
103 Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 20 (2000). 
104 Compare Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167 (1961)), with Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special 
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 95 (1989). See also Thompson v. Clark, 
No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 3128975, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) (describing the 
Court’s policy justifications for limiting § 1983’s reach and concluding that “consistently 
lurking in the background is the threat of financial cost to government officials”). 
105 Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 12. 
106 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In relevant 
part, the Ku Klux Klan Act, which is substantively similar to the current language of § 1983, 
provided as follows: 
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the 
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the 
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in the country’s history.107 Congress rushed through passage of the Act “in a 
highly inflamed atmosphere.”108 With a certain degree of understatement, 
the Supreme Court explained in 1985 that the “specific historical catalyst 
for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the campaign of violence and deception 
in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent 
citizens their civil and political rights.”109 But the true scale of the dire 
circumstances surrounding passage of the Act provides important context 
to its purpose, as the Court acknowledged just twelve years earlier: “Any 
analysis of the purposes and scope of § 1983 must take cognizance of the 
events and passions of the time at which it was enacted.”110 
As soon as the Civil War ended, White Southerners organized the 
Ku Klux Klan, and “a wave of murders and assaults was launched against 
both African Americans and Union sympathizers.”111 The Ku Klux Klan 
and other various white supremacist groups intended to restore the racial 
hierarchy of the pre-war South by all means available, including murder, 
threats, intimidation, and the essential takeover of the local legal system, 
                                                           
party injured in, any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress[.] 
Id. The provision was patterned after a criminal provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
but that act was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State 
Courts, and § 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 972 (1987). 
107 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 
at 425–26 (1988). On the House floor, Congressman Joseph Hayne Rainey, the first African 
American to serve in the House of the Representatives, stated that the “enormity of the 
crimes constantly perpetrated there finds no parallel in the history of this Republic in her 
very darkest days.” CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 393–95 (1871). 
108 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 (1951). The Act was “rushed through a deeply 
troubled Republican Congress.” Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: 
A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 530 (1985); see also Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (“Section 1, now codified 
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without 
amendment.”). 
109 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Two years before he wrote those words, 
Justice Stevens was a little more descriptive about the history that led to the Act’s passage:  
The Ku Klux Act . . . was enacted on April 20, 1871, less than a month 
after President Grant sent a dramatic message to Congress describing 
the breakdown of law and order in the Southern states. During the 
debates, supporters of the bill repeatedly described the reign of terror 
imposed by the Klan upon Black citizens and their White sympathizers 
in the Southern states. Hours of oratory were devoted to the details of 
Klan outrages—arson, robbery, whippings, shootings, murders, and 
other forms of violence and intimidation—often committed in disguise 
and under cover of night. These acts of lawlessness went unpunished, 
legislators asserted, because Klan members and sympathizers controlled 
or influenced the administration of state criminal justice.  
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983) (citation omitted). 
110 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973). 
111 Id. 
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including the state courts and local police.112 As a result, “Congress faced, 
just years after the close of an actual civil war, the threat of increasing 
violence by those who were defeated on the battlefield and who, some 
feared, sought to resurrect that system of political, economic, and social 
organization that sparked the war.”113 Similarly disturbing, local authorities 
either “did nothing to protect the freedmen or actively participated in the 
assaults.”114 
Congress responded by making certain acts punishable under 
federal law because of the inability (and unwillingness) of the state courts at 
that time to “enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of 
others.”115 As the Court famously explained 
It is abundantly clear that one reason [§ 1983] was passed 
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by 
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or 
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims 
of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and 
                                                           
112 See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 199 (1980) 
(“The violence mounted through the late 1860s and early 1870s as the Ku Klux Klan 
organized raids, lynchings, beatings, burnings.”); W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK 
RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, 670 (1935) (detailing the strategic use of 
atrocities during this period by “secret organizations and the rise of a new doctrine of race 
hatred”); FONER, supra note 107, at 425 (“In effect, the Klan was a military force serving . . . 
all those who desired the restoration of white supremacy.”). 
113 Michael F. Roessler, Mistaking Doubts and Qualms for Constitutional Law: Against the 
Rejection of Legislative History as A Tool of Legal Interpretation, 39 SW. L. REV. 103, 121 
(2009). “The South had lost the war, but it appeared to some in Congress that, even in defeat, 
elements of the rebellion would attempt to impose by violence in a time of ostensible peace 
that which could not be won on the battlefields during a time of actual war.” Id. As Justice 
Brennan put it, “It was fighting to save the Union.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, racially marginalized communities 
and individuals were still subject to racist murder and other violence well into the twentieth 
century (and to a lesser degree even today). See generally MANNING MARABLE, RACE, 
REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION OF BLACK AMERICA, 1945–
1990, at 174–78 (1991) (detailing acts of violence by the Ku Klux Klan in the twentieth 
century); see also TIMOTHY TYSON, THE BLOOD OF EMMETT TILL 214 (2017) (“A white 
supremacist gunman slaughtering nine Black churchgoers in a prayer meeting in Charleston, 
South Carolina, in 2014, however, reminds us that the ideology of white supremacy remains 
with us in its most brutal and overt forms.”). 
114 See Gilles, supra note 103, at 55–56 (“Sheriffs refused to investigate or arrest [White 
people] suspected of crimes against [African Americans], district attorneys refused to 
prosecute, and courts refused to entertain civil cases brought by the freedmen against their 
[W]hite persecutors.”). 
115 Carter, 409 U.S. at 426; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 252 (1871) 
(statement of Sen. Oliver H.P.T. Morton of Ind.) (“But it is said that these crimes 
[established by the Ku Klux Klan Act] should be punished by the States; that they are already 
offenses against the laws of the States, and the matter should be left to the States. The answer 
to that is, that the States do not punish them; the States do not protect the rights of the people; 
the State courts are powerless to redress these wrongs.”). 
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immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
might be denied by the state agencies.116  
The Court cited the extensive legislative history of the Act, including the 
forceful remarks of Representative David Lowe who explained, “While 
murder is stalking in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and 
banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the 
local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the 
proper corrective.”117 
Given the depth of the problem, it was clear from the onset that the 
application of § 1983 would have to be broad.118 The chief author of the Act, 
Representative Samuel Shellabarger, advised that § 1983 was to be “liberally 
and beneficently construed” to afford a remedy to victims, as is characteristic 
of remedial statutes designed to protect individual liberty.119 Even the bill’s 
opponents understood the broad remedial power that Congress intended.120 
While opposing the bill, Senator Allen Thurman observed, “[T]here is no 
limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, and they are as 
comprehensive as can be used.”121 
Despite its noble beginnings, however, § 1983 was dormant for 
nearly a century.122 Indeed, § 1983 was “almost dead on arrival” given the 
                                                           
116 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
117 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 374 (1871) (statement of Rep. David Lowe). 
Rep. Lowe reported, “Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, 
wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice.” Id.; see also 
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 182 (1990) (“[I]n 1871, Congress was concerned with 
Ku Klux Klan activities that were going unpunished in the Southern States and designed § 
1983’s remedy to combat this evil, recognizing the need for original federal-court jurisdiction 
as a means to provide at least indirect federal control over the unconstitutional acts of state 
officials.”) 
118 See, e.g., Gildin, supra note 102, at 888 (“The unqualified language and legislative history 
of Section 1983 suggest that the statute would furnish a generous remedy to victims of 
governmental misconduct.”); Gomez v. Toledo 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“As remedial 
legislation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.”). 
119 CONG. GLOBE APP., 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Samuel 
Shellabarger) (“Th[e] [A]ct is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and 
human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally 
and beneficently construed. It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were 
this not the rule of interpretation.”). 
120 See Gildin, supra note 102, at 888 (“Supporters and opponents alike acknowledged the 
breadth of the remedy that Section 1983 imparted to citizens whose federal constitutional 
rights were invaded.”). 
121 CONG. GLOBE APP., 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 216–17 (1871) (statement of Sen. Allen 
Thurman). The Court felt that Thurman “gave the most exhaustive critique” of the Act 
during legislative debates. Monell, 436 U.S. at 682. 
122 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2, at 374 (1989). 
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Supreme Court’s treatment of civil rights after Reconstruction.123 The 
Court’s view of civil rights in the decades following its passage “immobilized 
section 1983.”124 Its ineffectiveness likely kept it good law, however, since 
“[m]ost of the effective civil rights laws were repealed in 1894.”125 As 
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun concluded, in this “Dark Age of 
Civil Rights, . . . the Nation’s commitment to civil rights lay in remnants.”126 
A study in 1951 found only twenty-one reported § 1983 cases in the fifty 
years after its enactment.127  
b. The Renewal of § 1983 – Monroe v. Pape  
The Court brought § 1983 back to life in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape.128 
In Monroe, an African American family (including young children) alleged 
that thirteen Chicago police officers broke into their home early one 
morning, “routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living 
room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress 
covers.”129 The father, James Monroe, was then taken to the police station 
and detained on “open charges” for ten hours, interrogated in connection 
with a murder, denied a hearing before a magistrate, barred from calling his 
family or an attorney, and subsequently released with no charges against 
                                                           
123 See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the 
Scope of § 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1498–99 (1989) (noting that § 1983 “served as the 
litigational vehicle for only a smattering of constitutional cases in its first fifty years”). 
124 See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in 
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 506 (1993) (“Shortly after the 1871 statute 
became law, and for the next ninety years, the Court’s opinions immobilized [§] 1983, 
rendering it ineffective against both an individual officer’s constitutional abuses and a 
municipality’s role as a ‘moving force’ in causing those constitutional violations.”). 
125 See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 549 n.153 (1982) (“Ironically, had § 1983 developed in the 1870s, 
it is unlikely that it would have survived. Most of the effective civil rights laws were repealed 
in 1894.”). 
126 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1985). As Justice 
Harry Blackmun reported, “from the 1890’s to the 1940’s, the Civil Rights Acts lay virtually 
dormant.” Id. at 12. And “between 1939 and 1961, the significant § 1983 cases, like those 
prior to 1939, were few.” Id. at 19. Part of the reason for so few suits was that there were also 
few recognized federal rights. Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System 
of Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 188 
(2012) (“With so few rights to assert in a § 1983 lawsuit, there were few lawsuits.”). 
127 Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 
IND. L.J. 361, 363–66 (1951). 
128 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961); see also Barbara Kritchevsky, “Or Causes to Be Subjected”: 
The Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 
1188 (1988) (“The Supreme Court liberated [§] 1983 from almost a century of obscurity 
when it decided Monroe v. Pape.”). 
129 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. 
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him.130 Using § 1983, the family sued the officers, the Chicago Police 
Department, and the City of Chicago for damages.131 The lower court 
dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the dismissal, ruling that police officer misconduct did not make a 
“sufficient showing of a violation” of § 1983 under existing precedent.132 
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit decision, holding 
that a § 1983 action could be brought against persons who violated federally 
protected rights even though their acts were not authorized by state law.133 
After a lengthy review of the legislative history, the Court established three 
core principles of § 1983 jurisprudence. First, the Court clarified that police 
officers could still be held liable under § 1983 if their conduct was not 
authorized (or even prohibited) by the state, expanding the definition of 
“under color of state law.”134 Second, the Court held that § 1983 “was 
supplementary to the state remedy” so that plaintiffs did not have to first 
demonstrate whether state law remedies were available.135 As a result, 
Monroe “not only contributed to the expanded role of federal law in 
protecting individual rights but also guaranteed direct access to a federal 
forum in § 1983 actions” regardless of whether there were any state law 
remedies available.136 Third, § 1983 requires no particular state of mind 
requirement as a condition of liability.137 Accordingly, “Monroe led to an 
                                                           
130 Id. 
131 Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 365 (7th Cir. 1959), rev’d, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
132 Id. at 366. As the Seventh Circuit explained, “We do not condone the alleged misconduct 
of defendants, if true, but that is not the question before us. Under the . . . decisions of this 
circuit . . . the dismissal before us necessarily follows. Plaintiffs are not without their remedy 
in the state court.” Id. 
133 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184–85. 
134 Id. at 171. As the Court explained, “Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent 
it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.” Id. at 
171–72; see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power, 
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 
with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”). As the Court in 
Monroe made clear, “We conclude that the meaning given ‘under color of’ law in the Classic 
case . . . was the correct one; and we adhere to it.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.  
135 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183 (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would 
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not 
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked”). As the Court made clear, § 
1983 “was passed . . . to afford a federal right in federal courts.” Id. at 180. 
136 Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 389 (1984). 
137 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (ruling that the law “should be read against the background 
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions”).  
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explosion of Section 1983 claims in federal courts and to a corresponding 
increase in attempts by the Court to limit its effects.”138  
c. Congress Strengthens § 1983 – Attorney’s Fees  
Congress would soon enhance § 1983 with the addition of 
attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs in 1976.139 Congress added attorney’s 
fees in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.140 The Court ruled in Alyeska that 
without statutory guidance or other exceptions that were not applicable in 
this case, attorney’s fees were not available.141 In doing so, the Court 
reaffirmed the “American rule” that “each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall 
bear its own attorney’s fees unless there is express statutory authorization to 
the contrary.”142 Although Alyeska was not a § 1983 case, lower courts 
interpreted the decision to apply to § 1983 claims.143 
                                                           
138 Edward R. Stabell, III, Zinermon v. Burch: Putting Brackets Around the Parratt Doctrine, 
42 MERCER L. REV. 1655, 1656 (1991). Justice Scalia also noticed the impact of Monroe on 
the volume of cases. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Monroe changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in the first 50 years 
of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each year 
. . . .”). 
139 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)) (providing 
that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee 
as part of the costs”); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980) (“The legislative 
history is entirely consistent with the plain language. As was true with § 1983, a major purpose 
of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of 
constitutional and civil rights.”). 
140 421 U.S. 240 (1975). For an interesting historical perspective detailing the origins of the 
bill, including the role NAACP lobbyist Clarence Mitchell had in the initiation of the 
legislation, see Armand Derfner, Background and Origin of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee 
Awards Act of 1976, 37 URB. LAW. 653, 653 (2005). 
141 See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (“[W]e are convinced that it would be inappropriate for the 
Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in the manner 
and to the extent urged by respondents and approved by the Court of Appeals.”). 
142 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); see also Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (“In the 
United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ 
fee from the loser.”). 
143 Alyeska was brought under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, but the Court’s denial 
of attorney’s fees absent statutory authorization was used by courts in denying attorney’s fees 
in § 1983 actions. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Gigi A. Woodruff, Federal District Court 
Proceedings to Recover Attorney’s Fees for Prevailing Parties on Section 1983 Claims in 
State Administrative Agencies, 18 GA. L. REV. 83, 86–88 (1983) (citing Hostrop v. Bd. of 
Junior Coll., 523 F.2d 569, 580 (7th Cir. 1975) (former college president entitled to recover 
damages for wrongful termination of employment, but not attorney’s fees under § 1983), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Burband v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(finding a state prisoner who challenged certain prison disciplinary proceedings 
under § 1983 was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior 
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In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,144 authorizing courts to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases.145 
Congress explicitly referenced Alyeska in crafting the new legislation, 
pointing out that every other civil rights law included provisions for 
attorney’s fees.146 As Professor Pamela Karlan explained, “Every significant 
contemporary civil rights statute contains some provision for attorney’s fees, 
and in 1976, Congress passed a comprehensive attorney’s fee statute that 
provides for fees under the most important Reconstruction [e]ra civil rights 
statutes as well.”147 
In providing attorney’s fees, Congress recognized the important 
role of private parties and their lawyers in enforcing § 1983.148 The drafters 
understood that without providing attorney’s fees, many civil plaintiffs would 
be unable to afford counsel.149 As the legislative history explains, “[i]f private 
                                                           
Coll., 519 F.2d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 1975) (wrongful discharge of “bearded” college president 
would not justify award of attorney’s fees under § 1983)). 
144 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). The statute 
reads as follows: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of § 1981, 1982, 1983, 
and 1986 of this title, Title IX of Public Law 92-318, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, 
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Id. at § 1988(b). 
145 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429. 
146 See S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 4, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912 (“This bill . . . is an appropriate 
response to the Alyeska decision. It is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a 
category of cases in which attorneys’ fees have been traditionally regarded as appropriate. It 
remedies gaps in the language of these civil rights laws by providing the specific authorization 
required by the Court in Alyeska, and makes our civil rights laws consistent.”) 
147 Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205 
(2003); see also S. REP. 94-1011, 4, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911 (“This decision and 
dictum created anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws whereby awards of fees are, according 
to Alyeska, suddenly unavailable in the most fundamental civil rights cases.”). 
148 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909–10 (“All of these civil rights laws 
depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy 
if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important 
Congressional policies which these laws contain.”).  
149 See id. at 5910 (“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue 
to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer.”); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 
F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) (“Its goal was to remove 
financial impediments that might preclude or hinder ‘private citizens,’ collectively or 
individually, from being ‘able to assert their civil rights.’” (citations omitted)); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976) (“The effective enforcement of federal civil 
rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of 
the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. 
In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate a 
court action to correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will 
remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations 
cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts. In authorizing 
28
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss1/8
250 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the 
Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens 
must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these 
rights in court.”150 In addition, without attorney’s fees, lawyers might avoid 
cases that involve only equitable relief, many of which “often do the most to 
vindicate important societal interests.”151 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged, the Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act “g[ave] the victims of civil rights violations a powerful weapon that 
improves their ability to employ counsel, to obtain access to the courts, and 
thereafter to vindicate their rights by means of settlement or trial.”152 The 
addition of attorney’s fees has proven to be “an important tool to ensure 
that civil rights laws are enforced.”153 The impact of the Act was seen 
immediately in the number of civil rights cases filed. Within the first five 
years, “the number of civil rights cases brought against state and local 
governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 increased by two-thirds.”154 Despite 
significant setbacks in recent years in the Supreme Court,155 and a 
                                                           
an award of reasonable attorney’s fees § 1988 is designed to give such persons effective access 
to the judicial process where their grievances can be resolved according to the law.”). 
150 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910. Congress recognized that without 
fee awards to promote private enforcement of civil rights laws, these laws would become 
“mere hollow pronouncements” out of the reach of victims of racial discrimination. Id. at 
6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913. 
151 Karlan, supra note 147, at 205–06. Indeed, as Professor Karlan explained, such cases, 
which often do not involve large damages awards and contingency payouts for lawyers, “are 
the ones where plaintiffs function most clearly as private attorneys general.” Id.; see also 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“If successful plaintiffs were 
routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position 
to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.”). 
152 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741 (1986). 
153 Case Note, Federal Government Litigation—Equal Access to Justice Act—Fourth Circuit 
Holds That Attorney’s Fees Are Payable to Claimant and Are Eligible for Administrative 
Offset—Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 
792, 797 (2010). 
154 Mark D. Boveri, Note, Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984) (citing Robert A. Diamond, 
The Firestorm Over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420 (1983)). According to the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, “the number of lawsuits filed against state and local 
governments rose from 17,543 in 1976 to 29,173 in 1981.” Id. at 1295 n.14. But see Jose 
Roberto Juarez, Jr., The Supreme Court As the Cheshire Cat: Escaping the Section 1983 
Wonderland, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 52 (1993) (“While there has been a dramatic increase 
in the number of Section 1983 cases filed since the decision in Monroe, there is little 
empirical evidence that the federal courts are ‘flooded’ with Section 1983 cases.”). 
155 Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality 
and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 198 (1997) (“In the years since Congress enacted 
the Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, however, Supreme Court decisions have sanctioned the 
practice of permitting waivers of attorneys’ fees as a condition of settlement, imbued Rule 68 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with enormous impact in civil rights cases, 
eliminated contingent risk enhancement of fees, and defined the damages available for 
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proliferation of litigation on the calculation of fee awards,156 attorney’s fees 
remain a critical component to the enforcement of civil rights.157  
2. How the Supreme Court Has Undermined § 1983 
Despite its recognition as restoring the promise of § 1983,158 the 
Monroe decision also marks the beginning of one of the Court’s strikes 
against its efficacy. While the Monroe Court provided broad powers to sue 
individuals, it foreclosed the option of suing the responsible city government 
of a police department. In Monroe, the Court ruled that a municipality was 
not a “person” within the meaning of the statute and thus not liable under § 
1983.159 By barring civil rights suits against municipalities and local 
governments, the Monroe Court “eviscerated a valuable civil rights 
remedy.”160 Municipal liability was not recognized until seventeen years later 
in Monell v. Department of Social Services.161 However, instead of 
respondeat superior, which is recognized in “nearly every other area of 
law,”162 the Court in Monell limited recovery to “when execution of a 
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 
injury . . . .”163 
                                                           
violations of civil rights in a manner that minimizes the intangible or non-pecuniary character 
of many of the federal rights in issue.”). 
156 See Emily M. Calhoun, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of Non-
Negotiable Fee Awards Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1984) 
(“Attorneys frequently request courts to award fees in civil rights cases and, as a result, 
litigation over the propriety of fee awards proliferates.”). 
157 See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 610 F. Supp. 29, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“When Congress 
created the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, it recognized 
the critical nexus between providing for recovery of attorney’s fees and ensuring 
enforcement of the civil rights laws.”). 
158 Justice Blackmun, supra note 126, at 19 (“Monroe . . . is correctly credited as being a 
watershed in the development of § 1983.”). 
159 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191–92 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court explicitly ignored the “policy 
considerations” that “doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability because private 
remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures are conspicuously ineffective, and 
because municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause 
those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police level.” Id. at 191. 
160 Conrad K. Harper, The Overthrow of Monroe v. Pape: A Chapter in the Legacy of 
Thurgood Marshall, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 39 (1992). 
161 Monell, 436 U.S. 658. 
162 See Chemerinsky, supra note 33 (“In almost every other area of law, an employer can be 
held liable if its employees, in the scope of their duties, injure others, even negligently. This 
encourages employers to control the conduct of their employees and ensures that those 
injured will be compensated.”). 
163 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. According to the Court, 
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a. The Malignant Growth of Qualified Immunity  
Although addressing attorney’s fees lowered a significant barrier to 
plaintiffs, the largest barrier to recovery for damages for police misconduct 
comes from qualified immunity. As studies consistently show, “nearly all of 
the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity cases come out the same way—by 
finding immunity.”164 As Professor Joanna Schwartz recently concluded, 
“[s]ince 2005, when John Roberts became Chief Justice, the Court has 
granted certiorari to consider twenty qualified immunity denials, and ruled 
in the government’s favor every time.”165 The Court has now “made clear 
that an officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity remains stronger than 
ever.”166 
The concept of qualified immunity has existed in tort law since the 
nineteenth century, leaving the question of whether an officer exercised 
good faith for the jury to decide at trial.167 But “common law qualified 
immunity is different from that which has been developed by federal courts 
construing civil rights claims.”168 The Supreme Court removed the question 
of good faith from the inquiry and converted a subjective test that was a 
                                                           
[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the same 
legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend 
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official 
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In 
particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held 
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a 
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 
superior theory. 
Id. at 691. For a survey of the various critiques of the Monell decision, see Edward C. 
Dawson, Replacing Monell Liability with Qualified Immunity for Municipal Defendants in 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 483, 504 (2018) (“The Monell doctrine has 
drawn significant criticism and critique by both jurists and scholars.”); see also City of 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If the action of 
a police officer is far more serious than an ordinary state tort because it is made possible by 
his position, the underlying reason that such an action is a matter of federal concern is that 
it is treated as the action of the officer’s employer. If the doctrine of respondeat 
superior would impose liability on the city in an ordinary tort case, a fortiori, that doctrine 
must apply to the city in a § 1983 case.”). 
164 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 82–83 
(2018) (“In the thirty-five years since it announced the objective-reasonableness standard 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court has applied it in thirty qualified immunity cases. Only twice 
has the Court actually found official conduct to violate clearly established law.”). 
165 Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (2020). 
166 Wayne S. Melnick, Sun S. Choy & A. Ali Sabzevari, Flash-Bang Use: The Militarization 
of Police and the Status of Qualified Immunity, DRI FOR DEF., June 2017, at 24, 26. 
167 Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State 
Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 526 (1998).  
168 Id. 
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question of fact for the jury into a question of law that allows courts to 
dismiss claims before ever reaching a fact finder.169 
The Supreme Court began the process of undermining § 1983 
claims when it first recognized the availability of the qualified immunity 
defense for police officers in 1967.170 Despite any references to immunity in 
the statute itself or in the legislative history of the original Act,171 the Court 
decided that the common law protected police officers from suit when they 
acted in good faith.172 The rise of qualified immunity was likely the Court’s 
response to a growth in constitutional tort claims, which began to rise after 
Monroe was decided in 1961.173 Courts generally became concerned that 
“many of these lawsuits were frivolous and that defending them imposed 
both societal and individual costs.”174 
                                                           
169 See id. (“The more recent objective inquiry established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald is purely a 
creature of civil rights law.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) 
(acknowledging that the Court has “completely reformulated qualified immunity along 
principles not at all embodied in the common law”). 
170 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). Notably, the Court in Pierson never used the 
phrase “qualified immunity.” Instead, the Court observed that “[t]he legislative record gives 
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.” 
Id. at 554. The Court also noted that “the prevailing view in this country [is that] a peace 
officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because 
the innocence of the suspect is later proved.” Id. The Court then held that “the defense of 
good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in 
the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the 
action under § 1983.” Id. at 557. 
171 Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 78 (2016) (“[Q]ualified immunity is a doctrine—and a limitation on 
that statute—that is entirely the Court’s creation, devoid of support in § 1983’s legislative 
history.”). 
172 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556–57 (“Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of 
police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause.”). Tort law 
had also been important to the Court in Monroe, where the Court said § 1983 “should be 
read against the background of tort liability.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. 
173 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 122, at 428 (tracking the “phenomenal” growth in 
§ 1983 litigation in the thirty years after Monroe). The rise in the number of cases was due 
to many factors, including the adoption of attorney’s fees and the general growth in federal 
litigation during the 1980s. Id. at 428–29; see also Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of 
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937, 1938–39 (2018) (noting that other 
contributing factors likely included extending the exclusionary rule to state courts under 
Mapp v. Ohio and recognizing a damages action against federal officials for constitutional 
violations under Bivens). 
174 Chen, supra note 173, at 1938–39 (identifying three categories of such costs that the Court 
found concerning, including: (1) the unfairness of imposing financial liability on officials who 
might not understand the nuances of constitutional doctrine; (2) the risk that officials would 
hesitate when required to act if they were concerned that their actions could subject them to 
a lawsuit (“overdeterrence”); and (3) being subject to the burdens of the judicial process 
would cost police officers time, distract them from their jobs, and require them to incur 
litigation expenses). 
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The Court has steadily expanded the reach of qualified immunity.175 
Within a few years of establishing qualified immunity in § 1983 cases, the 
Court began to shift from common law interpretation to imposing an 
objective standard that government officials had a responsibility to know the 
law.176 Thereafter, the Court established qualified immunity as a shield 
against lawsuits, not merely as a defense to be raised at trial.177 In Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald,178 the Court eliminated the inquiry into an officer’s subjective 
intent and put the emphasis squarely on whether the officer’s conduct was 
objectively reasonable.179 The Court was now making it possible for an 
officer, even acting in bad faith, to be immune from suit through qualified 
immunity.180 
                                                           
175 See Kinports, supra note 171, at 78 (“In recent years, the Supreme Court opinions applying 
the qualified immunity defense have engaged in a pattern of describing the defense in 
increasingly generous terms and qualifying and deviating from past precedent—without 
offering any justification or even acknowledgement of the Court’s departure from prior case 
law.”); see also Baude, supra note 164, at 81 (explaining the “unusual degree” to which the 
Court has “openly tinkered” with qualified immunity to negative effect). 
176 The Court reasoned that “the appropriate standard necessarily contains elements of both” 
subjective and objective factors. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975), abrogated 
by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). According to the Court, under § 1983, officials 
“must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also on 
knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.” Id. at 322. In 
extending qualified immunity to school district officials, the Court ruled that “an act violating 
a student’s constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, 
indisputable law on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students’ daily lives than by 
the presence of actual malice.” Id. at 321. 
177 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) (“[S]uits concerning constitutional 
violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion 
for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity.”). As the Court put it, “plaintiffs 
may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits.” Id.; see also Hunter 
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of 
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985) (“[T]he denial of qualified immunity should be similarly 
[immediately] appealable.”); Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 10 (“[W]hen a defendant 
appeals an adverse ruling on qualified immunity, the appeal brings an immediate halt to all 
proceedings in the trial court. The effect of this, of course, is to make it much more difficult 
for a civil rights plaintiff to pursue a claim.”). 
178 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
179 The Court decided that “[t]he subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has 
proved incompatible with our admonition that insubstantial claims should not proceed to 
trial.” Id. at 815–16 (citations omitted). 
180 See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (stating “an 
officer’s actual intentions are irrelevant”); see also Joanna Schwartz, The Case Against 
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1802 (2018) (“Even when a plaintiff 
can demonstrate that a defendant was acting in bad faith, that evidence is considered 
irrelevant to the qualified immunity analysis.”). 
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Lastly, the Court imposed the standard that the conduct in question 
must violate “clearly established law.”181 As the Court now makes clear, 
qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”182 The Court requires that “existing precedent 
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”183 
Whether the right at issue was clearly established involves an analysis of 
precedent to determine whether it “squarely governs the case” before the 
court.184 As one circuit judge put it, “[m]erely proving a constitutional 
deprivation doesn’t cut it; plaintiffs must cite functionally identical 
precedent that places the legal question ‘beyond debate’ to ‘every’ 
reasonable officer.”185 
b. Qualified Immunity – The Current State 
The vast expansion of qualified immunity has played out with 
distressing results. Courts “aggressively dismiss[] civil rights cases on the 
ground of qualified immunity.”186 The Court watches lower courts like a 
hawk, closely monitoring any motions denying qualified immunity and 
placing outsized attention on the issue.187 The Court has managed to draw 
                                                           
181Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). Qualified immunity shields police 
officers from lawsuits based on official conduct if reasonable officers in the same position 
could have believed their conduct was “lawful, in light of clearly established law and the 
information the . . . officers possessed” at the time. Id. at 641. According to the Court, “[t]he 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 640; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 528 (1985) (finding that officials are immune unless “the law clearly proscribed the 
actions” they took). 
182 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1986) (“Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no 
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if 
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be 
recognized.”). 
183 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
184 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004). 
185 Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Judge Willett expressed his “broader unease with the real-world 
functioning of modern immunity practice.” Id. In a scathing rebuke of the Supreme Court’s 
qualified immunity jurisprudence, he concluded that “[t]o some observers, qualified 
immunity smacks of unqualified impunity,” because public officials are allowed to “duck 
consequences for bad behavior—no matter how palpably unreasonable—as long as they were 
the first to behave badly.” Id. 
186 Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 9 (reporting that a recent survey found that courts 
dismissed approximately seventy-two percent of claims, and “most of the dismissals were 
based on a determination that the plaintiff failed to present a sufficiently similar precedent”). 
187 See, e.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1780 n.3 (2015) 
(“[T]he Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual officers to 
liability.”); see also Baude, supra note 164, at 48 (“Essentially, the Court’s agenda is to 
especially ensure that lower courts do not improperly deny any immunity. This approach 
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criticism from a wide range of ideological perspectives on its application of 
qualified immunity.188 Even Justices from different ideological camps have 
openly questioned the Court’s approach to qualified immunity.189 And 
numerous scholars have criticized the doctrine,190 illustrating example after 
example of the miscarriage of justice in the pursuit of such unexamined 
deference to police officers.191 As Justice Sotomayor explained, the balance 
                                                           
sends a strong signal to lower courts and elevates official-protective qualified immunity cases 
to a level of attention exceeded only by the Court’s state-protective habeas docket.”). 
188 See, e.g., Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring Official Accountability, 
Restoring the Public’s Trust in Law Enforcement, and Promoting the Rule of Law as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Baxter v. Bracy, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 
18-1287), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (“Amici reflect an extensive cross-ideological 
and cross-professional consensus that this Court’s qualified immunity case law undermines 
accountability, harming citizens and public officials alike. . . . The diversity of the signatories 
reflects how qualified immunity abets and exacerbates the violation of constitutional rights of 
every sort—including the rights to freedom of speech and religious exercise, to keep and bear 
arms, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, to be free from racial discrimination, and to pursue a lawful occupation, just to 
name a few.”). 
189 See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity 
. . . we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute.”); Wyatt v. Cole, 
504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In the context of qualified immunity . 
. . we have diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards.”); Kisela v. Hughes, 
138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating the Court’s “one-sided 
approach to qualified immunity” has “transform[ed] the doctrine into an absolute shield for 
law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment”). 
190 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 165, at 311–12 (“[T]here have been growing calls by courts, 
as well as by a number of commentators and advocacy organizations across the political 
spectrum, to reconsider qualified immunity or do away with the defense altogether.”); Karen 
M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1887, 1892 (2018) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity is beyond repair.”); Baude, supra 
note 164, at 88 (arguing the doctrine “lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications 
are unpersuasive”); Kinports, supra note 171, at 78 (finding that the “increasingly broad 
brush” with which the Supreme Court has categorized the qualified immunity defense will 
likely increase protections for government defendants); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About 
Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 232 (2006) (arguing the Supreme Court has 
increasingly treated qualified immunity like absolute immunity—that is, as a total bar on suits 
against government officials). 
191 One of several examples comes from one of the most progressive circuits in the nation, 
illustrating just how widespread the issue is throughout the federal court system. The Ninth 
Circuit upheld a grant of qualified immunity to a police officer who, during a routine traffic 
stop, directed the vehicle’s driver to sit on the officer’s cruiser, pointed a gun at the driver’s 
head, and threatened to kill him if he declined to surrender on weapons charges when the 
officer discovered a gun in the backseat. Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 
2018). The court granted qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of the officer’s actions 
had not been clearly established under the circumstances because the stop had occurred at 
night, the driver had a prior conviction for unlawful firearms possession, and the driver 
“stood six feet tall,” “weighed two hundred and sixty-five pounds,” and “was only 10–15 feet 
away” from the gun. Id.; see also Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 
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tips too favorably toward the police, as the Court now “tells officers that they 
can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably 
unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”192 
3. The New Federalism – States Take Over As Federal Courts Have 
Failed 
States have the power to restore the original promise of § 1983 by 
creating an equivalent statute under state law. Ironically, it may now be left 
to state courts to provide the sort of accountability that federal courts were 
assigned 160 years ago in the Ku Klux Klan Act: it could be up to the states 
to prosecute what the federal government cannot.193 Looking to state law 
when federal courts have restricted civil rights is not new, of course. As 
Justice Brennan wrote over forty years ago in the face of growing resistance 
in federal court to desegregation and other issues, “the very premise of the 
cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts 
to step into the breach.”194 Justice Brennan was writing in “response to the 
                                                           
968 (2017) (collecting cases from the Supreme Court demonstrating that 
“[t]he Court’s veneration of police officers has not abated in recent years”); Katherine Mims 
Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1407 
(2019) (collecting other recent cases from the Supreme Court and answering the question, 
“why does qualified immunity matter? Among other reasons, because it excuses conduct that 
seems inexcusable.”). 
192 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
193 Of course, the law may not be the only reason why state courts could be better venues for 
prosecuting civil rights. The federal bench is becoming less and less diverse demographically 
and by legal experience. See, e.g., Maggie Jo Buchanan, The Startling Lack of Professional 
Diversity Among Federal Judges, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2020/06/17/486366/startling-lack-
professional-diversity-among-federal-judges/ [https://perma.cc/LW5J-WHBP] (“According 
to the Federal Judicial Center, only around 1 percent total of all federal appellate judges 
spent the majority of their careers as public defenders or legal aid attorneys.”); Elie Mystal, 
Donald Trump and the Plot to Take Over the Courts, THE NATION (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-mcconnel-court-judges-plot/ 
[https://perma.cc/TR3D-59KB] (“They’re hostile to minority voting rights and claims of 
racial or gender discrimination. They’re largely young and inexperienced, and an unsettling 
number have earned their stripes as partisan think-tank writers, op-ed columnists, or even 
bloggers.”); Andrew Cohen, Trump and McConnell’s Overwhelmingly White Male Judicial 
Appointments, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/trump-and-mcconnells-overwhelmingly-white-male-judicial-
appointments [https://perma.cc/5MXM-ANN4] (“In his first 40 months in office, Trump 
already has filled about 30 percent of the positions in the country’s federal appeals courts, 
where most of federal law is settled. Not a single one of Trump’s 53 confirmed appeals court 
nominees is Black. Only a single confirmed appeals court nominee is Latino.”). 
194 Justice William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977). One generation earlier, Justice Brandeis made a similar call 
for more state-based efforts. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
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Burger Court’s increasingly conservative interpretation of the federal 
constitution.”195 Until now, however, examples of using state courts to 
promote civil rights have been few and far between.196 
a. Examples from Other States  
A state-equivalent § 1983 statute is the logical next step to overcome 
what has happened to the federal version. Colorado has already taken such 
a step. Shortly after the killing of George Floyd amidst protests at the state 
Capitol,197 and with remarkable bipartisan support,198 Colorado enacted 
Senate Bill 20–217 (“SB-217”).199 Hailed as “The Law Enforcement 
                                                           
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
195 Caroline Davidson, State Constitutions and the Humane Treatment of Arrestees and 
Pretrial Detainees, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 4–5 (2014). 
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard 
individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective 
role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten that one of 
the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source of 
protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism is not served when 
the federal half of that protection is crippled. 
Justice Brennan, supra note 194, at 502–03. 
196 Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent 
State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 783 (2011) (“The promise of ‘the New 
Judicial Federalism’—of the independent interpretation by state courts of state constitutional 
corollaries to the federal Bill of Rights—has gone largely unfulfilled. . . . [I]ndependent state 
constitutionalism . . . is today more an aspiration than a practice.”). But see Jim 
Hilbert, Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to Challenge 
School Segregation, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4 (2017) (discussing how state constitutional claims 
can address school segregation). 
197 The protests had an impact. As Colorado State Representative and co-author of the bill 
Leslie Herod recalled, “Every day we would go into the capitol, and by about noon, we would 
start to hear chants from the crowd, . . . [like,] ‘Pass 217! I can’t breathe.[’] [Then] eight 
minutes, forty-six seconds of silence. That gets in people’s minds.” Berman, supra note 41. 
198 The Colorado Senate approved the bill nearly unanimously by a vote of thirty-three to two, 
and the House passed it by a vote of fifty-two to thirteen. Alex Burness & Saja Hindi, How 
Colorado Found the Political Will to Pass a Sweeping Police Reform Law in Just 16 Days, 
DENVER POST (June 19, 2020), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/06/19/colorado-police-
reform-accountability-bill/ [https://perma.cc/L9UT-BBPA]. 
199 Representative Herod acknowledged the broad implications of the new bill. See Nick 
Sibilla, Colorado Passes Landmark Law Against Qualified Immunity, Creates New Way to 
Protect Civil Rights, FORBES MAG. (June 21, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/06/21/colorado-passes-landmark-law-against-
qualified-immunity-creates-new-way-to-protect-civil-rights/#11b3e3cb378a 
[https://perma.cc/2VS7-LSDE] (quoting Representative and co-sponsor Leslie Herod, 
“Generations of Coloradans and communities across the country have been waiting far too 
long for this historic moment. . . . Together, we’ve made real change to address the violence 
and brutality that Black and Brown communities have endured at the hands of law 
enforcement.”). Representative Herod had tried to implement narrower reforms earlier in 
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Integrity and Accountability Act,” SB-217 implements a wide range of major 
policing reforms, including mandatory body-worn cameras,200 annual 
reporting on the use of force,201 prohibitions on the use of projectiles and 
chemical agents in response to protests,202 new limits on the general use of 
force,203 including a ban on the use of choke holds,204 and a duty to intervene 
on the part of officers who witness fellow officers use excessive force.205 
While those reforms are important changes to Colorado law and 
represent significant improvements, a unique aspect of the legislation was 
the creation of a § 1983 state-equivalent.206 Similar to its federal counterpart, 
SB-217 created a civil action for anyone whose state constitutional rights are 
deprived by a police officer acting “under color of law.”207 Importantly, SB-
217 makes explicit that “[q]ualified immunity is not a defense to liability 
pursuant to this section.”208 SB-217 also grants attorney’s fees to prevailing 
parties.209 By denying qualified immunity and providing attorney’s fees, the 
                                                           
the year in response to the death of Elijah McClain in Aurora, Colorado. Berman, supra 
note 41. Were it not for the pandemic, the Colorado Legislature would have already 
adjourned by the time of the killing of George Floyd. Id. McClain died after being placed in 
a choke hold by police and then injected with the sedative ketamine. See generally Lucy 
Tompkins, Here’s What You Need to Know About Elijah McClain’s Death, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-was-elijah-mcclain.html 
[https://perma.cc/3LK5-ZA6N]. 
200 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-31-902, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2020) (effective July 1, 2023) 
(requiring any recordings relevant to a complaint of officer misconduct be released to the 
public within twenty-one days).  
201 Id. § 24-31-903. 
202 Id. § 24-31-905. 
203 COLO. § 18-1-707. 
204 Id. subdiv. 2.5(a). 
205 Id. § 18-8-802. 
206 Jay Schwiekert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate 
Qualified Immunity, CATO INST. (June 22, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-
passes-historic-bipartisan-policing-reforms-eliminate-qualified-immunity 
[https://perma.cc/P23W-5RV7] (observing that Colorado “is the first state to specifically 
negate the availability of qualified immunity as a defense through legislation” and 
praising the ACLU of Colorado for “tremendous wisdom in recognizing that any civil rights 
legislation would need to specifically address and negate the defense of qualified immunity”). 
207 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131, subdiv. 1 (West 2020) (stating that a police officer 
who “under color of law” deprives any person of rights protected under Article II of the 
Colorado State Constitution “is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable or any other 
appropriate relief”). 
208 Id. subdiv. 2(b). The Act also removes liability caps and excludes other immunities. See 
id. subdiv. 2(a) (“Statutory immunities and statutory limitations on liability, damages, or 
attorney feeds do not apply to claims brought pursuant to this section.”). 
209 Id. subdiv. 3 (“In any action brought pursuant to this section, a court shall award reasonable 
attorney fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff.”). 
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Colorado legislation essentially takes the best of § 1983 without the baggage 
of the limitations that federal courts have imposed over the past sixty years.210 
While certainly the most ambitious, Colorado’s remarkable police 
reform in summer 2020 is not the first legislation to create a state-equivalent 
§ 1983 statute.211 The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“the MCRA”), which 
is also known as “little 1983” or the “baby civil rights bill,” was the first and 
most fully-developed state civil rights statute.212 The Massachusetts 
Legislature acted to overcome “the challenge posed by the Supreme Court’s 
retrenchment on civil rights.”213 Enacted “in response to problems of racial 
violence and harassment,”214 the MCRA authorizes a private right of action 
                                                           
210 In addition, SB-217 limits indemnification and requires officers to contribute to any 
damages assessed against them, but only if the officer’s employer “determines that the officer 
did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief that the action was lawful.” Id. subdiv. 4. 
In such cases, the officer is “personally liable and shall not be indemnified . . . for five percent 
of the judgment or settlement or twenty-five thousand dollars, whichever is less.” Id. The 
Colorado legislation is silent on respondeat superior liability, but Colorado law already 
recognizes the doctrine in its state tort law and may incorporate it into SB-217 automatically. 
See Rowe v. Parks, No. 06-01192, 2007 WL 683989, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 2007) 
(citing Stokes v. Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP, 159 P.3d 691 (Colo. App. 2006)) 
(“[U]nder Colorado law, the doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer is 
liable for the torts of an employee acting within the scope of employment.”).  
211 In addition to Colorado, Connecticut has also passed legislation that could limit the 
application of qualified immunity in state-based claims against police officers, but the 
Connecticut law includes a governmental immunity exemption for police officers who “at the 
time of the conduct complained of, . . . had an objectively good faith belief that such officer’s 
conduct did not violate the law.” See An Act Concerning Police Accountability, H.B. 6004, 
2020 Sess. (Conn. 2020), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2020/act/Pa/pdf/2020PA-00001-R00HB-
06004SS1-PA.PDF [https://perma.cc/3FMR-6UYX]; see also Nick Sibilla, New Connecticut 
Law Limits Police Immunity in Civil Rights Lawsuits, But Loopholes Remain, FORBES MAG. 
(July 31, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/07/31/new-connecticut-law-
limits-police-immunity-in-civil-rights-lawsuits-but-loopholes-remain/?sh=4fc56edace8d 
[https://perma.cc/6RXM-574Z] (concluding “the new law contains multiple loopholes that 
undermine its effectiveness”). 
212 Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 167, at 544. 
213 Ian F. Haney Lopez, Recent Development, An Act Relative to Civil Rights Under Law– 
Massachusetts General Laws Ch. 93, S 102 (1989), 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 147, 163 
(1990) (“As the Supreme Court of the United States has pulled back from the enforcement 
of civil rights, those seeking redress for violation of their rights have looked increasingly to 
state laws and to the state courts.” (quoting the Boston Bar Association, Proposed Civil Rights 
Legislation Explanatory Statement Presented in Advance of the Legislation)). 
214 O’Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Mass. 1987). In signing the bill, Governor 
Dukakis stated that the MCRA “reinstates the employment discrimination protection of the 
1976 Supreme Court Runyon v. McCrary ruling which was partially overturned in June 
by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.” Lopez, supra note 213, at 157. The act has also 
extended to sexual harassment. O’Connell, 511 N.E.2d at 353 (“Sexual harassment 
accomplished by threats, intimidation, or coercion constitutes precisely the kind of conduct 
proscribed by the act.”). 
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in state court for violation of state and federal civil rights.215 The MCRA, like 
other civil rights statutes, is remedial and “is entitled to liberal construction 
of its terms.”216 As an example of the possibilities of using state law to exceed 
federal court limitations, the MCRA goes beyond what is allowed in federal 
civil rights cases by including actions performed by non-state, private 
actors.217 
In addition to Colorado and Massachusetts, three other states have 
created statutes similar to § 1983.218 A handful of states have enacted more 
limited provisions that allow claims for violations of only certain rights.219 
The majority of state legislatures, however, “have not affirmatively 
established a civil action to recover damages for the deprivation of state 
constitutional rights.”220 
One important limitation on previous state-based § 1983 statutes is 
that they import federal jurisprudence with respect to qualified immunity. 
The text of other state civil rights statutes “is typically cast in general 
terms.”221 As Professor Gary Gildin observes, “[a]bsent unambiguous 
                                                           
215 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11I (1996) (“Any person whose exercise or 
enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights 
secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or 
attempted to be interfered with, as described in § 11H, may institute and prosecute in his 
own name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable 
relief as provided for in said section, including the award of compensatory money 
damages.”).  
216 Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Mass. 1985). 
217 See Chaabouni v. City of Boston, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93, 100–01 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The 
purpose of the MCRA was to provide a state remedy for deprivation of civil rights extending 
beyond the limits of federal law by incorporating private action within its bounds. . . . Thus, 
the Legislature intended to provide a remedy under state law coextensive with the federal 
remedy except that the federal statute requires state action whereas the MCRA does not.” 
(citation omitted)).  
218 See, e.g., Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (2006); 
Tom Bane Civil Rights Act of 1993, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) & (b) (West 1997); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682, 1-A (West 1996); see also Donoghue and Edelstein, supra note 
167, at 541 (noting that “[t]he idea of a civil rights statute at the state level is a relatively new 
one in American law” and “[p]rior to 1977, only federal law provided a statutory cause of 
action for damages for violation of constitutional rights”). 
219 Nebraska also has a civil rights statute, but it is limited to private employment 
discrimination cases. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-148 (1997); see also Wiseman v. 
Keller, 358 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Neb. 1984) (discussing the legislative history of the Nebraska 
civil rights act and indicating it was limited to private employment discrimination cases); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1983) (recognizing claim by employee disciplined 
or discharged because of exercise of right of expression or religious belief as provided 
by state constitution); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-E:1 (2017) (protecting state employees’ 
right of freedom of speech); New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:6-2 (West 
2014) (providing a private cause of action where interference state constitutional protections 
was made through “threats, intimidation, or coercion”). 
220 Gildin, supra note 102, at 885. 
221 Id. at 887. 
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guidance from the statutory text, courts may turn to what superficially 
appears to be the most analogous authority—relevant Supreme Court 
doctrine on defenses available to those same state and local officials and 
entities when they violate the federal constitution.”222 This is precisely what 
Massachusetts courts have done. According to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court, “[w]e presume that the Legislature was aware of this case law [on 
qualified immunity] when it chose to pattern the Massachusetts Civil Rights 
Act after § 1983.”223 As a result, the MCRA “affords qualified immunity to 
public officials to the same extent that § 1983 does.”224  
Minnesota legislators would be wise to look to their colleagues to 
the West for ideas on improving how Minnesota law might handle police 
misconduct in the civil context, as Colorado avoids this issue by explicitly 
stating that qualified immunity does not apply. Minnesota courts have 
already signaled that qualified immunity, or other similar immunity, would 
likely apply in a state-based § 1983 claim without explicitly prohibiting the 
defense.225 As the Minnesota Supreme Court instructed, “[i]f a statutory 
enactment is to abrogate common law, the abrogation must be by express 
wording or necessary implication.”226 A Minnesota state-based § 1983 claim 
could avoid qualified immunity (and the lack of respondeat superior) 
through clear drafting to explicitly prohibit the defense.227  
b. The Present State of Minnesota Civil Law and Police Abuse 
Currently, under Minnesota state law, civil remedies for police 
abuse are available only through tort law.228 Like the vast majority of states, 
                                                           
222 Id. 
223 Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989); see also Lyons v. Nat’l Car Rental 
Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Accordingly, we look to cases construing the 
federal Civil Rights Act for guidance [in interpreting MCRA cases].”). 
224 See Rodriques v. Furtado, 575 N.E.2d 1124, 1127 (Mass. 1991) (explaining that the 
MCRA “intended to adopt the standard of immunity for public officials developed under 42 
U.S.C. 1983”). 
225 State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. 1994) (applying 
official immunity to Minnesota Human Rights Act because “this court has long followed the 
presumption that statutory enactments are consistent with common law doctrines”). 
226 Id. 
227 While not a focus of this article, one other clear advantage that a state-based § 1983 statute 
could have is the application of respondeat superior. Under Minnesota law, municipalities 
may be liable for the misconduct of their police officers under the doctrine. Yang v. City of 
Brooklyn Park, 194 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875 (D. Minn. 2016) (citing Watson by Hanson v. 
Metro. Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn.1996)). The U.S. Supreme Court 
eliminated such liability from § 1983 five decades ago. See supra notes 159–63 and 
accompanying text.  
228 Police may also be subject to discrimination claims under the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act. In June 2020, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights opened an investigation 
into the Minneapolis Police Department, claiming that the killing of George Floyd and other 
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Minnesota does not have a statutory equivalent of § 1983.229 Additionally, 
with a few important exceptions,230 there is (almost) no private right of action 
for violations of the state constitution, let alone for violations by police.231 
Plaintiffs using state law to prosecute police abuse are stuck with similar 
challenges of immunity issues, and unlike § 1983, there are generally no 
attorney’s fees included with available remedies.  
                                                           
incidents “similar to it since at least January 1, 2010 and continuing to the present” require 
investigation into whether the department’s “training, policies, procedures, practices, 
including but not limited to use of force protocols, and any corresponding implementation, 
amounts to unlawful race-based policing, which deprives People of Color, particularly Black 
community members, of their civil rights.” Minnesota Department of Human Rights, Charge 
of Discrimination, Minneapolis Police Department (Respondent), June 2, 2020 (on file with 
author).  
229 See Jihad v. Fabian, No. 09-1604 (SRN/LIB), 2011 WL 1641885, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 
17, 2011) (“Minnesota has not enacted a statute that is equivalent to § 1983”), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1641767, at *3 (D. Minn. May 2, 2011); Riehm v. 
Engelking, No. 06-293 (JRT/RLE), 2007 WL 37799, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 2007) 
(dismissing claims under Minnesota Constitution because “[u]nlike 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, Minnesota has no statutory scheme providing for private actions based on violations 
of the Minnesota Constitution”); Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961, 975 (D. Minn. 2005) 
(finding that “Minnesota has not enacted a statute equivalent to § 1983”). 
230 See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302–03 (Minn. 1993) (permitting lawsuit by school 
districts with low property-tax bases alleging that state school financing formula violates 
Education Clauses and Equal Protection guarantees of the Minnesota Constitution); 
Knudtson v. City of Coates, 506 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (enjoining 
prohibition on non-obscene nude dancing under free expression provision to Minnesota 
Constitution); Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904–05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d on 
other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) (striking down welfare statute disfavoring new 
Minnesotans under Equal Protection guarantees of the Federal and Minnesota 
Constitutions); McGovern v. City of Minneapolis, 480 N.W.2d 121, 126–27 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992) (permitting owners of houses damaged in police actions to obtain compensation from 
the City of Minneapolis under the state constitution’s takings clause); Wegner v. Milwaukee 
Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41–42 (Minn. 1991), reh’g denied, (Jan. 27, 1992) (holding 
that a municipality is not insulated from liability to homeowners under doctrine of public 
necessity); see also Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d 400, 409 (Minn. 1944) 
(permitting hybrid tort/constitutional lawsuit against officials but not the town); Thomsen v. 
Ross, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 975–76 (D. Minn. 2005) (“The Court is mindful of the remedies 
clause of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides a ‘certain remedy in the laws’ for 
injuries and wrongs . . . . Here, the Court assumes, without deciding, that a Minnesota court 
would recognize a private right of action to remedy violations of Article I, sections 6, 7 
and 10.” (citations omitted)). 
231 See Eggenberger v. W. Albany Twp., 820 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]here is no 
private cause of action for violations of the Minnesota Constitution.”); see also Mlnarik v. 
City of Minnetrista, No. A09–910, 2010 WL 346402, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2010) 
(explaining “no private cause of action for a violation of the Minnesota constitution has yet 
been recognized”); Danforth v. Eling, No. A10-130, 2010 WL 4068791, at *6 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 19, 2010) (noting “there is no private cause of action for violations of the 
Minnesota Constitution”). 
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First, immunity defenses provide a barrier to tort claims. Police 
officers in Minnesota may avoid state tort actions through the application of 
another affirmative defense—official immunity.232 The defense applies to 
“discretionary duties,”233 and it requires that plaintiffs prove a “willful or 
malicious wrong” by defendants to overcome the defense.234 Under 
Minnesota law, the decision to use deadly force is a discretionary decision 
entitling a police officer to official immunity absent a willful or malicious 
wrong.235  
In determining whether an official has committed a malicious 
wrong, Minnesota courts “consider whether the official has intentionally 
committed an act that he or she had reason to believe is prohibited.”236 
Importantly, this “contemplates less of a subjective inquiry into malice, 
which was traditionally favored at common law, and more of an objective 
inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an official’s actions.”237 The defense 
applies even if officers take intentional action that could support an 
                                                           
232 Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (en banc).  
233 Under Minnesota law, a public official is entitled to official immunity from state law claims 
when the official’s duties require the exercise of discretion or judgment. Johnson v. Morris, 
453 N.W.2d 31, 41 (Minn. 1990). As opposed to “discretionary” duties, “an [o]fficial duty is 
ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a 
specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677. On the 
other hand, the commissioner of corrections and a prison warden had discretionary duties 
in supervising the prison industries program, insulating those officials from liability for a 
negligence claim arising from a prison factory incident. Susla v. State, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 
(Minn. 1976) (en banc). Not surprisingly, the distinction between “discretionary” and 
“ministerial” duties has been subject to “enigmatic application and occasional 
breakdown.” Papenhausen v. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1978). 
234 Susla, 247 N.W.2d at 912. 
235 Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
236 State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571–72 (Minn. 1994). 
237 Id. at 571. Courts regularly determine that, where the use of force was not objectively 
unreasonable, it was also not willful or malicious. Henderson v. City of Woodbury, 233 F. 
Supp. 3d 723, 732–33 (D. Minn. 2017); see also Hayek v. City of St. Paul, 488 F.3d 1049, 
1056 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Because the officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable, a reasonable 
fact-finder could not conclude the officers’ conduct was willful or malicious.”). 
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intentional tort claim.238 Official immunity also extends to protect 
government entities from vicarious liability for an official’s actions.239 
The analysis for determining whether official immunity applies 
“is similar, but not identical,” to the analysis of qualified immunity in § 1983 
actions.240 As with the federal standard for § 1983 cases, an official seeking 
protection through official immunity in Minnesota must show that (1) his or 
her conduct was “legally reasonable,” or (2) “no clearly established law or 
regulation prohibited [the] conduct.”241 Minnesota rejected the argument 
that federal law supplanted the Minnesota common law doctrine of official 
immunity in part because the Minnesota Supreme Court determined 
that Harlow “completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles 
not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective 
malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into 
the legal reasonableness of the official action.”242 
The Minnesota official immunity doctrine and the federal qualified 
immunity doctrine differ with respect to the analysis of “legal 
reasonableness.”243 In Elwood v. Rice County,244 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court declined to adopt the federal governmental immunity analysis to 
common law official immunity as applied to state tort claims because the 
U.S. Supreme Court had eliminated the subjective “good faith” component 
                                                           
238 Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding immunity for 
state tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rico v. State, 472 
N.W.2d 100, 102–06 (Minn. 1991) (finding immunity for an official who fired a former 
employee, even if the official intentionally committed an act later determined to be 
wrong); Johnson, 453 N.W.2d at 42 (finding immunity for shooting out tires and handcuffing 
a man who evaded arrest even though those same actions would otherwise be 
battery); Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 674 (finding immunity on claims of battery and trespass). 
Of course, the court is careful to add, “The doctrine protects honest law enforcement efforts, 
and is not intended to shield police brutality.” Id. at 679. 
239 Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 1998); see also Mike 
Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 239, 
252 (2006) (“If official immunity applies to a government official, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has made the decision to extend vicarious official immunity to the governmental entity 
employing that official.”). 
240 Galarnyk v. Fraser, No. 08-3351 (JMR/AJ), 2009 WL 2929428, at *9 (D. Minn. June 25, 
2009) (citing Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309, 317–18 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d in part, 582 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 1998)); see also Greiner v. City 
of Champlin, 816 F. Supp. 528, 545 (D. Minn. 1993), decision rescinded, 27 F.3d 1346 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (“While qualified immunity and official immunity are distinct concepts, the tests 
are similar.”). 
241 Compare Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”), with Rico, 472 
N.W.2d at 107 (“[N]o clearly established law or regulation prohibited [the] conduct.”). 
242 Ellwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677. Accordingly, the court held that “[w]e decline to simply 
apply the federal standard in all state tort actions.” Id. 
243 Gleason, 563 N.W.2d at 317. 
244 423 N.W.2d at 677. 
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of legal reasonableness.245 Despite this, some Minnesota cases have 
sometimes “indicated favor for the federal standard and the federal courts’ 
attempts to isolate purely legal questions on which to decide the applicability 
of immunity.”246 But the court has retained reference to the subjective “good 
faith” component of legal reasonableness in stating its test.247 The Minnesota 
test is three parts. “Immunity for the discretionary act applies when the 
official demonstrates: (1) the conduct was ‘objectively’ legally reasonable, 
that is, legally justified under the circumstances; (2) the conduct was 
‘subjectively’ reasonable, that is, taken with subjective good faith; or (3) the 
right allegedly violated was not clearly established, that is, there was no basis 
for knowing the conduct would violate the plaintiff’s rights.”248 
Also, unlike § 1983 claims, Minnesota courts generally do not 
provide for attorney’s fees for tort claims against police officers.249 Minnesota 
follows the American rule, which “prevents a party from shifting its attorney 
fees to its adversary without a specific contract or statutory authorization.”250 
                                                           
245 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the subjective “good faith” component because it 
typically involved fact questions requiring resolution by a jury and was therefore contrary to 
the purpose of immunity which is to protect officials from suit. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
246 Gleason, 563 N.W.2d at 317; see, e.g., Carter v. Cole, 539 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1995) 
(citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (adopting federal reasoning for separating 
appeals challenging evidence sufficiency, a fact-based question, from appeals of immunity 
denials, a legal question); Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 108 (“[F]ederal decisions interpreting 
qualified immunity under § 1983, though certainly not conclusive, are instructive when we 
examine an official immunity issue because § 1983 qualified immunity and common law 
official immunity further the same purpose.”). 
247 See State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994) (The 
standard contemplates “less of a subjective inquiry into malice, which was traditionally 
favored at common law, and more of an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an 
official’s actions.”). The “subjective inquiry into malice” does not refer to the question of 
whether the official was acting with animus. See id. Malice in the context of immunity 
connotes a concept unrelated to “ill will” or “improper motive.” See Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 
107 n.5 (distinguishing malice in the defamation context). 
248 Gleason, 563 N.W.2d at 318. Though, as the court acknowledged, “it is the rare case in 
which the ‘subjective component’ of legal reasonableness will be relevant or a viable theory 
for the defendant seeking to avoid suit.” Id. at 318. Rather, the “subjective component” 
allows an official to argue that, despite the lack of an “objective” legal justification for the 
violation, the offending acts were taken in good faith. Id.; see Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 107. 
249 See generally John M. Bjorkman, Minnesota and the American Rule: The Recoverability 
of Attorneys’ Fees Following In Re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 541, 543–46 (2003) (discussing the history of the American rule in 
Minnesota). 
250 Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 1998); see also Irwin v. Surdyk’s 
Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“That fees may not 
be shifted in the absence of a statute or contract was settled more than 100 years ago in this 
state. With limited exception, this court has consistently adhered to the American Rule.” 
(citations omitted)); see generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575–78 (1993) 
(describing the origin and history of the American Rule). 
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The exception to the American rule is when legislatures enact fee-shifting 
provisions in statutes, like Congress did in § 1983.251 While tort claims in 
the state do not have this provision, Minnesota has enacted several hundred 
statutes authorizing attorney’s fees for other claims.252 
B. Proposal No. 2: Require that Police Officers Carry Individual 
Professional Liability Insurance 
Employment and labor laws create their own set of barriers to 
holding police officers accountable.253 Supervisors have increasingly limited 
ability to discipline and fire police officers no matter how egregious their 
conduct because of arbitration provisions in police union contracts or other 
statutorily required protections.254 And even when officers are found guilty 
in civil court and substantial damages are imposed, the officers are 
indemnified entirely by taxpayers and usually never pay a dime.255 
                                                           
251 According to Justice Russell Anderson, “the legislature, not the court, has the power to 
determine when, or if, an attorney should be awarded attorney fees against unsuccessful 
litigants.” Irwin, 599 N.W.2d at 145 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., dissenting). There are 
exceptions to the rule, of course. See, e.g., Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319 
N.W.2d 26, 33 (Minn. 1982) (“An exception to this rule arises in situations in which the 
defendant’s wrongful act thrusts the plaintiff into litigation with a third person.”). 
252 See generally MARY MULLEN, MINN. H.R. RSCH. DEP’T, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN 
MINNESOTA STATUTES (2018), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/attyfee.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C765-NNKG] (identifying well over 400 statutory provisions). One such 
provision is the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.33, subdiv. 7 
(providing that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). 
253 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012) 
(detailing the various employment and labor laws that interfere with efforts of police reform). 
254 Collective bargaining agreements are one source for arbitration protections, but there is 
wide variability on where precisely in state law arbitration protections reside. See Stephen 
Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 551 (2019) (“These 
procedures are often articulated not just in state statutes or municipal codes, but also in 
department-specific police union contracts.”). Minnesota police officers’ rights to collective 
bargaining and arbitrate disputes over discipline are both creatures of statutory law. See 
MINN. STAT. § 179A.06, subdiv. 2 (“Public employees have the right to form and join labor 
or employee organizations.”); MINN. STAT. §§ 179A.20-.21 (outlining arbitration rights). 
255 Schwartz, supra note 34, at 960 (reviewing the policies and practices of eighty-one different 
police departments and finding that “officers almost never contribute anything to settlements 
and judgments in police misconduct suits”). Most of the indemnification requirements stem 
from state law. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 466.07, subdiv. 1 (“Subject to the limitations in 
§ 466.04, a municipality or an instrumentality of a municipality shall defend and indemnify 
any of its officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, for damages, including 
punitive damages, claimed or levied against the officer or employee.”); MINN. STAT. § 3.736, 
subdiv. 9(a) (“The state shall defend, save harmless, and indemnify a peace officer who is 
not acting on behalf of a private employer and who is acting in good faith under § 629.40, 
subdivision 4, the same as if the officer were an employee of the state.”). Yet Professor 
Schwartz found that “[g]overnments satisfied settlements and judgments in police 
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Both arbitration and indemnification are deeply embedded across 
nearly every police department in the country. Some other mechanism must 
come into play to remove problem officers and create incentives for all 
officers to comport with good practices. While it is still relatively obscure, 
individual liability insurance, unheard of for police officers, creates 
important accountability in other professions, such as medicine and law, and 
could fill the gap that arbitration and indemnification have carved into police 
officer accountability.256 
1. Arbitration Protections and the Inability to Fire Problem Officers 
 Failure to fire police officers who are clearly unfit for duty can 
have significant ripple effects. Officers with serious past misconduct remain 
on the force despite numerous complaints against them, and they are likely 
at a higher risk of killing suspects. Derek Chauvin had seventeen 
misconduct complaints against him during his nineteen years as a 
Minneapolis policeman before he killed George Floyd.257 Chauvin joins a 
long list of officers involved in killing suspects who already had multiple 
complaints filed against them.258 Garrett Rolfe, who shot and killed Rayshard 
Brooks just two weeks after Mr. Floyd was killed, had twelve complaints.259 
                                                           
misconduct cases even when indemnification was prohibited by statute or policy.” Schwartz, 
supra note 34, at 890. Indemnification even covered officers who had been fired or criminally 
prosecuted for the conduct in question. Id. 
256 See Deborah Ramirez, Marcus Wraight, Lauren Kilmister, & Carly Perkins, Policing the 
Police: Could Mandatory Professional Liability Insurance for Officers Provide A New 
Accountability Model?, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 407, 412 (2019) (“Our hope is that just as drivers 
with established histories of reckless driving can be priced off the road by insurance 
premiums, so too, the most dangerous officers might be forced into another profession.”). 
As Professor Ramirez and her colleagues explain, “The idea has the advantage of being 
market-based, aligning the financial interests of individual officers, police departments, 
municipalities, and insurance companies towards safer policing . . . [and] has the added 
benefit of not being solely punitive; officers with histories indicating their professionalism 
and excellence can be financially rewarded with lower premiums.” Id. 
257 Stephen Montemayor, Jennifer Bjorhus & Matt McKinney, Even To Friends, Former 
Officer Derek Chauvin Was An Enigma, Star Trib. (Aug. 8, 2020), 
https://www.startribune.com/those-who-know-derek-chauvin-say-they-would-not-have-
predicted-his-killing-of-george-floyd/572054552/ [https://perma.cc/R6UF-9QCC]. 
258 Of course, complaints are not the only measure of misconduct, and most civil rights 
verdicts against officers are not part of an officer’s record. Judith A.M. Scully, Rotten Apple 
Or Rotten Barrel?: The Role Of Civil Rights Lawyers In Ending The Culture Of Police 
Violence, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 137, 150–52 (2008) (finding that civil rights settlements are 
not kept on the personnel files of problem officers, which could reflect a clean record but 
multiple § 1983 claims). 
259 Curtis Gilbert, Atlanta Cop Who Killed Rayshard Brooks Had Prior Controversial 
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Jason Van Dyke, who shot and killed seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald 
in Chicago, had twenty-two complaints against him.260 Daniel Pantaleo, the 
NYPD officer who used a fatal choke hold on Eric Garner, had seven 
disciplinary complaints and fourteen individual allegations lodged against 
him.261 These officers are not mere outliers. Emerging research supports the 
logical assumption: officers with multiple complaints are higher risks for 
future misconduct.262 
The current system actually protects officers—who, in most other 
professions, would lose their jobs—and keeps those officers in a position to 
inflict deadly force. Former Boston Police Commissioner William Evans 
explained the predicament police leadership faces: “he can’t hire the 
officers he wants, promote those who share his values, effectively discipline 
errant officers, and he can’t fire them, or if he did, he risks having the 
decision overturned.”263 A former police chief explained that “in nearly nine 
years as chief . . . , [he] had 16 cops out of 650 whom [he] felt should be 
fired. Four [he] actually did fire. The Civil Service Commission promptly 
reversed [him] on three of them.”264 This same problem exists in Minnesota. 
In the past eight years in Minneapolis, “9 of every 10 accusations of 
misconduct were resolved without punishment or intervention aimed at 
changing an officer’s behavior.”265 After receiving approximately 3,000 total 
                                                           
260 Michael Lansu, Former Chicago Cop Jason Van Dyke Sentenced to 81 Months in Prison 
For 2014 Murder, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/18/686391662/former-chicago-cop-jason-van-dyke-to-be-
sentenced-for-laquan-mcdonald-murder [https://perma.cc/6T27-49CN] (noting Chicago 
police records show that at least twenty-two complaints had been filed against Van 
Dyke before he shot McDonald).  
261 Danika Fears, Cop Who Fatally Choked Eric Garner Had Long List of Complaints, N.Y. 
POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/03/21/cop-who-fatally-choked-eric-garner-
had-long-list-of-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/UJ6E-MFDC]. 
262 Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to 
Predict Police Misconduct, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 225, 227 (2019) (finding that past 
civilian allegations predict future misconduct). Researchers reviewed more than 50,000 
civilian complaints against officers in Chicago and determined that “[t]he worst one percent 
of officers, as measured by civilian allegations, generate almost five times the number of 
payouts and over four times the total damage payouts in civil rights litigation.” Id. 
263 Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 411. 
264 Daniel Oates, I Used to Be a Police Chief. This Is Why It’s So Hard to Fire Bad Cops, 
Wash. Post (June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/12/i-used-
be-police-chief-this-is-why-its-so-hard-fire-bad-cops/ [https://perma.cc/UQ8H-F3GW]. 
265 Reade Levinson & Michael Berens, Special Report: How Union, Supreme Court Shield 
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complaints against Minneapolis police officers during that period, only five 
officers were fired.266 
Arbitration puts a startling number of fired officers back on the 
job.267 In Minnesota, approximately half of all officers fired since 2013 got 
their jobs back through arbitration.268 Those who were returned to work by 
arbitrators included one officer who was fired for “kicking an unarmed suspect 
who was already on the ground being attacked by a police dog,” another officer 
for “repeatedly punching a handcuffed . . . man in the face,” and a third officer 
for “failing to write up nearly four dozen cases, copying a judge’s signature onto 
search warrants[,] and lying during the investigation.”269 As the Minnesota 
Supreme Court acknowledged, even conduct that “[n]o doubt many 
observers would find . . . disturbing” is not sufficient if an arbitrator decides 
the officer should be back on the job.270 Under our current system, even the 
most miscreant officer can get their job back from an arbitrator.271 
                                                           
266 Id. As one example, Officer Blayne Lehner was fired “for violating the department’s use 
of force policy after video showed him repeatedly throwing a woman to the ground while 
responding to a domestic disturbance.” Id. Officer Lehner had more than thirty complaints 
during his eighteen-year career. Id. Despite his conduct and past complaint, an arbitrator 
overturned the termination of his employment and reduced the penalty to a forty-hour 
suspension without pay. Id.; see also Mark Iris, Unbinding Binding Arbitration of Police 
Discipline: The Public Policy Exception, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 540, 545 (2013) (detailing how an 
arbitration reversal required the St. Paul police to reinstate a convicted sex offender to the 
force). 
267 Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery, & Steven Rich, Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often 
Forced to Put Officers Fired for Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/ 
[https://perma.cc/HEF3-WJDZ] (describing data collection efforts that found a significant 
proportion of American law enforcement officers terminated by their police departments are 
ordered to be rehired on appeal by arbitrators). 
268 Jon Collins, Half of Fired Minnesota Police Officers Get Their Jobs Back Through 
Arbitration, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/07/09/half-of-fired-minnesota-police-officers-get-their-
jobs-back-through-arbitration [https://perma.cc/D8MC-9KEU] (“Since 2013, independent 
arbitrators in Minnesota have ruled about half the time that police officers who were 
terminated should get their jobs back or receive lesser discipline.”).  
269 Jennifer Bjorhus, Fired Minnesota Officers Have a Proven Career Saver: Arbitration, STAR 
TRIB. (June 21, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-cops-fired-then-
rehired/571392702/ [https://perma.cc/XY6Q-WGZD]. 
270 City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., 923 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2019). In 
October 2015, a Richfield police officer, who had previously been disciplined for how he 
used force, was fired for striking a teenager in the head during a traffic stop. Collins, supra 
note 268. The officer had also pushed the teenager twice and used profanity. Richfield, 923 
N.W.2d at 39. Three and a half years later, the court upheld the arbitrator’s ruling to give 
the officer his job back, despite the “disturbing” nature of the behavior. See id. at 42 (“But 
state statute requires arbitration, and the City’s contract with the Union gives the arbitrator 
the authority to decide what constitutes just cause for termination.”).  
271 See Rushin, supra note 254, at 550 (documenting numerous cases of officers who were 
given their jobs back despite serious misconduct). As Professor Rushin concludes, “police 
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This process not only puts problem officers back at their job, but it 
makes their supervisors less likely to impose disciplinary sanctions in the 
first place.272 As Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo explained, 
“There is nothing more debilitating to a chief from an employment matter per-
spective, than when you have grounds to terminate an officer for misconduct, 
and you’re dealing with a third-party mechanism that allows for that employee to 
not only be back on your department, but to be patrolling in your communi-
ties.”273 The process also “can have a corrosive effect on police discipline and 
morale, telling the misbehaving officers they may continue their misconduct 
without fear of adverse action, while undermining the morale of those who 
adhere to police regulations and ethical norms.”274 Nevertheless, most 
departments continue to include arbitration provisions in their police union 
contracts.275  
Not surprisingly, city officials from all across Minnesota made 
arbitration one of their main targets for reform during last summer’s special 
                                                           
disciplinary appeals have forced communities to rehire police officers deemed unfit for duty 
by their supervisors.” Id. at 550–51; see also Iris, supra note 266, at 544 (examining 
numerous studies and concluding that arbitrations often overturn “disciplinary actions, 
grounded in conduct which chiefs of police and presumably the public at large would find 
simply unacceptable”); Martha Bellisle, Police in Misconduct Cases Stay on Force Through 
Arbitration, AP NEWS (June 24, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/d098a19c1c34749d763fd57a721d9e1d [https://perma.cc/BP8K-
G97P] (collecting examples, including an Oregon police officer who “lost his job and then 
returned to work after fatally shooting an unarmed Black man in the back[, a] Florida 
sergeant [who] was [fired] six times for using excessive force and stealing from suspects[, and] 
a Texas lieutenant [who] was terminated five times after being accused of striking two women, 
making threatening calls[,] and committing other infractions”).  
272 Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2211–
12 (2014) (“An officer’s ability to contest adverse employment actions makes supervisors less 
likely to impose disciplinary sanctions because while a supervisor faces a possible headache 
for not disciplining a misbehaving subordinate, they face a certain headache if they do.”). 
273 Bjorhus, supra note 269. The process makes it less likely that problem officers will be 
fired. Minneapolis Assistant Chief Mike Kjos explained, “The fact that firing an officer could 
end up in arbitration—and be reversed—weighs on decisions to officially terminate.” Id. 
274 Iris, supra note 266, at 546. 
275 See generally Rushin, supra note 254 (drawing on a dataset of 656 police union contracts 
to show that the overwhelming majority of these contracts provide officers with the option to 
appeal disciplinary action to arbitration and provide officers with other protections on 
appeal). In addition to providing unusually strong appeal mechanisms, police unions have 
other distinctive features. See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 
COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1335–36 (2020) (“In many ways, police unions flout both traditional 
assumptions about organized labor and contemporary framings of the new labor movement. 
Where unions often swing left, police unions swing right. Where much modern labor 
organizing focuses on low-wage workers, police unions protect higher-wage professionals. 
Where unionism and antiracism sometimes have travelled hand-in-hand, police unions still 
represent predominantly white workers and frequently take public stands that are hostile to 
racial justice or that express outright racism.”). 
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legislative sessions.276 The Mayor of Minneapolis, Jacob Frey, stated, “If the 
legislature is serious about deep, structural police reforms, this is the most 
impactful change they could make.”277 The St. Paul Police Chief Todd 
Axtell recommended making arbitration decisions more easily appealed.278 
Coon Rapids Police Chief Brad Wise testified that “there’s nothing worse, in my 
view, for an organization than to lose an arbitration. . . . [I]t makes police leaders 
be reluctant to even let cases go to arbitration for fear of losing them.”279 Duluth 
Police Chief Mike Tusken testified that serious misconduct cases erode public 
trust and to maintain that trust “[w]e need a process in which there is a fair 
outcome.”280 
Despite calls for broader reform, the changes passed last summer 
provided only a minor tweak to the arbitration system in Minnesota and left 
in place arbitrators’ largely unlimited authority to reinstate officers fired for 
                                                           
276 Erik Misselt, interim executive director of the Peace Officers Standards and Training 
Board, told the media that arbitration is an issue “we hear a lot about. Chiefs have made it 
pretty clear that is one of the things they want the Legislature to address.” Star Tribune 
Editorial Board, Police Arbitration System Needs an Overhaul, STAR TRIB. (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.startribune.com/police-arbitration-system-needs-an-overhaul/571511992/ 
[https://perma.cc/P85G-Y2DM]. St. Paul Mayor Melvin Carter submitted a statement joining 
several Twin City area mayors in calling for major arbitration reform. See MSR News Online, 
Frey, Arradondo, and MN Mayors Call on Legislators to Fix Arbitration Process for Law 
Enforcement, MINN. SPOKESMAN-RECORDER (June 18, 2020), https://spokesman-
recorder.com/2020/06/18/frey-arradondo-and-mn-mayors-call-on-legislators-to-fix-
arbitration-process-for-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/CD3Y-UXZW] (quoting Mayor 
Carter as saying, “This moment demands decisive action. Reforming arbitration is critical to 
ensuring we can hold officers who betray our trust accountable.”). 
277 Coulter Jones & Louise Radnofsky, Many Minnesota Police Officers Remain on the Force 
Despite Misconduct, Wall St. J. (June 25, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-
minnesota-police-officers-remain-on-the-force-despite-misconduct-11593097308 
[https://perma.cc/3WPZ-G4C3].  
278 Emma Nelson, St. Paul Police Chief Defends His Officers, Calls for Arbitration Reform, 






%20630. [https://perma.cc/3BG5-4NGM]. Specifically, the Chief told the City Council that 
“he would like to see a new arbitration process that would allow the department to appeal 
overturned firings in court.” Id. 
279 Star Tribune Editorial Board, supra note 276. Chief Wise added that losing an arbitration 
“creates distrust within the workplace . . . and saps the confidence of a police leader.” Id. 
280 Id. Incidentally, Chief Tusken’s great-aunt was Irene Tusken, who had claimed to have 
been raped by six Black circus workers in 1920 which set in motion the Duluth lynchings. 
Dan Kraker, ‘We Never Solved the Problem’: Echoes of 1920 Duluth Lynching Persist At 
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misconduct. Under the new law, arbitrators in police officer employment 
disputes will be selected directly by the Commissioner of the State Bureau 
of Mediation Services, not the parties to the dispute, as before.281 The 
Commissioner, “in consultation with community and law enforcement 
stakeholders,” will appoint a roster of six arbitrators who can only serve as 
arbitrators in police grievance arbitrations.282 Arbitrators are selected 
through an alphabetical rotation.283 The arbitrators will be required to attend 
training on cultural competency and implicit bias, as well as training on the 
“daily experience of peace officers, which may include ride-alongs with on-
duty officers or other activities that provide exposure to the environments, 
choices, and judgments required of officers in the field.”284 But the main 
concern of the chiefs and mayors—that arbitration undermines their 
authority to fire problem officers—was not addressed. Not surprisingly, city 
leaders complained that the change was too insignificant and would hinder 
police chiefs’ ability to “effectively address individual officer behavior.”285 
2. The History of Personal Liability Insurance for Officers as an 
Idea 
In response to the impact of indemnification and arbitration, 
academics and community activists have proposed mandatory personal 
liability insurance for police officers. Initial credit for this idea goes to 
Professor Noel Otu of the University of Texas at Brownsville, who 
suggested mandatory professional liability insurance for police in 2006.286 
Professor Otu proposed that all police officers should be required to carry 
“occupational liability insurance” so that financial liability for misconduct 
                                                           
281 See MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 11 (2020) (“The parties shall not participate in, 
negotiate for, or agree to the selection of an arbitrator or arbitration panel under this 
section.”).  
282 Id. subdiv. 4. In selecting the six arbitrators, the Commissioner may consider a “candidate’s 
familiarity with labor law, the grievance process, and the law enforcement profession; or 
experience and training in cultural competency, racism, implicit bias, and recognizing and 
valuing community diversity and cultural differences.” Id. 
283 Id. subdiv. 11 (“The commissioner shall assign or appoint an arbitrator or panel of 
arbitrators from the roster to a peace officer grievance arbitration under this section on 
rotation through the roster alphabetically ordered by last name.”).  
284 Id. subdiv. 10(a)(1)–(2) (“(1) at least six hours on the topics of cultural competency, racism, 
implicit bias, and recognizing and valuing community diversity and cultural differences; and 
(2) at least six hours on topics related to the daily experience of peace officers, which may 
include ride-alongs with on-duty officers or other activities that provide exposure to the 
environments, choices, and judgments required of officers in the field.”). 
285 Bailey & Bella, supra note 7 (quoting Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey).  
286 Noel Otu, The Police Service And Liability Insurance: Responsible Policing, 8 INT’L J. OF 
POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 294, 309 (2006); see also Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 439 
(reporting how related ideas on this from both academics and community activists “originates 
in [Professor Otu’s] article.”). 
52
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss1/8
274 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
was removed from departments and cities and placed squarely on the 
officer’s liability insurance.287 Currently, no state or municipality has a 
liability insurance requirement for their police officers. However, as part of 
its significant police reform legislation last summer, Colorado passed a bill 
that makes officers personally liable for up to $25,000 in damages in lawsuits 
related to misconduct.288 
Professor Deborah Ramirez at Northeastern University Law 
School and her colleagues (who are all recent graduates of Northeastern) 
recently “dust[ed] off” Professor Otu’s idea and updated it in some 
important ways.289 They proposed that the municipality cover the base 
premium for all officers, but individual officers might have to cover their 
own costs if they are assessed a surcharge because of being a higher risk 
(e.g., for having past complaints of misconduct).290 In other words, “[o]fficers 
with histories that create a higher premium would be responsible for paying 
the difference between their premium and the departmental average.”291 
This would give insurance companies “leverage over both the whole 
department and over individual officers.”292  
But academics are not the only ones suggesting this novel 
approach.293 Activists in Minnesota have been calling for liability insurance 
for years,294 and they came close to getting it on the ballot in Minneapolis. 
                                                           
287 Professor Otu also proposed that officer salaries be increased to cover the basic liability 
insurance premium. Otu, supra note 286, at 309. 
288 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-21-131 (4) (West 2020) (requiring that an officer to pay 5% or 
$25,000, whichever, is less, toward any judgment or settlement if the officer’s employer 
determines that the officer “did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief that the 
action was lawful”). For other aspects of the Colorado police reform bill, see supra notes 
197-210 and accompanying text. 
289 Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 411. 
290 Id. at 455. This is similar to the proposal by activists in Minneapolis. See infra notes 294–
96 and accompanying text. 
291 Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 455. 
292 Id. at 455 (“Should the department adopt safer policies, like mandatory de-escalation 
training, the average officer base premium would be reduced. Similarly, insurance companies 
can tie premium reductions to specific trainings and programs that are shown to lower risk 
and liability, giving individual officers a direct incentive to seek out such trainings. 
Departments and individual officers alike would face a simple choice: recoup the financial 
benefits of reducing risk or bear the cost of being less risk averse.”). 
293 Similar ideas were floated in the Chicago City Council and the Maryland State Legislature 
but did not get very far. Id. at 439. The New York Senate proposed a similar bill last summer. 
N.Y. S.B. 8676 (N.Y. 2020), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2019/S8676 
[https://perma.cc/6CW7-2RBH]. 
294 Michelle Gross, president and founder of Communities United Against Police Brutality 
and co-founder of The Committee for Professional Policing, came up with the idea in 2010. 
Carla Murphy, A Push to Make Cops Carry Liability Insurance in Minneapolis, CHI. REP. 
(June 27, 2016), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/a-push-to-make-cops-buy-liability-
insurance-in-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/8QEV-UMBZ]. According to Gross, “It’s using 
market forces to motivate individual cops to change police culture.” Id. 
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In July 2016, a now-defunct community group, the Committee for 
Professional Policing, submitted a petition to the Minneapolis City Council 
for a proposed amendment to the city charter to be placed on the 
November 2016 general election.295 The proposed amendment would have 
required Minneapolis police officers to obtain and maintain professional 
liability insurance coverage.296 The proposed amendment was ultimately 
rejected by the City Council as being contrary to state law, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the Council’s decision.297  
Yet in the wake of the George Floyd killing, Communities United 
Against Police Brutality, Minnesota’s Council on American-Islamic 
Relations, and two Black Lives Matter chapters re-introduced the idea of 
mandatory liability insurance for individual officers, among other 
recommendations.298 Steven Belton, president and CEO of the Urban 
                                                           
295 The group collected more than 7,000 signatures. Susan Du, Group Wants Minneapolis 
Police to Carry Liability Insurance, CITY PAGES (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://www.citypages.com/news/group-wants-minneapolis-police-to-pay-for-their-own-
liability-insurance-8182566 [https://perma.cc/L4VR-GN4Y]. The group tried three times to 
get the measure on the ballot, 2014, 2015, and 2016. Id. The group was formed in 2014 by 
Citizens United Against Police Brutality (“CUAPB”), a long-time community organization 
working to address police brutality. FLYER, CONCERNED ABOUT MINNEAPOLIS POLICE 
BRUTALITY? HELP US! (on file with author).  
296 The proposed additional text to the city charter included the following: 
Each appointed police officer must provide proof of professional 
liability insurance coverage in the amount consistent with current limits 
under the statutory immunity provision of state law and must maintain 
continuous coverage throughout the course of employment as a police 
officer with the city. Such insurance must be the primary insurance for 
the officer and must include coverage for willful or malicious acts and 
acts outside the scope of the officer's employment by the city. If the City 
Council desires, the city may reimburse officers for the base rate of this 
coverage but officers must be responsible for any additional costs due to 
personal or claims history. The city may not indemnify police officers 
against liability in any amount greater than required by State Statute 
unless the officer’s insurance is exhausted. This amendment shall take 
effect one year after passage.  
TEXT OF PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT SUBMITTED VIA PETITION BY THE COMMITTEE 
FOR PROFESSIONAL POLICING, July 26, 2016 (on file with author). 
297 Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W.2d 304, 315 (Minn. 2017). According to the 
court in a per curiam decision, the charter amendment would: (1) add requirements that are 
absent from existing state law on municipal insurance requirements, such as designating the 
officer’s required coverage as “primary”; (2) include provisions that permit what state law 
forbids, such as relieving the City of its liability for torts committed in the scope of the officer’s 
employment until the officer’s insurance coverage is first “exhausted”; and (3) amend 
provisions to forbid what state law expressly permits, such as purchasing insurance coverage 
for acts for which the City would otherwise be immune. Id. at 315.  
298 Amy Forliti & Mohamed Ibrahim, Some Minneapolis Activists Doubt Disbanding the 
Police Will Work, Associated Press (June 8, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/56a32b17f029abd750bfd58927ec5563 [https://perma.cc/49DZ-CB28]. 
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League Twin Cities, specifically criticized the reforms passed in July for “not 
includ[ing] a requirement that law enforcement officers carry their own 
personal liability insurance . . . [which] creates an incentive for officers to 
check themselves.”299 Unlike the efforts in 2016, however, this time activists 
are targeting the Minnesota State Legislature.300  
3. Indemnification – Taxpayers, Not Police Officers, Pay for Police 
Misconduct  
One key assumption in our legal process is that liability in civil court 
will incentivize better police conduct.301 The U.S. Supreme Court has said 
that the fear of paying judgments creates important incentives for officers to 
follow the law.302 The Court relies on this assumption for its qualified 
immunity jurisprudence.303 In Pierson v. Ray, the same case in which the 
                                                           
In addition, Black Lives Matter Cleveland included the idea in its list of 10 demands for 
accountability of Cleveland law enforcement last summer. Amanda VanAllen, Black Lives 
Matter Cleveland Has a 10-point Proposal for Better Policing in Cleveland, News 5 
Cleveland (June 5, 2020), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/america-in-crisis/black-
lives-matter-cleveland-has-a-10-point-proposal-for-better-policing-in-cleveland 
[https://perma.cc/X325-Q783]. 
299 Bjorhus & Van Oot, supra note 12. 
300 Tiffany Bui, What to Do About the MPD? How Three Activist Groups Are Rethinking 
Public Safety, MinnPost (July 1, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/metro/2020/07/what-to-
do-about-the-mpd-how-three-activist-groups-are-rethinking-public-safety/ 
[https://perma.cc/99T7-KC7B] (reporting that “CUAPB’s latest iteration for this measure 
appeals to the Minnesota Legislature instead”). 
301 See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2005) 
(“Ordinarily, the threat of liability for compensatory damages also gives the defendant 
an incentive to behave in the manner required by the standard of care.”). 
302 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983) (“[W]e assume, and hope, that most officials are 
guided primarily by the underlying standards of federal substantive law—both out of devotion 
to duty, and in the interest of avoiding liability for compensatory damages.”). 
303 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions about Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 479, 495–96 (2011) (observing that in its qualified immunity analysis, “the Court 
relied heavily on the assumption that officials, absent immunity, would face the threat of 
personal liability for constitutional violations committed in the ostensible performance of 
their official duties”); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (“When officials 
are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may 
well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways 
that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide 
their conduct. In this way, exposing government officials to the same legal hazards faced by 
other citizens may detract from the rule of law instead of contributing to it.”). Of course, the 
Court has articulated other justifications for qualified immunity for police officers. See, e.g., 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity 
doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive 
discovery.’”); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances 
two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise 
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability 
when they perform their duties reasonably.”).  
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Court introduced the concept of qualified immunity, the Court explained 
its rationale for protecting officers from judgments: “A policeman’s lot is not 
so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of 
duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted 
in damages if he does.”304  
Federal courts generally seem to believe that police officers have to 
pay for whatever damages are assessed against them in civil rights cases.305 
Jurors may believe the same thing, particularly in the Eighth Circuit, which 
has prohibited lawyers from telling jurors that police do not have to pay for 
judgments against them.306 The Eighth Circuit has made clear that it is 
prejudicial to clarify for the jury that the government will pay damages, and 
not the officers, because it “could result in an overly generous award of 
damages.”307  
 But police do not pay for the judgments against them in civil rights 
cases, undermining a core assumption that civil liability for misconduct will 
incentivize better police behavior. As Professor Joanna Schwartz found in 
her recent study, “governments paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars 
that plaintiffs recovered in lawsuits alleging civil rights violations by law 
enforcement.”308 Police officers paid $0 toward the $3.9 million in total 
punitive damages.309 Many officers paid nothing whatsoever, regardless of 
the type of judgment.310 Governments paid for police officer damages even 
when indemnification was prohibited by statute or policy, when officers 
                                                           
304 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). 
305 Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials' 
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 79 (1999) (“Although federal officials do 
not in practice pay the costs of defending themselves or compensating the victims of 
constitutional violations, the federal courts have not accounted for that reality. The courts 
instead have taken the fiction of individual liability seriously, acting as if individual officials 
continue to bear the costs of litigation and liability personally.”). 
306 Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052, 1058 (8th Cir. 1986). 
307 Id. As the court explained, “We see no distinction between this and the injection of 
testimony or argument concerning insurance, however. We believe that the jury’s 
apprehension that the government would be responsible for paying damages could result in 
an overly generous award of damages.” Id. Minnesota state courts have a similar restriction 
on informing juries about insurance or indemnification. See Purdes v. Merrill, 268 Minn. 
129, 135, 128 N.W.2d 164, 168 (1964) (“We have discussed in numerous cases the 
impropriety of referring to the subject of insurance coverage by counsel in arguments to the 
jury.”); see also Hon. Peder B. Hong, Summation at the Border: Serious Misconduct in Final 
Argument in Civil Trials, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 179, 188 (1995) (“Counsel must avoid undue, 
unwarranted references to whether or not either party to an action is insured. This type of 
misconduct, if not cured, may result in a new trial.”). 
308 Schwartz, supra note 34, at 890. 
309 Id. Note that in Professor Schwartz’s study, she found that one officer was required to pay 
a $300 punitive damages award, but that officer ended up never paying anything. Id. at 918. 
310 Id. (“And officers in the thirty-seven small and mid-sized jurisdictions in my study never 
contributed to settlements or judgments in lawsuits brought against them.”). 
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were disciplined, and when officers had been terminated by the department 
or criminally prosecuted for their conduct.311 With nearly no financial stake 
in these lawsuits, officers, therefore, have “little financial incentive to correct 
course.”312 
4. Specific Legislation for Professional Liability Insurance 
 Several representatives of the Minnesota House of 
Representatives proposed a bill last July to require liability insurance for 
Minnesota police officers.313 As a first step, the proposed bill would 
eliminate mandatory indemnification by the employing city that is now 
provided under Minnesota Statute sections 466.03 and 466.07.314 Next, the 
proposed legislation would require liability insurance for each police officer 
in the state.315 Officers would have to cover any additional costs of insurance 
due to misconduct or other factors that raise their premiums, and police 
departments would be permitted to reimburse the officer “for the base rate 
                                                           
311 One example Professor Schwartz shares is particularly egregious:  
Another example concerns the case brought by the estate of Kathryn 
Johnston, a 92-year-old Atlanta woman who was shot and killed by 
Atlanta police officers after they illegally raided her home. Officers 
involved in the shooting later admitted that they planted marijuana in 
Johnston’s home after her death and submitted as evidence cocaine that 
they falsely alleged had been purchased at her home. Three officers 
pleaded guilty to offenses related to the shooting and coverup. They 
were sentenced to between five and ten years in federal prison and were 
ordered to pay $8180 restitution--the cost to bury Johnston. Another 
nine officers were fired or disciplined, or resigned, following the 
incident. The City of Atlanta paid $4.9 million to settle the civil suit 
brought by Johnston’s estate. No officers contributed to the settlement.  
Id. at 923–24. 
312 Megan Quattlebaum & Tom Tyler, Beyond the Law: An Agenda for Policing Reform, 100 
B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1023–24 (2020). 
313 Representatives Jay Xiong, Kaohly Her, Aisha Gomez, Fue Lee, and Hodan Hassan 
authored the bill during the second special session. H.R. 87, 91st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. 
(Minn. 2020). 
314 Under current Minnesota law, cities must indemnify their police officers. MINN. STAT. 
§ 466.07, subdiv. 1. The proposed bill would eliminate that requirement. See H.R. 87, 91st 
Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. ll. 1.12–1.14 (Minn. 2020) (“Neither the officer’s employing agency 
nor any other individual or organization, public or private, may assume liability in lieu of the 
officer or the officer’s insurance . . . .”); see also id. at l. 1.20 (adding the language “other 
than licensed peace officers” to 466.07, subdiv.1, exempting police from the indemnification 
requirement). In addition, the proposed legislation stated that any settlements would remain 
public data (even if between private individuals). Id. at ll. 1.15–1.16.  
315 See id. at ll. 3.18–3.24 (“Each licensed peace officer shall obtain a policy of professional 
liability insurance coverage in an amount no less than current limits for municipalities as 
provided in § 466.04.”). 
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of the policy required by this subdivision, but may not cover any additional 
premium costs due to personal or claims history.”316  
5. Why Insurance Could Work  
There are several compelling arguments as to why a market-based 
insurance program could reduce police misconduct. For starters, problem 
officers might have trouble maintaining their position because they are no 
longer insurable.317 This has already played out for small communities where 
the cost or inability to get liability coverage has led to the closure of entire 
police departments, mainly because of lawsuits.318 The same could be true 
for officers whom insurers refuse to insure or place such high premiums on 
their continued service that they can no longer afford to be police officers.319 
In this fashion, insurers in a compulsory insurance environment serve 
“effectively as quasi-regulators” and provide a way to screen and filter 
                                                           
316 Id. at ll. 3.24–3.26. 
317 See, e.g., Communities United Against Police Brutality, What Will It Take to End Police 
Violence? Recommendations for Reform (2020), 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cuapb/pages/1/attachments/original/1591595256/
WHAT_WILL_IT_TAKE_TO_END_POLICE_VIOLENCE_with_Appendices.pdf?15
91595256 [https://perma.cc/Q6QL-CV8N] (“Some of the worst offenders—likely including 
ex-Officer Derek Chauvin—would become uninsurable and then would no longer be able to 
work as police officers.”). 
318 Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 443–44. Communities cited include Lincoln Heights, 
Ohio; Maywood, California; Oakley, Michigan; Sorrento, Louisiana; Niota, Tennessee; King 
City, California; and Port Marion, Pennsylvania. Id. These police departments were 
considered uninsurable for a wide range of misconduct, including rampant fraud, threats of 
violence against a romantic partner, and exposing oneself on a previous job. Id. In these 
circumstances, at least, the inability to purchase insurance has worked to eliminate problem 
officers from service. 
319 As the plaintiffs in Bicking explained, the proposed insurance amendment seeks to address 
“the incorrigible and longstanding problem” of police misconduct by “applying the proven 
risk management strategy of professional liability insurance.” Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 
891 N.W.2d 304, 312 n.7 (Minn. 2017). As Dave Bicking told National Public Radio, “We 
have one officer [in Minneapolis] who’s had five significant settlements against him just in a 
year and a half. Someone like that could never, ever buy insurance. They’d have to charge 
him $60[,000]-$70,000 a year. That officer would be gone.” Martin Kaste, To Change Police 
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individuals who undertake important but potentially socially harmful 
activities.320 
Relatedly, the impact of premium cost could deter bad behavior. 
Professor Ramirez and colleagues use car insurance as a potential model, 
and they collected data to support the notions that increasing premiums for 
bad driving does bring accidents down and that higher costs of insurance 
makes people more cautious.321 And of course, if a person has been in too 
many accidents for any insurance company to offer them car insurance, the 
result is that they cannot buy insurance and thus legally cannot drive a car.322 
There is also the strong possibility that the insurance industry itself 
could bring significant leverage to impose policies that improve policing 
safety. The automobile industry is a good analogy for this, too. Car insurers 
have fought the industry and government for stronger vehicle safety policies 
for decades.323 They were an early and strong advocate for airbags.324 The 
insurance companies have continued to work together to collect 
information and conduct studies to improve safety.325 More recently, car 
                                                           
320 Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law–A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 41 
(2012) (describing such gatekeeping as a principal function of compulsory insurance 
companies). 
321 Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 443–44 (collecting studies). Professor Ramirez and her 
colleagues suggest that car insurance is a better model than malpractice insurance for lawyers, 
in part, because most states do not require lawyers to carry malpractice insurance. Id. at 399. 
Only two states currently require malpractice insurance for lawyers, and five states are 
studying the issue. See Susan Saab Fortney, Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance: 
Exposing Lawyers’ Blind Spots, 9 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 190, 193 
(2019) (“Over the last two years, a few states have considered whether to join Oregon, and 
now Idaho, in requiring malpractice insurance for practicing attorneys. Bar groups in 
California, Washington, Nevada, New Jersey, and Georgia have studied the issue of 
mandatory insurance coverage for attorneys.”). 
322 Avraham, supra note 320, at 41.  
323 See, e.g., Walter Rugaber, Industry Resists Car-Safety Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/06/archives/industry-resists-carsafety-costs-
companies-feel-consumers-will.html [https://perma.cc/7PUZ-R6JU] (describing the coalition 
of insurance companies working with Ralph Nader to require air bags among other safety 
provisions). The insurance companies took the fight all the way to the Supreme Court and 
won. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1983) (reinstating the original air bag requirement). Of course, Ralph Nader and 
the auto insurers were not always on the same side. Alan Fram, Auto Insurers, Consumer 
Activists Square Off Over California Proposition, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 6, 1988), 
https://apnews.com/7fa6fd19854c43e897ba3be7db263f74 [https://perma.cc/9PHP-4ECF] 
(quoting Nader’s testimony to Congress, “Insurance customers will be standing up for their 
rights against unreasonable insurance rates, arbitrary practices[,] and lobbying pressure by 
insurance companies and their corporate allies to take away victims’ rights.”). 
324 See generally Robert Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61 J. RISK 
& INS. 107 (1994) (documenting the decades-long strategy and motivation of the auto insurers 
to fight for air bags). 
325 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 222 (2012) (describing, as one example, the 
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insurers successfully fought for “graduated driver licensing” laws (under 
which driving privileges are introduced gradually) and published ratings of 
state highway safety laws.326 
Insurance providers who provide insurance to entire police 
departments have similarly had some positive impact on policing.327 Current 
municipal insurance providers already provide a number of “loss-
prevention” measures to the police departments they cover, including policy 
development, education and training, accreditation, and auditing.328 Insurers 
have also successfully imposed their influence on the firing of problem 
officers,329 and they have even seen to the reconstitution of entire 
departments due to widespread officer misconduct.330  
As Professor John Rappaport explained, “the insurer may be better 
positioned than the government to reform police behavior.”331 Compared to 
government oversight agencies, the insurer  
                                                           
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “a nonprofit organization wholly funded by the auto 
insurance industry . . . whose stated goal is to reduce the losses from highway crashes” and 
whose claim to fame is “testing and rating the crashworthiness of new automobiles as they 
come on the market”). 
326 Id. at 222–23 (citations omitted). 
327 See generally John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 1539, 1543 (2017) (arguing that insurance risk management encourages better 
policing practices). By using market-based incentives, “an insurer writing police liability 
insurance may profit by reducing police misconduct.” Id. at 1543–44. Because an insurer 
has significant power over the police department, it has the “the means and influence 
necessary” to “regulate” the police. Id. at 1544. Insurance “has probably been the source of 
the most far-reaching yet deep reforms in American policing over the past three decades.” 
Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow, & Doug Mellom, Federal Civil 
Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects 
of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
9, 41 (2016).  
328 Rappaport, supra note 327, at 1574–86 (detailing the many efforts insurers use to reduce 
the incidence and magnitude of police misconduct); White et al., supra note 327, at 40 
(noting that “insurance companies would not offer attractively priced policies if police 
agencies could not demonstrate that they had done everything possible to reduce the risk of 
lawsuits”). 
329 See, e.g., Rachel B. Doyle, How Insurance Companies Can Force Bad Cops off the Job, 
THE ATLANTIC (June 10, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/insurance-companies-police/529833/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2JG-TH44] (reporting that “[i]n 2010, a police chief in Rutledge, 
Tennessee, was fired to appease the town’s liability insurer after assault allegations were 
leveled against him”).  
330 Radley Balko, How the Insurance Industry Could Reform American Policing, WASH. 
POST, (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2016/03/01/how-the-insurance-industry-could-reform-american-policing/ 
[https://perma.cc/K42B-4PF2] (including, among other examples, “[t]he town of King City, 
California, [which] had to rebuild its police department from scratch after reports of cops 
operating a towing scheme against low-income Latin[x] drivers”). 
331 Rappaport, supra note 327, at 1544. 
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may possess superior information, such as data that cut 
across myriad police agencies; deeper and more nimble 
resources, including ‘boots on the ground’ and the capacity 
to develop harm-prevention technologies; market 
incentives that favor good, but not overzealous, risk-
management policies; and the flexibility to develop and 
prescribe individualized risk-reduction plans.332  
The profit motive in such a market-based structure can create powerful 
incentives for insurance companies to impose reform on police 
departments.333 Departments usually listen.334 
But general insurance at the municipal level is not enough. To the 
extent that general insurance for municipal police departments can have 
positive impacts on policing policy, any such benefits typically do not reach 
the larger municipalities. Larger city police departments, Minneapolis and 
St. Paul, in particular, are self-insured.335 The larger police departments not 
only miss out on any positive influence from an outside insurance provider 
(which might push for reforms), but they also lack any sort of risk-
management structures.336 Indeed, Professor Carol Archbold surveyed the 
354 largest municipal agencies about their risk-management programs, and 
                                                           
332 Id. at 1544. 
333 As Professor John Rappaport explains:  
When the insurer assumes the risk of liability, it also develops a financial 
incentive to reduce that risk through loss prevention. By reducing risk, 
the insurer lowers its payouts under the liability policy and thus increases 
profits. An effective loss-prevention program can also help the insurer 
compete for business by offering lower premiums. 
Id. at 1543.  
334 See id. at 1596–97 (“To the extent that researchers have identified successful strategies for 
combating police misconduct, insurers have been reasonably effective at inducing police 
agencies to use them,” including effective policies on vehicle pursuits, the use of force and 
other high-risk conduct, and the use of body-worn cameras and training simulators.).  
335 Furst & Webster, supra note 28. To self-insure, Minneapolis sets aside money each year 
in its budget to cover any anticipated legal judgments. Miguel Otárola, Minneapolis 
Taxpayers Will Feel Effect of Record $20 Million Settlement, STAR TRIB., (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-taxpayers-will-feel-effect-of-record-20-million-
settlement/509756012/ [https://perma.cc/8XZH-QA5D]. The city contracts with a third-
party actuarial firm annually to determine appropriate premium charges; the May 28 cash 
balance in the self-insurance fund was approximately $96 million. Judy Greenwald, Group 




336 Rappaport, supra note 327, at 1597 (noting that “the Chicagos and New Yorks may do 
surprisingly little loss prevention”). 
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only fourteen of the 354 employed an in-house risk manager (most were 
presumably self-insured).337 
C. Proposal No. 3: Expand Minnesota’s Deadly-Use-of-Force Statute338 to 
Include What Officers Did (or Did Not Do) Before They Used 
Deadly Force  
1. Current Standards Are Inadequate 
Current deadly use of force standards have not sufficiently curtailed 
police-involved killings. Only a tiny fraction of the officers that kill suspects 
are prosecuted, and an even smaller number are convicted.339 In Minnesota, 
no police officer had been convicted out of nearly 200 police-involved 
deaths since 2000 until Somali-American Officer Mohamed Noor was 
convicted of third-degree murder in 2017 (the victim, notably, was 
White).340 This is very likely “the first time a Minnesota police officer has 
been convicted of murder for an on-duty shooting.”341 Until the killing of 
George Floyd, only one other police officer in Minnesota had been charged 
                                                           
337 Id. (citing CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND 
LEGAL ADVISING 62, 77–79 (2004)). Based on her research, Archbold concluded that “risk 
management programs are still in the infancy stage of being embraced by police agencies,” 
and that “the vast majority of the over 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country 
have no outside reviewers to assist with accountability efforts.” Id. at 1597–98.  
338 MINN. STAT. § 609.066 (effective Mar. 1, 2021). 
339 Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (Oct. 3, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/DN8S-GXNN] (providing examples of high-profile police killings across 
the country that did not result in charges or convictions against the officers including Lamar 
Anthony Smith in 2011, Sylville Smith in 2016, Philando Castile in 2016, Terence Crutcher 
in 2016, Freddie Gray in 2015, Samuel DuBose in 2015, Eric Garner in 2014, Michael 
Brown in 2014, Tamir Rice in 2014, Sandra Bland in July 2015, and Alton Sterling in 2016). 
As researchers at FiveThirtyEight found last summer, “despite the increased scrutiny on 
police violence since 2014 (when the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and 
the Black Lives Matter movement raised public awareness of the issue), neither the number 
of officers charged nor the number of convictions has meaningfully increased.” Amelia 
Thomson-DeVeaux, Nathaniel Rakich, & Likhitha Butchireddygari, Why It’s So Rare for 
Police Officers to Face Legal Consequences, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 4, 2020) 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-still-so-rare-for-police-officers-to-face-legal-
consequences-for-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/7PWX-WPHD] (analyzing data from the 
Henry A. Wallace Police Crime Database). 
340 Rachel M. Cohen, After a Black Cop Was Convicted of Killing a White Woman, 
Minnesota Activists Say Focus Should Be Police Reform, THE INTERCEPT (May 2, 2019), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/02/minnesota-police-convicted-justine-damond/ 
[https://perma.cc/M6TZ-ZX35].  
341 Amy Forliti, Conviction for Minneapolis Cop Prompts Questions About Race, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 1, 2019), https://apnews.com/f87950f2f05243fbaa7a93bb1f826f1a 
[https://perma.cc/P8K7-JZAJ]. 
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for killing a suspect in recent history—Jeronimo Yanez, a Latino officer, who 
was later acquitted of manslaughter in the 2016 death of Philando Castile.342  
Similarly, police officers nationwide rarely get charged for the 
deaths of those in their custody.343 Over the last several years, police killed 
on average about 1,000 people each year in the United States.344 A staggering 
number, particularly when compared to other countries.345 While more 
White suspects have been killed overall, Black and Indigenous suspects are 
significantly more likely to be killed by the police.346 Despite thousands of 
                                                           
342 Id. 
343 MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ [https:/perma.cc/C62L-
ZYX9] (database updated as of Oct. 28, 2020) (99% of police killings from 2013-2019 have 
not resulted in officers being charged with a crime). 
344 John Sullivan, Liz Weber, Julie Tate & Jennifer Jenkins, Four Years in a Row, Police 
Nationwide Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000 People, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/four-years-in-a-row-police-nationwide-fatally-
shoot-nearly-1000-people/2019/02/07/0cb3b098-020f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/N77Z-5BRC] (reporting that approximately one thousand people die 
annually from police shootings). Mapping Police Violence’s data, which is gathered from 
public databases and law enforcement records, also shows that the number of police killings 
varied by year from 2013 to 2019 but did not fall significantly overall—in that span, the 
number of killings fell to a low of 1,050 in 2014, and had a high of 1,143 in 2018. MAPPING 
POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 343; Fatal Force, WASH. POST (updated Nov. 3, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ 
[https://perma.cc/95VQ-34UC]; Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and 
Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 955 (2020) (compiling data on fatal 
police shootings). 
345 Jamiles Lartey, By The Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days Than Other Countries Do 
in Years, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries [https://perma.cc/CMF8-
29PM] (comparing the number of police shootings in the U.S. with those in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Iceland, Germany, Canada, and Finland and concluding that “America 
is the outlier—and this is what a crisis looks like”). For example, in England and Wales (with 
one-sixth the population of the U.S.), there were fifty-five fatal police shootings in the twenty-
four years between 1990 and 2015, and there were fifty-nine fatal police shootings in the U.S. 
in the first twenty-four days of 2015. Id. 
346 Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases, 2018 WIS. 
L. REV. 369, 376 (2018) (finding that over the two-year period of 2015–2016, African 
Americans and Native Americans were respectively 2.5 times and 2.7 times more likely to 
be killed by police than Whites). The disparity may be even higher for unarmed suspects. 
See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of 
Prevention?, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 907, 910 (2019) (“Unarmed African-American individuals are 
3.5 times more likely to be shot by police than unarmed [W]hite persons.”); see also Ann C. 
Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement Officers 
Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2018) (collecting studies 
suggesting that Persons of Color were far more likely to be shot and killed by police officers 
than Whites). The disparity is even more pronounced in Minneapolis. See Matt 
Furber, John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch, Minneapolis Police, Long Accused of Racism, 
Face Wrath of Wounded City, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/XM5F-
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police killings since 2005, only 110 officers have been charged with murder 
or manslaughter in an on-duty shooting,347 and only 42 of those officers have 
been convicted.348  
2. Minnesota’s Most Recent Reforms  
Minnesota took substantial steps last summer to strengthen its 
standards with respect to deadly use of force by police. Minnesota’s previous 
standard essentially “boiled down to a ‘subjective’ perception about whether 
an individual officer felt threatened.”349 The key for prosecutors when 
contemplating whether to charge officers was what an officer believed 
subjectively at the time the deadly force was used.350 As a group of local 
criminology and criminal justice professors concluded, “[i]f an officer ‘feels’ 
threatened, regardless of whether or not they are, deadly force is justified.”351 
In their view, “the law gives officers wide discretion and makes it difficult to 
prosecute and charge officers.”352 After the trial of Officer Yanez for the 
shooting of Philando Castile, jurors specifically “pointed to the law 
authorizing police to use deadly force to explain their decision to find Yanez 
                                                           
XUAW] (“Black people accounted for more than 60 percent of the victims in Minneapolis 
police shootings from late 2009 through May 2019, data shows.”). 
347 Thomson-DeVeaux et al., supra note 339 (analyzing data from the Henry A. Wallace 
Police Crime Database). This data does not include killings that did not involve shooting, 
but setting aside the killing of George Floyd, deaths not involving guns are quite rare. Id.  
348 See id. (“Fifty were not [convicted] and 18 cases are still pending. . . . [M]any of these 
convictions ended up being for a lesser offense—only five of these officers were convicted of 
murder (and did not have that conviction overturned).”). 
349 Gina Erickson, Sarah Greenman, Jillian Peterson & Shelly Schaefer, Break the Cycle: Five 
Changes in Minnesota Policing That Can Be Enacted Right Now, MINNPOST (June 2, 2020), 
https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2020/06/break-the-cycle-fives-changes-in-
minnesota-policing-that-can-be-enacted-right-now/ [https://perma.cc/44GA-TQZL] (legal 
analysis of Minnesota’s deadly use-of-force statute by associate professors of criminology and 
criminal justice at Hamline University).  
350 Indeed, in his decision not to charge the officers in the fatal shooting of Isak Aden, Dakota 
County Attorney James Backstrom concluded that because “it was objectively reasonable for 
these five police officers to subjectively believe Aden posed a deadly threat to other officers 
at the scene of this incident at the time they fired their service weapons and, therefore, they 
were legally justified in using deadly force in this instance.” LEGAL CHARGING STATEMENT 
OF JAMES BACKSTROM, DAKOTA CTY. ATT’Y (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.co.dakota.mn.us/LawJustice/AttorneyNewsReleases/Pages/Eagan-And-
Bloomington-Police-Officers-Were-Legally-Justified-In-Using-Deadly-Force-In-Shooting-
Death-Of-Isak-Aden.aspx [https://perma.cc/DAG6-DEER]. Hennepin County Attorney 
Mike Freeman similarly refused to charge the officers in the death of Jamar Clark because 
Officer Schwarze “reasonably believed” that Clark was lethal threat to the arresting officers. 
David A. Graham, No Charges in the Shooting of Jamar Clark, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/03/no-charges-in-the-shooting-of-
jamar-clark/476031/ [https://perma.cc/V22A-EM25]. 
351 Erickson et al., supra note 349. 
352 Id.  
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not guilty.”353 One of the jurors in the Yanez trial lamented the result and 
challenged the public to “go after the law.”354 Removal of the subjective 
standard became one of the major components in the reform efforts last 
summer.355  
 The reforms passed in July 2020 included numerous changes to 
the deadly use of force standards. In addition to outlawing choke holds and 
other dangerous restrictive holds,356 it also established a legislative intent that 
deadly force must be “exercised judiciously” and “for the sanctity of every 
human life.”357 Importantly, the reforms also enhanced reporting on the use 
of force,358 adding the requirement that officers intervene when present and 
observing the excessive use of force by another officer.359 Lastly, the use of 
                                                           
353 Jon Collins, Law Gives Officers Wide Discretion in Deadly Force Incidents, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/08/14/police-shootings-
prompt-discussion-of-deadly-force-laws [https://perma.cc/YHA5-P8NQ]. 
354 Tom Weber, Yanez Juror: “Nobody Was OK with It,” MINN. PUB. RADIO (June 23, 
2017), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/06/23/74-seconds-yanez-juror 
[https://perma.cc/74RG-KERB]. 
355 Brian Bakst, Deadly Force Law a Key Issue in Capitol Policing Debate, MINN. PUB. RADIO 
(June 17, 2020), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/06/16/deadly-force-law-a-key-issue-in-
capitol-policing-debate [https://perma.cc/JJ6Y-ZUJ9]. During a legislative hearing last 
summer, Representative Rena Moran explained, “We’ve heard . . . before from law 
enforcement officers that said, ‘Well, I feared for my life or I was scared.’ . . . This makes 
prosecuting and gaining a conviction extremely difficult.” Mara Gottfried, Would Proposed 
Changes to MN Law Bring More Charges Against Officers? Probably Not, Attorneys Say, 
PIONEER PRESS (June 13, 2020), https://www.twincities.com/2020/06/13/lawmakers-weigh-
use-of-deadly-force-as-they-consider-police-reform-in-wake-of-george-floyds-death/ 
[https://perma.cc/BY8J-KB7J]. 
356 MINN. STAT. § 609.06, subdiv. 3 (2020). Importantly, the definition of “choke hold” 
includes “applying pressure to a person’s neck on either side of the windpipe, but not to the 
windpipe itself, to stop the flow of blood to the brain via the carotid arteries.” Id. subdiv. 
3(b). In addition to choke holds, the new bill prohibits “tying all of a person’s limbs together 
behind the person’s back to render the person immobile” and “securing a person in any way 
that results in transporting the person face down in a vehicle.” Id. subdiv. 3(a)(2), (3). 
357 MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 1(a) (effective Mar. 1, 2021). 
358 See MINN. STAT. § 626.5534 (2020) (“A chief law enforcement officer must provide the 
information requested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation about each incident of law 
enforcement use of force resulting in serious bodily injury or death, as those terms are 
defined in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s reporting requirements, to the 
superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.”). 
359 MINN. STAT. § 626.8475 (2020). Just days before the second special session, Twin Cities 
law enforcement officials sent a letter to legislative leaders urging them to pass a requirement 
that officers intervene when witnessing other officers using excessive use of force, among other 
suggested reforms. Dana Ferguson, Police Reforms Among the Issues Legislators Expected to 
Take Up When They Return to the Capitol, PIONEER PRESS (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.twincities.com/2020/07/10/police-reforms-among-the-issues-legislators-
expected-to-take-up-when-they-return-to-the-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/CXD4-P75H]. The 
letter was signed by Ramsey County Attorney John Choi, Hennepin County Attorney Mike 
Freeman, St. Paul Police Chief Todd Axtell, Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arrandondo, 
and Minnesota Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington. Id. St. Paul Police had already 
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force reforms removed the subjective belief standard and replaced it with 
that of an objectively reasonable officer.360 Now an officer can only use 
deadly force “if an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on 
the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without 
the benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary . . . to protect the peace 
officer or another from death or great bodily harm.”361 
3. Problems with Minnesota’s New Deadly Use of Force Standard 
a. Reasonableness is Not a Reasonable Way to Hold Police 
Accountable 
The change in Minnesota’s use of deadly force statute improved 
the standard but did not go far enough. Objective reasonableness of an 
officer’s beliefs alone does not get at the full picture.362 It relies too heavily 
on viewing the circumstances from the officer’s perspective and restricts the 
time frame to the seconds before the officer uses deadly force.363 A more 
comprehensive analysis of what led to the police shooting is needed—a 
standard that includes the officer’s pre-deadly force actions, and not just the 
officer’s beliefs at the moment deadly force was employed. 
As a preliminary matter, there is a problem generally with any 
standard of review that relies on the “reasonableness” of an officer’s belief.364 
                                                           
required their officers to intervene “to prevent the use of excessive force.” ST. PAUL POLICE 
DEP’T MANUAL, POLICY 246.01, II. (updated Feb. 25, 2020).   
360 See MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 2(a) (effective Mar. 1, 2021) (“[T]he use of deadly 
force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only if an objectively reasonable officer 
would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and 
without the benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary . . . .”). 
361 See id. 
362 Even the determination of what is “reasonable” is problematic. Mawia Khogali, Redefining 
Standards of Excessive Force: Implications for Policy and Practice, 12 S. J. POL’Y & JUST. 
105, 137 (2018) (“[A]long with the possibility that perceptions of ‘reasonableness’ vary across 
different departments and individual officers, there is evidence that officers’ ability to 
perceive situations objectively is obstructed when they are prepared to fire a gun.”). 
363 Part of the issue may be “the popular perception that law enforcement is extremely 
dangerous work and that police officers are under constant threat of attack.” John P. 
Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 
21 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 155, 167–68 (2016). People generally are wrong about this. As 
Professor Gross found, “While law enforcement can be dangerous, those dangers have been 
greatly exaggerated. The reality is that more police officers are killed accidentally by motor 
vehicles than are fatally shot.” Id. at 168. Without minimizing the risks to law enforcement, 
it is important to keep in mind that “[b]eing a truck driver, construction worker, or a roofer 
is more dangerous than being a police officer.” Id. 
364 This is the standard used in most states. See Steven M. Salky & Joshua A. Levy, Reforming 
Police Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, THE CHAMPION 52 (June 2020) (providing a brief 
summary of the current number of states using objective reasonableness as the deadly use of 
force standard). 
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The term “reasonableness” is too much of “an open-ended standard” to 
provide sufficient guidance to the jury deciding whether an officer’s deadly 
use of force was justified.365 Jurors can struggle with the concept of 
reasonableness in the context of police behavior, in particular.366 The 
Supreme Court has clouded the matter by suggesting officers be given 
deference and that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody 
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.”367 Jurors have followed this guidance and are reluctant to hold 
police accountable.368 It can be difficult for jurors to find that an officer’s 
beliefs were unreasonable when they too often accept the testimony of 
police as more believable than the testimony of others.369 As a result, “almost 
any use of deadly force can appear to be reasonable.”370 
                                                           
365 Lee, supra note 39, at 654–55. The Court acknowledged the messiness and lack of any 
real standard. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“[W]e must still slosh our way 
through the fact bound morass of “reasonableness.”). 
366 Khogali, supra note 362, at 109 (noting that “it is not exactly clear what constitutes ‘objective 
reasonableness’ . . . [since] the definition of a reasonable officer is equivocal [and given] 
hundreds of thousands of police officers in the U.S., perceptions of ‘reasonableness’ may 
not be universally similar”). 
367 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). As Professor John Gross points out, 
“the Court did not say that police officers should be shown some amount of deference in 
their decision making when the situation they are in actually is ‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving,’ but simply because they are often placed in such situations.” Gross, supra note 
363, at 158–59 (citations omitted, emphasis added). In such circumstances, “[t]here is an 
understandable desire of jurors to give officers the benefit of the doubt, especially when making 
split-second decisions in what they perceive as life-threatening circumstances.” Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Opinion, Police Dodge Accountability for Deaths, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Dec. 7, 
2014), https://www.ocregister.com/2014/12/07/erwin-chemerinsky-police-dodge-
accountability-for-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/3D3G-FNQ9]. 
368 Justice Burger recognized the reluctance of jurors to hold police accountable forty years 
ago. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
421 (1971) (Burger, J. dissenting) (“There is some validity to the claims that juries will not 
return verdicts against individual officers except in those unusual cases where the violation 
has been flagrant or where the error has been complete.”); see also Ramirez et al., supra note 
256, at 420 (“[J]urors do not believe that police officers who have mistakenly perceived a 
deadly threat and thus mistakenly used deadly force are criminals. Jurors think of these cases 
as instances where a police officer doing a dangerous job made a mistake in the line of duty. 
They often empathize with an officer who had to make an unexpected split-second life-or-
death decision.”). 
369 German Lopez, Cops Are Almost Never Prosecuted and Convicted for Use of 
Force, VOX, (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938234/police-
shootings-killings-prosecutions-court [https://perma.cc/J52Z-DN9U]. Part of what makes 
police more believable to jurors may be that “police are also trained and skilled narrators of 
observed conflicts and also skilled witnesses and advocates.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN 
POLICE KILL 181 (2017).  
370 Gross, supra note 363, at 176. 
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 A second problem is that reasonableness, while sounding 
objective, often incorporates negative stereotypes.371 Racial bias, for 
example, can impact juror perception of whether an officer’s beliefs were 
“reasonable” in two related ways.372 First, jurors might find an officer’s beliefs 
“reasonable” because they do not notice (or do not care) that the officer’s 
beliefs were motivated by racist assumptions.373 The reasonableness 
standard often turns on whether the quick thinking of an officer was 
reasonable in light of circumstances, and such “mental shortcuts” can trigger 
racial bias by an officer.374 Second, jurors might act on their own racial biases 
in determining whether it would be reasonable to use force, particularly 
when the victim of the force is a Person of Color.375 Whether implicit or 
                                                           
371 Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth 
Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 187 (2008) (arguing that standards like 
reasonableness “have always been assigned a race (White), a gender (male), and a class 
(wealthy)”). 
372 See generally Shawn E. Fields, Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931, 980 (2019) 
(detailing the long and disturbing history of White fear of People of Color and concluding 
that “implicit bias inevitably affects factfinding analyses”). 
373 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory 
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 74 (1993) (“[M]any White Americans are quite 
insensitive to cues of prejudiced behavior in others.”). 
374 Former FBI Director James Comey explained, in rather unfiltered terms, how the process 
can work inside the minds of police officers: 
A mental shortcut becomes almost irresistible and maybe even rational 
by some lights. The two young Black men on one side of the street look 
like so many others the officer has locked up. Two White men on the 
other side of the street—even in the same clothes—do not. The officer 
does not make the same association about the two White guys, whether 
that officer is White or Black. And that drives different behavior.  
Remarks by James Comey, Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race 
[https://perma.cc/69JS-74J2]. Professors L. Song Richardson and Phillip Goff describe how 
quick thinking often triggers a “suspicion heuristic” where “perceiving race – even absent 
racial animus – can influence judgments of criminality beyond conscious awareness.” L. Song 
Richardson & Phillip A. Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 293, 307 (2012). The “Black-as-Criminal Stereotype” can influence the officer’s belief 
in the need to shoot, especially given that heuristics are often relied on to “reduce complex 
decisions to simpler assessments.” Id. at 298. Police officers, like others, can experience 
“attentional bias” when they see Black faces, and this is “driven by stereotypic associations 
that [officers] are not even aware are operating on [them]” but are based on the false 
equivalence between being African American and being a criminal. JENNIFER L. 
EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT SHAPES WHAT WE 
SEE, THINK, AND DO 60–61 (2019). 
375 See Fields, supra note 372, at 980 (reporting that “implicit bias inevitably affects factfinding 
analyses”). Racism on the part of White jurors, in particular, is nothing new. See, e.g., Natalie 
A. Spiess, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending 
War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV. 809, 825 (2018) (“A wealth of research has also found 
that juries are more likely to convict People of Color than Whites, even when the facts in 
two separate cases are identical.”); see also Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How 
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explicit, “racist beliefs continue to factor into jury deliberations.”376 As a 
result, applying a standard of reasonableness can “fail[] to effectively protect 
Persons of Color by allowing racial bias to influence an officer’s use of 
deadly force.”377 
Even after the modest reforms passed last summer, Minnesota’s 
state policing standards are still behind local law enforcement policies for 
deadly use of force by officers. For example, St. Paul requires its officers to 
first try to de-escalate conflict and limits authorized use of force to situations 
involving an “imminent” threat.378 Minneapolis requires its officers to 
consider all reasonable alternatives before using deadly force.379 Minnesota’s 
state government should be pushing departments to do more, not the other 
way around.  
b. Minnesota Law Lags Behind Current Policies of Local Police 
Departments  
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of at 
least keeping up with the policies of local law enforcement in the context of 
the use of deadly force in particular. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court 
emphasized the importance of reviewing actual police practice when 
considering what constitutes a reasonable use of deadly force.380 The Court 
overturned a longstanding common law rule that permitted any amount of 
force, including deadly force, to stop a fleeing felon, after examining “the 
sweeping change in the legal . . . context.”381 The Court found that examining 
                                                           
Much Do We Really Know About Race & Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory & 
Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1010 (2003) (“[S]ubstantial evidence exists to support 
the conclusion of many legal scholars that, at least under some conditions, White jurors 
exhibit racial bias in their verdicts and sentencing decisions.”). 
376 Kathryn E. Miller, The Attorneys Are Bound and the Witnesses Are Gagged: State Limits 
on Post-Conviction Investigation in Criminal Cases, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 135, 172 (2018). 
377 Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. 
L. REV. 951, 999–1000 (2020). As Professors Fagan and Campbell note, “Without rethinking 
the reasonableness standard, persons who are perceived to be dangerous on account of their 
race . . . will remain at risk.” Id. 
378 ST. PAUL POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 246.01 IV (de-escalation), 246.00 VII.B (2020). 
379 MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 5-301 III.B.3 (2020) (“Officers shall not 
use deadly force except in accordance with MN Statute § 609.066, and [adding] even in those 
circumstances officers shall first consider all reasonable alternatives including less lethal 
measures, before using deadly force.”). Minneapolis also requires officers to de-escalate and 
reduce the use of force “immediately as resistance decreases or control is achieved.” 
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 5-301 III.G.4 (2020).  
380 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985) (citing numerous studies of police department 
regulations). 
381 See id. at 13 (“Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance 
on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes 
of a historical inquiry.”). 
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the reasonableness of officer conduct required consideration “[i]n light of 
the rules adopted by those who must actually administer them” and noted 
that “[a]ctual departmental policies are important.”382  
The reverse is true, too. Changes in the law can impact police 
department policy. After the Garner decision, numerous departments 
improved their internal policies.383 In a survey of police departments in the 
100 most populous U.S. cities about their policy response to the Garner 
decision, over thirty percent had changed their deadly force policies as a 
result of Garner.384 The other seventy percent had already instituted policies 
at least as restrictive as what Garner required.385 Even in departments that 
were already in compliance with Garner, stronger policies were enacted 
beyond what even Garner required.386 As research has shown, “individual 
police department rules . . . generally place a more restrictive standard of 
conduct than permitted by law.”387 The impact of these adjustments to 
department policies, prompted by the change in the law from Garner, led 
to a significant reduction in police homicides.388 
4. Deadly Use of Force Restrictions Need to Include the Actions or 
Inactions of the Officers that Take Place Before the Use of 
Deadly Force, not Just Their Beliefs 
Actions (and inactions) by officers are often just as important as the 
reasonableness of their beliefs. The Supreme Court’s concern that “police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments”389 overstates how 
                                                           
382 Id. at 19. Not every department was ahead of the law, however. See Abraham N. 
Tennenbaum, The Influence of the Garner Decision on Police Use of Deadly Force, 85 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 244 (1994) (“[A]ctual police departments’ policies before 
[Garner] varied significantly not only from state to state, but also within each state.”). 
383 See id. at 260 (“[T]he Garner decision demonstrates that a decision can have a strong effect 
on police behavior.”). 
384 Samuel Walker & Lori Fridell, Forces of Change in Police Policy: The Impact of 
Tennessee v. Garner, 11 AM. J. POLICE 97, 101 (1992). State legislatures, however, were less 
enthusiastic about following Garner’s lead. See James J. Fyfe & Jeffery T. Walker, Garner 
Plus Five Years: An Examination of Supreme Court Intervention into Police Discretion and 
Legislative Prerogatives, 14 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 177 (1990) (concluding that of the twenty-
two states that Garner impacted, only four amended their statutes to comply with the ruling). 
385 Fyfe & Walker, supra note 384, at 177. 
386 Jerry R. Sparger & David J. Giacopassi, Memphis Revisited: A Reexamination of Police 
Shootings After the Garner Decision, 9 JUST. Q. 211, 218 (1992) (“Even though Memphis’ 
policy before Garner was consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision, the police restricted 
the policy even further after the decision.”). 
387 Tennenbaum, supra note 382, at 256 (quoting KENNETH J. MATULIA, A BALANCE OF 
FORCES: MODEL DEADLY FORCE POLICY AND PROCEDURE 17 (2d ed. 1985)). 
388 See id. (finding that Garner led to a reduction in the total number of police homicides by 
approximately sixty homicides a year (more than sixteen percent)). 
389 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
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common such circumstances arise. Law professor and former police officer 
Seth Stoughton points out that “the realities of police violence are such that 
the circumstances in which officers must make a truly split-second decision 
are highly unusual.”390 On the contrary, it is typically the officer who is the 
first to use force. When a police officer uses force, it is usually done 
“offensively to induce compliance, not defensively to protect their own 
safety or the safety of an innocent bystander.”391 Use of force standards, 
therefore, should require officers to avoid taking actions that place them in 
situations where they have no choice but to make split-second decisions.392 
  Professor Cynthia Lee has put together an entire model use-of-
force statute that recognizes the importance of the actions that officers take 
before using deadly force.393 Among other reforms to standards of deadly 
use of force,394 Professor Lee recommends directing juries to examine what 
“pre-seizure conduct” officers took when evaluating whether the use of 
                                                           
390 Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 869 (2014). Despite the fact that 
it describes only rare occasions, the phrase “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” has 
become, inaccurately, “the accepted depiction of the environment in which police officers 
use force.” Id. at 865. According to Professor Stoughton, since the Supreme Court first 
introduced that description in 1989, federal district and circuit courts have repeated it on 
more than 2300 occasions. Id. 
391 Megan Quattlebaum & Tom Tyler, Beyond the Law: An Agenda for Policing Reform, 100 
B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (2020); see also Stoughton, supra note 390, at 868 (“The vast 
majority of the time, then, officers use force aggressively, not defensively.”). 
392 PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 17 (recommending policies “to take steps 
that help prevent officers from being placed in situations where they have no choice but to 
make split-second decisions”). 
393 See Lee, supra note 39, at 635 (“My model statute goes beyond current law by broadening 
the time frame the law considers relevant when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s 
use of deadly force.”). Professor Lee’s model statute has already been adopted by 
Washington, D.C. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lethal Force Laws Re-Examined after Police 
Killings; Is Reasonableness Standard Too Easy?, A.B.A. (June 19, 2020, 11:23 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lethal-force-laws-re-examined-after-police-killings-
is-reasonableness-standard-too-easy [https://perma.cc/UAU8-5JVQ]. 
394 For example, tracking traditional self-defense law, Professor Lee includes the requirement 
that the suspect posed an “imminent” threat of death or bodily injury to the officers or others. 
See Lee, supra note 39, at 667 (“My model statute includes an immediacy requirement in 
police use-of-force law for the same reasons that imminence is required in self-defense law. 
If the suspect did not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or if it was 
not immediately necessary to use deadly force against the suspect at the time the officer shot 
him, then it is hard to say it was necessary at that moment to shoot him.”). Minnesota House 
Democrats had hoped the new Minnesota reforms would have changed the threshold for 
using deadly force to “imminent” from “apparent.” Jessie Van Berkel & Briana Bierschbach, 
Minnesota Lawmakers Still Hope for Police Reforms, Public Works Bill, STAR TRIB. (July 
8, 2020, 5:14 AM), https://www.startribune.com/legislature-getting-a-do-over-on-police-
reform-public-works/571662302/ [https://perma.cc/K2Y4-TQFD]; see MINN. STAT. § 
609.066, subdiv. 2(a)(1) (effective Mar. 1, 2021) (“[T]o protect the peace officer or another 
from apparent death or great bodily harm.” (emphasis added)).  
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deadly force was justified.395 Juries should also consider failure to take 
actions that could “de-escalate” the circumstances that led to the use of 
deadly force.396 By broadening the time frame to look at a police officer’s 
actions (or inaction) before the use of deadly force, Professor Lee hopes to 
“influence police behavior before the moment in time when an officer is 
fearing for his life.”397 The point is not to require any particular conduct per 
se, but to allow juries to consider what an officer did, or failed to do, that 
led to the circumstances of the deadly use of force.398 
a. Pre-seizure Conduct  
Minnesota law should be amended so that the jury can consider 
what actions the officer took before the incident that may have increased 
the likelihood of the use of deadly force. Such “pre-seizure conduct,”399 
sometimes known as “officer-created jeopardy,”400 asks to what extent did 
                                                           
395 Lee, supra note 39, at 635. 
396 Id. According to “11 of the most significant law enforcement leadership and labor 
organizations in the United States,” including the International Association of the Chiefs of 
Police, de-escalation is “[t]aking action or communicating verbally or non-verbally during a 
potential force encounter in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy 
of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to resolve the 
situation without the use of force or with a reduction in the force necessary.” National 
Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 
(Oct. 2017), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-
08/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NNH-N77P].  
397 See Lee, supra note 39, at 635. As Professor Stoughton explained: 
If an officer steps in front of a car and then shoots the driver because 
the car starts moving toward them, under this new law, the jury, the 
judge, the prosecutor will analyze the propriety, the appropriateness of 
the officer’s actions not just at the moment that the shots were fired but 
also the officer’s actions leading up to the moment that the shots were 
fired. And one of the questions there is whether the officer put 
themselves into an unnecessarily dangerous situation and then used 
force to address the danger that they should’ve avoided in the first place.  
All Things Considered, Law Professor on California’s New Police Use-of-Force Law, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 24, 2019, 5:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/24/754052321/law-
professor-on-california-s-new-police-use-of-force-law [https://perma.cc/JBR6-TYMH].  
398 See Lee, supra note 39, at 670–71 (“Whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures 
prior to using deadly force is merely one factor for the fact finder to consider when assessing 
the reasonableness of the officer’s actions . . . . If an officer does not engage in such measures, 
the officer’s actions could still be considered reasonable.”) (citing Gardner v. Buerger, 82 
F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[U]nreasonable police behavior before a shooting does not 
necessarily make the shooting unconstitutional.”)).  
399 Pre-seizure conduct refers to “conduct by the officer prior to the shooting that helped 
create the dangerous situation or increased the likelihood that deadly force would need to 
be used to protect the officer or others.” Lee, supra note 39, at 671. 
400 “[Officer]-created . . . jeopardy . . . refers to a dangerous situation into which an officer 
unnecessarily puts himself.” Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth 
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the officer create the situation that led to the use of deadly force.401 As 
experts have pointed out, “a decision made early in an encounter, or even 
before an encounter begins, when there is no time pressure, can avoid 
putting officers into a position where they have to make a time-pressured 
decision.”402 For example, the Philadelphia Police Department instructs 
officers to “ensure their actions do not precipitate the use of deadly force by 
placing themselves or others in jeopardy by taking unnecessary, overly 
aggressive, or improper actions.”403  
Many federal courts are already employing a similar test in Fourth 
Amendment civil cases. The majority of circuits that have addressed the 
issue have held that “police use of force is unreasonable if the police create 
the situation that requires the police to use force.”404 Police officers can be 
culpable for the improper use of deadly force if they “set in motion a series 
of events” that lead to the deprivation of constitutional rights.”405 Even if an 
officer reasonably believed that the officer’s life was in danger, the use of 
deadly force is unreasonable if the officer “had unreasonably created the 
encounter that led to the use of force.”406 As the Ninth Circuit warned, “it is 
                                                           
Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 259 (2017); see also Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death 
Resulted from “Officer-Created Jeopardy.” So Why Were No Officers Indicted?, SLATE 
(Dec. 28, 2015, 5:19 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/12/28/tamir_rice_s_death_didn_t_lead_to_ind
ictments_because_of_supreme_court_vagueness.html [https://perma.cc/4A8L-WRY5] 
(explaining how the officers who killed Tamir Rice put themselves in a bad position prior to 
killing him that likely led to their deadly actions). 
401 Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the Chain of Events in Excessive Force 
Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 22 (2017) (“[O]fficers should be liable for excessive force 
when their conduct causes the justification for the force.”). The conduct of a police officer 
“that precipitated the seizure matters, not just as context for understanding the seizure as an 
isolated segment, but as context for understanding the entire chain of events.” Id.; see also 
Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 288 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part) (“At some point, an officer crosses the line between 
setting up a risky situation and actually himself directly causing the ‘threat.’”). 
402 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 400, at 259. 
403 PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 10.1, USE OF FORCE - INVOLVING THE 
DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS 6 (Sept. 18, 2015). According to the policy, “It is often a tactically 
superior police procedure to withdraw, take cover or reposition, rather than the immediate 
use of force.” Id. 
404 Arthur H. Garrison, Criminal Culpability, Civil Liability, and Police Created Danger: Why 
and How the Fourth Amendment Provides Very Limited Protection from Police Use of 
Deadly Force, 28 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 241, 245 (2018) (finding that six of the eleven 
circuits that have directly addressed the issue have so held); see also Armacost, supra note 
346, at 986 n.275 (discussing circuit split). 
405 Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 1075 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 137 
S. Ct. 548 (2017) (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
406 Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that that an officer’s 
actions preceding a deadly shooting were not objectively reasonable because the officer 
“enter[ed] the dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without 
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conceivable that some police officers could commit ‘homicide by self-
defense’ by unconstitutionally and intentionally provoking an attack so that 
they could respond to it with deadly force.”407  
 The proposed changes to the deadly-use-of-force statute require 
an examination of the true “totality of circumstances,” which, in some use-
of-force jurisprudence, has included pre-seizure conduct.408 But Minnesota’s 
new statute is clear that the totality to be considered is merely “based on the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the 
benefit of hindsight.”409 This is consistent with how the Eighth Circuit 
excludes pre-seizure police conduct to be used in the determination of 
reasonableness: “[W]e scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events 
leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”410   
b. De-escalation  
Of course, police may fail to act when doing so might eliminate the 
need for deadly force. Just as they should examine what conduct officers 
take in creating a dangerous situation, juries should similarly be able to 
consider whether the officer failed to engage in de-escalation measures, 
                                                           
shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat”); see also Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 
F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that reasonableness of officers’ actions depends in 
part on whether their own reckless or deliberate conduct during a seizure unreasonably 
created the need to use deadly force); Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that “[w]here a police officer unreasonably places himself in harm’s way, his use of 
deadly force may be deemed excessive.”); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that a police officer cannot get in front of a suspect’s car and then rely 
upon the danger of the oncoming car to justify the use of deadly force); Young v. City of 
Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (ruling that the court should 
examine the actions of the government officials leading up to the seizure, and therefore 
“police officers’ actions for our purposes need not be examined solely at the moment of the 
shooting”). But see Sok Kong Tr. for Map Kong v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 993–94 
(8th Cir. 2020) (reaffirming that in the 8th Circuit, the reasonableness of force depends on 
the threat the person poses during the shooting, even if officers created the need for deadly 
force through their own actions). 
407 Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, Cal. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). 
408 See, e.g., Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Obviously, 
events immediately connected with the actual seizure are taken into account in determining 
whether the seizure is reasonable.”). 
409 MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 2 (2020) (effective Mar. 1, 2021). 
410 Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the police chase of a 
fleeing tractor trailer was not relevant to the subsequent shooting of the driver). The court 
explained that “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable 
or ill-advised conduct in general.” Id. But see Gardner v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir. 
1996) (finding that “unreasonable police behavior before a shooting does not necessarily 
make the shooting unconstitutional.”). That court, however, also wisely noted, “[b]ut this 
does not mean we should refuse to let juries draw reasonable inferences from evidence about 
events surrounding and leading up to the seizure.” Id. 
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including communication, using distance, cover, and time, and using less 
lethal types of force, if feasible, prior to using deadly force.411 Making de-
escalation a consideration for the jury would obviously “give[] officers an 
incentive to engage in de-escalation measures and consider less deadly 
alternatives before using deadly force” and could change police culture.412 
Experts in the field single out de-escalation tactics as a significant 
opportunity to reduce police killings.413 Indeed, many police departments 
already require officers to use de-escalation tactics or use deadly force only 
as a last resort, including the St. Paul Police and other major metropolitan 
area departments.414  
Aside from the logical justifications, there are at least some signs of 
demonstrated results. As Professor Lee reports, several cities “have seen a 
marked reduction in the number of fatal police shootings after 
implementing de-escalation measures.”415 For example, Dallas saw a forty 
                                                           
411 PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 9. PERF’s fourth guiding principle on use 
of force is adopting de-escalation as a formal agency policy. Id. at 40 (“Agencies should adopt 
General Orders and/or policy statements making it clear that de-escalation is the preferred, 
tactically sound approach in many critical incidents.”); see also PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK 
FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 27, at 2 (“[L]aw enforcement agencies 
should have clear and comprehensive policies on the use of force (including training on the 
importance of de-escalation).”); INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 396, at 9 
(“[T]he goal of de-escalation is to slow down the situation so that the subject can be guided 
toward a course of action that will not necessitate the use of force, reduce the level of force 
necessary, allow time for additional personnel or resources to arrive, or all three.”); STATE 
OF MINN. WORKING GROUP, supra note 87, at 11 (“Require officers to de-escalate when 
such effort does not compromise officer safety.”). The Department of Justice under 
President Clinton recognized the value of de-escalation decades ago. See Principles for 
Promoting Police Integrity, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL3Y-VD86] (“[O]fficers 
should assess the incident to determine which nondeadly technique or weapon will best de-
escalate the incident and bring it under control in a safe manner.”). 
412 Lee, supra note 39, at 670.  
413 PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 7 (reporting that leading police executives 
believe that there is a “significant potential for de-escalation and resolving encounters by 
means other than the use of deadly force” in as many as one-third of the annual total of fatal 
officer-involved shootings). 
414 See supra notes 378–79 and accompanying text (reference to St. Paul and Minneapolis 
policies); see also SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL http://www.seattle.gov/police-
manual/title-8---use-of-force/8000---use-of-force-core-principles [https://perma.cc/SM83-
93JJ] (“When safe, under the totality of the circumstances, and time and circumstances 
permit, officers shall use de-escalation tactics in order to reduce the need for force.”); 
DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER § 906.01(C), USE OF DEADLY FORCE (2009) 
(“Deadly force will be used with great restraint and as a last resort only when the level of 
resistance warrants the use of deadly force.”) (emphasis added); see also PERF GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 5 (“de-escalation [strategies] are already in place in many police 
agencies, and have been for years.”). 
415 See Lee, supra note 39, at 669 (citing Dallas and Las Vegas, in particular). Cleveland is 
another possible example. Its chief recently credited de-escalation training, among other 
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percent drop in shootings by police and a sixty-four percent drop in 
excessive force complaints against the department.416 Las Vegas transformed 
itself from a department with some of the highest rates of police killings to 
a “model of police reform.”417 Importantly, de-escalation tactics can also 
protect officers’ lives too.418 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The police play a critical role in our society. For most citizens, the 
police are by far the most visible members of our justice system, and “the 
entire society suffers if their behavior violates the rule of law.”419 Importantly, 
                                                           
reforms, for a dramatic drop in police killings. See Heather Gillers, For Many Police 
Departments, De-escalation Training Is a Response, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2020, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-many-police-departments-de-escalation-training-is-a-
response-11598470239 [https://perma.cc/4VGV-Z2RS ] (quoting Chief Williams that the 
department has seen a “dramatic decrease in deadly force and then use of force in general 
by our officers” between 2015 and 2019 compared with the previous four years); see also 
Armacost, supra note 346, at 961 (“Police departments that have instituted de-escalation 
training have reported drops in use-of-force incidents.”). 
416 Dallas News Staff, Dallas Police Excessive-Force Complaints Drop Dramatically, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS (Nov. 16, 2015, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2015/11/17/dallas-police-excessive-force-
complaints-drop-dramatically/ [https://perma.cc/T74J-Z8U7]. And “[i]t’s not just Dallas, 
the Morning News reported; excessive force complaints have also fallen in Seattle, 
Baltimore, and New York, among other major American cities.” Drake Baer, The Dallas 
Police Force Is Evidence That ‘De-Escalation’ Policing Works, THE CUT (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.thecut.com/2016/07/deescalation-policing-works.html [https://perma.cc/8QSE-
YDXA]. 
417 Daniel Hernandez, How One of the Deadliest Police Forces in America Stopped Shooting 
People, QUARTZ (Dec. 4, 2015), https://qz.com/565011/how-one-of-the-largest-police-
forces-in-america-stopped-shooting-people/ [https://perma.cc/RU82-N4MH].  
418 PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 14 (“Rather than unnecessarily pushing 
officers into harm’s way in some circumstances, there may be opportunities to slow those 
situations down, bring more resources to the scene, and utilize sound decision-making that 
is designed to keep officers safe, while also protecting the public. Through de-escalation, 
effective tactics, and appropriate equipment, officers can prevent situations from ever 
reaching the point where anyone’s life is in danger and where officers have little choice but 
to use deadly force.”). 
419 Morgan Cloud, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal 
Justice System: Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1354 
(1996). President Obama has written about the special role that police have in our society: 
Police officers are the heroic backbone of our communities. They hold 
significant civic and law enforcement responsibilities and put their lives 
at risk to protect us each day, at times facing some of the most adverse 
circumstances imaginable. As I have emphasized time and again, the 
overwhelming majority of police officers are fair, dedicated, and honest 
public servants who strive daily to cultivate and sustain positive 
relationships with the communities they serve and protect. 
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the police have, at times, been at the leading edge of reform. In the wake of 
Mr. Floyd’s killing, fourteen Minneapolis police officers sent a letter to 
“Everyone” condemning the unlawful acts of their colleagues and offering 
support for change: “We stand ready to listen and embrace the calls for 
change, reform, and rebuilding.”420 Many more officers were willing to sign 
the letter, but the group selected those fourteen officers to highlight the 
broad diversity of voices on the letter.421 In addition, police chiefs have 
frequently pushed their departments to go beyond what is required by the 
law.422 These efforts are commendable, but the legal system can do far better. 
Despite many promising signs of reform, systems for holding police 
officers accountable are still broken. The courts are unable to provide the 
degree of necessary oversight, and the Supreme Court and inadequate state 
laws are largely at fault. The Supreme Court has greatly undermined § 1983 
by continually expanding the nullifying effect of qualified immunity. Current 
state employment and labor laws make taxpayers, not officers, pay for 
judgments and settlements for police misconduct and make it too difficult 
for police chiefs to fire officers unfit for duty. Inadequate state criminal law 
has contributed to very few officers being charged and even fewer officers 
being convicted of even the most obvious criminal acts. The recent attempts 
at reform last summer by the Minnesota Legislature fell short of addressing 
these deficiencies. 
But the Legislature has many options to fix this. A state-based § 
1983 law, carefully crafted to exclude qualified immunity and to include 
attorney’s fees and vicarious liability, could restore the promise of the 
original § 1983, this time under state law. Requiring officers to carry 
individual liability insurance, just like lawyers and doctors, could leverage 
market-based forces to weed out problem officers and create better 
incentives for safer policing. Finally, expanding the deadly-use-of-force 
statute to include what officers did (or did not do) before the moment they 
                                                           
Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 811, 840 (2017). 
420 Melissa Alonso & Josh Campbell, Minneapolis Police Officers Pen Open Letter 
Condemning Former Officer Derek Chauvin, CNN (June 13, 2020, 12:09 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/12/us/minneapolis-police-letter-chauvin-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/XA97-L3C5]. 
421 According to their spokesperson, “There were many more willing to sign, but the group 
opted to showcase people from across the [department] as well as male/female, Black/White, 
straight/gay, leader/frontline, etc. Internally, this is sending a message.” Id. 
422 Mara H. Gottfried, St. Paul Police Reforms Were Underway for Years When George 
Floyd Died in Minneapolis, PIONEER PRESS (June 25, 2020, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.twincities.com/2020/06/25/police-chief-to-city-council-reforms-in-st-paul-
underway-for-years-when-george-floyd-died-in-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/PS5C-HZH2] 
(highlighting the reforms made in the St. Paul Police Department under Chief Todd Axtell); 
see generally Adam Minter, Opinion, In the City of St. Paul, Police Reform Is Working, 
STAR TRIB. (June 26, 2020, 11:41 AM), https://www.startribune.com/in-the-city-of-st-paul-
police-reform-is-working/571505322/ [https://perma.cc/5ALC-Z6WL]. 
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used deadly force, such as de-escalation and other pre-seizure conduct, will 
hold more officers to account for deadly acts and put pressure on 
departments to train and require officers to avoid situations where deadly 
force is used.  
 These changes will not, of course, address the entire problem of 
racism and police abuse, but increasing these measures for officer 
accountability will make the court system a more useful tool for police 
reform. The Minnesota legislature has stepped up in the past to provide a 
model for the nation for addressing the scourge of lynching. But that was 
100 years ago. It is time for Minnesota to act again. 
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